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Operational Epidemiological Modeling: 
A Proposed National Process 
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Theresa Lynn Difato, and Jody Wireman
ABSTRACT
To support the successful integration of 
civilian and military domestic disaster 
medical response,  the Yale New  Haven 
Center for Emergency Preparedness and 
Disaster Response (YNH-CEPDR) and US 
Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) have 
established the National Center for 
Integrated Civilian-Military Domestic 
Disaster Medical Response (ICMDDMR). As 
part of the ICMDDMR, YNH-CEPDR has 
conducted research to determine the 
requirements of a national operational 
epidemiological modeling process to 
integrate modelers  with operational decision 
makers  during an infectious  disease  event of 
national significance. This  article presents  a 
proposed process  that is  based on research 
and consultation with a workgroup of 
i n t e r a g e n c y a n d o r g a n i z a t i o n a l 
stakeholders.
INTRODUCTION
The National  Health  Security  Strategy 
(NHSS) recognizes that  in  order to protect 
the nation  from  public health  threats, it  is 
critical for  responders, the private  sector  and 
federal,  state, and local  government  to work 
together. 1 
During a  public health  emergency, 
decision  makers often  require prospective 
epidemiological  information  that  can  be 
provided by  epidemiological  models.2 
Without a  coordinated process linking 
decision  makers with  modelers, leaders may 
become overwhelmed with  the amount  and 
complexity  of information received,  or  the 
proper  information  may  not  be provided in  a 
timely  manner. Additionally, it  is difficult  for 
the non-specialist  to rapidly  confirm  the 
va l id i ty  o f each model , potent ia l ly 
undermining  confidence in  the information 
from the models to make critical decisions. 
There is currently  no formalized process 
among US government agencies and 
d e p a r t m e n t s t o s u p p o r t e f f e c t i v e 
coordination  between modelers and decision 
makers.  Moreover, there is no way  for 
decision makers to request  operational 
epidemiological  models unless their 
respective organization has pre-existing 
capabilities and/or relationships to solicit 
operational  epidemiological models. 3  And 
yet,  the nature of a  complex biological  event 
requires decision makers to have access to 
the kind of information  that  can  be provided 
by  such  models.  Articulating  this point,  the 
Institute of Medicine (IOM) identifies the 
need to “improve information  management, 
i n c l u d i n g  s c e n a r i o m o d e l i n g  a n d 
forecasting.” 4 An  integrated national process 
for  operational  epidemiological modeling 
would support improved information 
management in a health emergency.
DETERMINING THE 




This study  sought to understand the nature 
and scope of existing  relationships between 
modelers and decision  makers prior to 
determining the requirements of a  national 
operational epidemiological  modeling 
process (NOEMP). The research  team 
conducted a literature review, which  included 
reviewing  government  publications and 
reports, peer-reviewed articles, and agency/
organizations’ policies and mandates. The 
literature review  focused on  describing the 
scope of the policy  landscape for the use of 
o p e r a t i o n a l  m o d e l s ,  r o l e s ,  a n d 
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responsibilities in  an infectious disease 
disaster  response. Associated mission 
statements,  organizational structures,  and 
operational  capabilities of various agencies 
were also captured. 
Concurrently,  stakeholders were engaged 
through an  interagency  workgroup that 
included members of the epidemiological 
modeling  community  as well as the health 
and medical consequence management 
communities. (Workgroup members served 
as subject matter  experts,  but  their 
participation  should not necessarily  be 
considered an  endorsement or  acceptance of 
findings.) Workgroup members were 
recruited through  existing relationships and 
included subject  matter  experts employed by 
federal  agencies (including the Departments 
of Agriculture, Defense, Health  and Human 
Services,  and Homeland Security), state and 
local public  health  agencies,  national 
laboratories, academia, and private sector 
“think-tank”  organizations.  The workgroup 
identified information  sources for  agency/
organizational  research  and reference, and 
provided reviews of preliminary  documents 
from this study. 
The research  indicated that a  national 
operational epidemiological  modeling 
process should be structured around three 
distinct priorities:
1. Develop an interagency  process that 
establishes and cultivates relationships 
b e t w e e n m o d e l  d e v e l o p e r s a n d 
operational  coordination structures for 
incorporation of models into response 
planning, execution, and evaluation;
2. Increase availability  of models and model 
outputs that support  operational decision 
making;
3. E n h a n c e a b i l i t y  o f o p e r a t i o n a l 
coordinators to integrate  models into 
their  information  analysis processes for 
decision support.
Once the study  team  completed the 
literature review,  the stakeholder  workgroup 
convened in  Arlington, VA, on  August 11, 
2011, to determine the requirements of a 
national operational epidemiological 
modeling  process. This meeting  identified the 
following components of a  successful 
National Operational Epidemiological 
Modeling Process (NOEMP):
1. Functions via  diverse interagency 
w o r k g r o u p r a t h e r  t h a n  s i n g l e 
organization;
2. Operates with  administrative and fiscal 
management provided by a lead agency;
3. Develops and aligns modeling  guidance 
and standards with  available funding 
streams;
4. Directs funds to models designed to 
support decision making ;
5. Channels funds to local  and state public 
health  departments and other similar 
users to mitigate shortfalls;
6. Leverages existing federal  modeling 
infrastructures; 
7. Accommodates the diverse missions of 
stakeholders;
8. Enhances the use of models during  an 
operational  response,  including  sharing 
models and model outputs within  and 
between agencies/organizations.
Several events were held with  stakeholders 
to gain direction and input as the NOEMP 
was being  refined. Near  the end of this phase 
of the research, the study  team  presented and 
discussed the draf t NOEMP to the 
stakeholder  workgroup on  November  10, 
2011,  via  a  web-based tool (WebEx™ 
Training Session  5.5).  The stakeholders 
provided substantive feedback leading  to 
additional revisions.  The study  team 
presented the revised process in  a scenario-
based, exercise environment to a small group 
during  the Public Health  Preparedness 
Summit in  Anaheim,  CA, on  February  21, 
2012  in a blended web-based and in-person 
format (also utilizing  WebEx™ Training 
Session  5.5).  Exercise players included 
workgroup members as well as external 
public health  stakeholders with  no previous 
knowledge of the NOEMP.  The NOEMP was 
revised further and is presented below.
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The NOEMP is defined as a  national 
“process”  that aggregates efforts of people, 
tasks,  and organizations operating  for the 
common purpose of effectively  integrating 
models with  prospective infectious disease 
response decision-making. The purpose of 
the NOEMP is to establish  and maintain  a 
national capability  to produce infectious 
disease modeling  outputs that are supportive 
of a  broad range of information requirements 
among  agency/organizational consequence 
management  Operational  Coordinators (OC). 
OC are defined in this study  as the staff 
responsible for  coordinating  the flow  of 
information  to and from  policy  decision 
makers and tactical  capabilities within  an 
agency  or  organization. They  are also 
responsible  for  identifying  external sources of 
information  and providing sufficient  analysis 
of the information  to allow  decision  makers 
at  policy  and agency/organizational  tactical 
levels to make well-informed decisions. The 
NOEMP will allow  the OC to integrate this 
prospective information  into their  decision 
support  process and give them  the ability  to 
include not  only  the information  provided by 
the NOEMP but also other  models developed 
and executed outside of the NOEMP.
The process recognizes the following  types 
of models as providing  information  that  is 
relevant  across a  broad spectrum  of decision 
types and decision makers:
• Impact  Models: Forecast the impact of 
an  infectious disease on such  activities as 
the ability  to continue essential services, 
maintain  Critical Infrastructure and Key 
Resources (CI/KR), and the economy.
• Intervention  Models: Predict  the 
impact  of intervention strategies on  a 
disease’s direction,  intensity,  and impact 
on  a population.  These models provide 
insight  into potential countermeasure 
policy  and operational questions (e.g., 
awareness,  preparation, prevention, 
response, and recovery  mitigation 
strategies).
• Spread Pattern  Models: Forecast the 
spread patterns of disease, utilizing 
relevant  demographic, social,  and 
geographic information  of the population, 
in a given time frame.  
• Intensity  Models: Forecast the severity 
of the disease burden  in  terms of 
morbidity  and mortality  within  a  given 
time frame.
To better  establish  regular  and sustainable 
progress in  disseminating  model information 
products,  a  phased approach  to incorporating 
the process should be considered. The first 
phase should be limited to models that 
forecast  the impacts of infectious disease 
outbreaks and of intervention  strategies at  a 
national level and, where data  is made 
available, at state and local levels. The second 
phase should expand to include spread and 
intensity  models. The models should not be 
exclusive to human  models, but should also 
include models on  diseases in  animal 
populations and vegetation  that potentially 
impact  human  health  (consistent with  the 
One Health  concept). 5  The process should 
aggregate  and disseminate model  outputs to 
a  broad spectrum  of operational  coordination 
structures within response agencies. The 
process should include a catalogue of relevant 
models in  order to maintain  awareness of 
national capabilit ies for  operational 
epidemiological modeling, as well as to 
faci l itate  potential  modeler  and OC 
relationships. 
Outlined below  is a  proposed inter-
agency/organizational structure with  tangible 
capabi l i t ies that  can be e f fec t ive ly 
coordinated and implemented during an 
emergency for the benefit of all stakeholders. 
GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE
This study  recommends that  the NOEMP be 
governed by  the Interagency  Operational 
Modeling  Advisory  Group (IOMAG).  The 
IOMAG should be led by  and include 
representatives from  the federal  interagency, 
and have representation  from  state,  local, 
county,  and tribal  governments,  and private 
and academic  sectors (see Figure 1). This 
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advisory  body  should be integrated into an 
existing  strategic,  federal interagency 
biosurveillance governance structure under 
the rules and regulations established by  the 
Federal  Advisory  Committee Act  (FACA).  The 
role of this advisory  committee should be to 
provide guidance and recommendations to its 
affiliated inter-agency  governance structure 
on strategic topics to:
• Provide strategic direction  of the national 
operational  epidemiological modeling 
capability;
• Review  and approve guidance for 
operational  model development  for 
inclusion in the NOEMP;
• Review and approve NOEMP policy;
• Determine measures of effectiveness and 
regularity  of reporting (e.g.,  steady  state 
and response);
• Facilitate interagency coordination;
• Advise  on  operational epidemiological 
model funding  priorities, and research 
and development strategies;
• Ensure existing  epidemiological modeling 
c a p a b i l i t i e s a r e l e v e r a g e d a n d 
redundancies are avoided;
• Coordinate and advise on  operational 
priorities for  epidemiological  modeling 
during an event of national significance.
Figure 1 – NOEMP Proposed Structure
Existing Interagency Coordination Group
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The administration and management  of the 
NOEMP should be integrated into an  existing 
management  structure that can coordinate 
the human  resource and financial  needs of 
this process.  Additionally,  this management 
structure should be able to provide 
overarching quality  assurance and quality 
control  processes and will  have pre-existing 
relationships and complimentary  information 
products for  supporting a common  operating 
p i c t u r e a m o n g  t h e b i o s u r v e i l l a n c e 
community.  The creation  of a  program 
manager  position  for  Model Integration  and 
Dissemination  may  be required to ensure the 
functioning  of a Model Integration  and 
Dissemination  Unit  (see below)  into the 
existing management structure.
OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES
Operational activities should be carried out 
by  a  newly  created Model  Integration and 
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Dissemination  Unit  (MIDU) with  the existing 
management  structure under  the leadership 
of the Model  Integration  and Dissemination 
Program  Manager.  The MIDU should include 
analytical  staff that  is responsible for all 
operational  activities of coordinating  among 
stakeholders,  integrating  model outputs into 
the NOEMP, analyzing model parameters 
and outputs,  and developing/disseminating 
information  products to stakeholder  OC. The 
positions and general  responsibilities are 
outlined in Table 1.
Table 1 – MIDU Position Expertise and Duties
Health and Medical Operations 
Analyst Information Product Analyst Epi Modeling Technical Analyst
Expertise includes: Expertise includes: Expertise includes:
• Coordination of health and 
medical response 
operations
• Identification of information 
requirements and 
information sources for 
operational decision making
• Integration of model 
information with health and 
medical response operation
• Health and medical 
operational decision making 
processes
• Visual analytics
• Technical/graphical systems 
for communicating 
information
• Communications policy and 
guidance development
• Mathematical model 
development
• Epidemiology or infectious 
diseases data standards
• Data management and 
aggregation
• Technical policy and 
guideline development
• Oversight of model 
validation, verification and 
evaluation 
Duties include: Duties include: Duties include:
• Support model output 
analysis and summarization 
• Draft content for information 
products
• Maintain relationships with 
Operational Coordinators
• Draft policy/guidance to 
prioritize research and 
develop initiatives based on 
information requirements of 
Operational Coordinators
• Coordinate with Operational 
Coordinators to determine 
information requirements 
from model outputs
• Develop templates for 
dissemination of model 
outputs
• Develop/maintain list of 
Operational Coordinators to 
receive information products
• Disseminate model outputs 
as needed
• Draft model validation and 
verification requirements for 
IOMAG review/approval
• Develop model output 
technical requirements (in 
collaboration with all MIDU 
analysts)
• Run existing models, or 
solicit model outputs from 
external model developers 
as needed
• Determine/review model 
parameters based on 
surveillance information
• Coordinate the integration of 
models into the NOEMP
• Provide technical assistance 
to external partners 
developing models for the 
NOEMP
• Determine data input 
standards for the receipt 
and integration of data into 
NOEMP models
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The MIDU will  also require the capability 
to provide operational  epidemiological  model 
outputs for  information  products. Some 
models will need to be procured or  may  be 
submitted from  external  partners and may  be 
run  by  the MIDU modeling  technical  analyst
(s). The MIDU analyst(s) must have an 
understanding  of how  the models operate 
and their  associated limitations,  so the 
models can  be utilized to provide information 
during response operations. The models’ 
outputs should be in a format  that  allows for 
analysis by  the MIDU health  and medical 
operations analyst(s) and information 
product analyst(s).  External  partners may  be 
leveraged for  the model development, data 
input, and model running  processes as well; 
however, these external partners must  be 
able to provide appropriate model outputs as 
requested by  the NOEMP. In  order  for 
information  products to be provided to the 
OC, the model  outputs must  be analyzed by 
the MIDU’s health  and medical operations 
analyst and information  product analyst. 
After  analyzing  outputs the analysts will 
create information  products for  use by  the 
OC.
 The activities performed would be 
dist inguished between  two types of 
operations: steady-state  operations and 
response operations (see Figure 2). The 
steady-state operational period is considered 
to be the time period when  the MIDU is not 
activated by  a  federal agency.  The response 
operational  period is the time period when 
the MIDU has been  activated by  a  federal 
a g e n c y  t o p r o v i d e e p i d e m i o l o g i c a l 
information.    
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NOEMP Scope
Referral Process
for Requirements Outside of 
NOEMP Scope
Steady-State Operations
During  steady-state operations the NOEMP 
should work  with  stakeholders to determine 
how  information results will  be produced and 
presented to the requester  once the 
information  provided by  the model has been 
analyzed.  By  engaging stakeholders early  in 
the process, the NOEMP can  then leverage 
these established relationships to conduct 
exercises and provide modeling support 
during  small-scale incidents in  order  to refine 
the process that will be used during  response 
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operat ions of nat ional s ignif icance. 
Stakeholders will then  be able  to provide 
guidance and insight  into the validation and 
verification  processes they  currently  use and 
assist  in  determining the minimum 
acceptable  validation and verification 
standards for the NOEMP.  
The NOEMP should also have the ability 
to operate as a  referral service  for those 
agencies having  specific  model requests that 
could not  be fulfilled by  the organization. 
This ability  will be gained through  the 
relationships established with  model 
development organizations. During  the 
steady  state period the organization may 
provide support  to communities to provide 
targeted infectious disease outbreak support. 
Dur ing the in i t ia l phases o f the 
implementation  of the NOEMP, research 
priorities will need to be established based on 
identified epidemiological  modeling  gaps and 
the MIDU should work to close those gaps by 
developing  in-house models.  As stated 
earlier,  standards will be identified for  the 
type and amount of data  gathered for  the 
model process, model run-time, and the 
levels of analysis to be conducted on  the 
model outputs. Decision  makers and OC will 
have such  a  variety  of information  that  it  may 
not be possible for the NOEMP to close all 
identified gaps, therefore, some models may 
be submitted for  use to the MIDU but  will 
n e e d t o b e e x e c u t e d b y  e x t e r n a l 
organizations.  Policies and procedures will 
need to be created for  the submission  of 
models by  external agencies. Examples of 
these policies and procedures may  be the 
amount  of time it  takes for  a  model to create 
outputs, on-going  model maintenance,  and 
type of information  being  analyzed.  As 
discussed above,  validation  and verification 
standards will  also need to be developed/
adopted for  both  model outputs from  internal 
and external  models.  The stakeholders will 
need to be involved in  this process in  order  to 
ensure that  information  products are 
accepted by their agencies.
Response Operations
The MIDU will  need to establish  response 
triggers, which  will pre-determine how 
involved the MIDU will become with  an 
infectious disease outbreak. The established 
triggers may  be based on  population size, 
proximity  to borders, or  the MIDU may 
provide information based on  direct  orders 
from  federal officials.  These triggers for 
transition to response operations should be 
distinct  from  decision  making  for  outbreak 
support  and exercise participation during 
steady-state operations.  (It  is also understood 
that  other  variables beyond triggers will  also 
influence level of effort by MIDU).
When  the NOEMP is “triggered”  or 
otherwise called upon during  a  response, 
MIDU staff members should be redirected 
from  steady-state operations to focus on 
processing  all  collected information  and 
c r e a t i n g  i n f o r m a t i o n  p r o d u c t s f o r 
dissemination.  The information  should be 
gathered by  running models within  the 
organizations or  by  reaching  out to modeling 
organizations and requesting  specific model 
outputs. This data  will  be integrated into 
information  products that will be provided to 
e x t e r n a l  O C . I n f o r m a t i o n  p r o d u c t 
d e v e l o p m e n t w i l l  b e b a s e d o n  t h e 
collaboration  with OC during  the steady-state 
operational period.  The NOEMP should 
maintain  its role as a  referral agency  if 
information  requests were made that could 
not be fulfilled with  cataloged models or  if 
the organization was unable to develop the 
appropriate model  within the operational 
time period. The stakeholder  relationships 
establ ished during  the s teady-state 
operational  period will be critical during  the 
response period.  Those that  have interacted 
with  the organization prior  to a  response 
situation  will  be educated on  the processes 
and will  be familiar  with  the information 
products produced by the MIDU. 
The timeframe for  making decisions is 
variable,  so is the time required for running 
models. It  is recommended that  the NOEMP 
provide information  products on  a  daily 
schedule initially.  This will  narrow  the scope 
of models that can  be run  to those that  can 
produce usable outputs in  less than twenty-
four  hours,  and will  target decisions that  can 
be informed by  daily  updates of information. 
As the NOEMP is developed further  and the 
understanding  of health  and medical decision 
making and the field of operational 
epidemiological modeling  matures, the 
frequency  and types of reporting may  be 
expanded with  a long  term  goal  of being  able 
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to accommodate four  to six  hour  decision 
cycles for events of national significance. 
Data Collection/Management
The output  of the models for  information 
dissemination will only  be as good as the 
surveillance data  that  is provided to run  the 
models. Additionally,  the timely  collection  of 
data  will  be required in  order to rapidly 
receive and aggregate model  outputs. In 
order  to accomplish  this it  will be necessary 
for  the NOEMP to be co-located with  a 
national biosurveillance center  or  to have a 
close relationship with  those who have pre-
existing  relationships with  sources of 
biosurveillance data. 
Additionally,  the NOEMP may  need to be 
able to work with de-personalized data  from 
state and local sources and to ensure the 
privacy  and integration  of the data  from 
those OC who are providing  it. This may 
require the use of partially  aggregated data 
from  the local and state surveillance systems. 
Automation  of data sharing should also be 
recognized as an  important factor  in 
receiving  data  from  surveillance systems that 
may  not  have staffing to devote to providing 
data during response activities.
In  order  to collect data, the OC providing 
it  should also have the opportunity  to realize 
jurisdictional  value for  their  efforts. 
Therefore,  it  is proposed that they  provide 
epidemiological  information to the MIDU 
through  an  established process on a  set 
schedule during  the steady-state operational 
period. By  providing  information  to the 
MIDU, during  a  response OC may  receive 
data  run  specifically  for  their  information as 
well  as the aggregate national  data.  The 
agencies participating  during  steady-state 
operations may  also be given  a  priority  status 
for  information dissemination during  a 
response operation. 




The NOEMP,  as proposed, is intended as the 
beginning  of a  process that will  grow  and 
mature over time.  Specific  decision-making 
questions of a  jurisdiction  and/or  agency  may 
not necessarily  be accommodated through  a 
broad reaching  national process nor  will  a 
national process be able to accommodate 
every  response at  the  federal, state and local 
level. Model information  will be variable 
based on  the models that are run  and the 
data  that  is available.  This variability  should 
be embraced as a  reality  of forecasting  the 
spread of disease within  a  social environment 
and be integrated into model output 
information products.  Additionally,  the 
science of health  and medical operational 
decision-making is an  emerging area  of 
research  and will  need to continue to grow  to 
p r o v i d e t h e N O E M P w i t h  c r i t i c a l 
understanding of the desired impact  of 
information  products and model outputs. 
Epidemiological  modeling is a  well-
established scientific  practice; however, the 
application  to operational decision making is 
not  as widespread and will require a 
coordinated effort  among the scientific  and 
academic  communities to ensure a  supply  of 
appropriate models for  the NOEMP. As the 
fields of health  and medical operational 
modeling  and decision making  grow, the 
NOEMP will grow  in tandem, providing  a 
critical linkage between  scientific  analysis 
and operational decision  making.  Finally, 
there are limited opportunities to test 
models, particularly  for  rare catastrophic 
events and incidents of bioterrorism.  The 
parameter  sets for  infectious disease models 
will be inherently  limited, as they  will be 
based on historic data  and subject matter 
expert  conjecture. While efforts can  be made 
to keep parameter  information  near  real-time 
through  advanced surveillance data,  this will 
always be an  assumption  imbedded into 
models.
CONCLUSIONS
A  NOEMP should be structured in  a  way  that 
e ng ag e s t h e int e rag e nc y  and o t h e r 
stakeholders in  a manner that  is conducive to 
collaboration  among varying sets of 
capabilities and information  requirements. 
The core function  of the NOEMP should be to 
ensure that OC are able to obtain  information 
products with modeling information  within  a 
timeframe that  can  support  operational 
decision  making.  Additionally, the NOEMP 
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should also have awareness of the modeling 
community  and consequence community  in 
order  to foster relationships and refer 
potential partners to one another  for  long-
term  collaboration.  The creation  of the MIDU 
will provide an  operational vehicle  that  can 
support  these functions as a  dedicated 
resource.
The implementation  and operation  of the 
NOEMP should seek  to leverage existing 
funding and operational structures to ensure 
the prudent  use of fiscal resources as well as 
to integrate effectively  within  the interagency 
and other  stakeholders. The implementation 
process should be tiered over  several years 
and have clear capabilities that provide early 
and sustainable value to response operations. 
The successful establishment  of the 
NOEMP will require ongoing  collaboration 
and participation  of stakeholder  agencies and 
organizations.
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Evacuation and Sheltering of People with Medical Dependencies 
– Knowledge Gaps and Barriers to National Preparedness
Petter Risoe, Jeffrey Schlegelmilch, and James Paturas
ABSTRACT
Emergency plans are mandated by a 
number of federal regulations, often with 
conflicting definitions, to  incorporate people 
with  medical dependencies.  However 
targeted planning for this segment is 
present ly hampered by substant ial 
knowledge deficits  defining this population 
and the potential resource requirements in a 
d i s a s t e r .  T h e s e  g a p s  p r e v e n t t h e 
development of evidence-based best 
practices  for locating, communicating with, 
transporting,  sheltering, and ensuring the 
safe recovery of those with medical 
dependencies. The authors  discuss  the 
knowledge gaps in preparing for this 
population and propose solutions  to fill these 
gaps in order to  facilitate enhanced 
preparedness  for people  with medical 
dependencies.    
INTRODUCTION
Federal  regulations such  as the Americans 
w i t h  D i s a b i l i t i e s A c t o f 1 9 7 0 ,  t h e 
Rehabilitation  Act of 1973, and Post-Katrina 
Emergency  Management  Reform  Act  of 2006 
stipulate the general  principle that  children 
and adults with  disabilities and functional 
needs must be able  to access the same 
programs and services as everyone else. This 
essentially  mandates that  emergency  plans 
must  develop and incorporate strategies for 
locating,  communicating  with, transporting, 
and sheltering  those with  needs beyond the 
general population when disaster strikes. 
Incorporating  this and other  “whole of 
community”  concepts is a  fundamental 
aspect  of the emergency  manager’s role in the 
community. 1  However  the broad,  evolving, 
and often  conflicting  guidance on  the extent 
to which  the community  can be understood 
based on  functional limitations can  cause 
confusion  and slow  down  planning efforts as 
the legal requirements and implications are 
understood.  This is especially  problematic for 
responding to members of the community 
who are normally  self-sufficient,  but  have 
medical conditions stressed into greater 
severity  due to the impact  from  a  disaster. 
This heterogeneous group raises special 
preparedness challenges,  as its members’ 
wellbeing  demand specialized equipment or 
medical supplies not only  to prevent 
deterioration of their  health,  but  in  many 
cases also to sustain  life. Evidence suggests 
that  many  of those who may  have the greatest 
need for  such support  pay  insufficient 
attention  to personal preparedness.2  The 
scarcity  of knowledge with  regards to the 
composition  and size  of this group prevents 
proper  preparation  and could lead to 
inefficiencies in  disaster  response; limited 
acute-care transport assets being  tied up for 
non-essential transport when  what  was really 
needed was just  a wheelchair,  or  evacuees 
who are  used to functioning  independently  in 
daily  life being  directed to hospital 
emergency  departments because of shelters 
lacking the necessary  generator  capacity  and 
power  outlets to charge their  essential 
medical equipment.  Factors such as these 
could explain  observations pointing  to a 
disproportionate  fatality  rate among  those 
with medical dependencies.3 
We originally  sought  to comprehensively 
review  the underly ing  evidence for 
recommendations aimed towards people with 
medical dependencies, including aspects such 
as communication,  transport,  sheltering  and 
recovery. However,  during  the course of this 
process we concluded that  to create an 
efficient  research agenda  to plug  current 
knowledge gaps, it  is imperative to 
understand this subset of the “access and 
functional needs”  population  better. 
Therefore,  we focused this piece on  the key 
questions of how  to identify  this segment and 
how  to estimate what critical  resources are 
needed.  We believe that strategies for 
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delivering  tailored information,  using 
appropriate transportation  resources or 
ensuring that  shelters have the requisite 
features and supplies,  will  be more efficiently 
improved once answers to the above 
questions have been found. 
METHODS
The following discussion  is based on  subject 
matter expert  and responder  interviews 
conducted as part  of various planning  and 
training programs developed by  the Yale New 
Haven Center  for  Emergency  Preparedness 
and Disaster  Response (YNH-CEPDR), which 
has highlighted challenges in  developing  a 
community  response to support  people with 
medical dependencies.  Through a  review  of 
the literature and the preparedness guidance 
of United States agencies, we have attempted 
to identify  some of the critical  knowledge 
gaps in applying  the scope and intent  of 
national  level doctrine into improved 
response paradigms to support people with 
medical dependencies at the community 
level.
We conducted a literature review  using 
online medical  databases (Medline,  Cinahl, 
Cochrane and Scopus) and internet-based 
search  engines (Google Scholar) to retrieve 
published information  related to people with 
medical dependencies in  mass evacuations 
and disasters.  The following search  words 
were used in  various combinations: “medical 
dependencies,”  “vulnerable populations,”  “at 
risk populations,”  “special needs,”  “special 
healthcare needs,”  “disaster,”  “evacuation,” 
“emergency,”  and “preparedness.”  This was 
supplemented with a  review  of reference lists 
in  articles deemed relevant, as well as post-
event  reports from  Hurricanes Katrina  and 
Rita, the 2004  Hurricane season  in  Florida, 
as well as hurricanes in Texas and Louisana 
such  as Gustav  and Ike.  A  number  of articles 
from  international sources were assessed for 
relevancy, but  were not  included due to 
doubts about  their  applicability  to US 
conditions. Relevant information was also 
provided in interv iews or  personal 
conversations with  various subject matter 
experts (listed in Acknowledgements).
WHAT ARE “MEDICAL 
DEPENDENCIES”?
Although  there is a  recognized need to better 
address the inadequacies in  preparedness 
planning  for  members of the population  who 
can  be expected to require assistance beyond 
what  is provided to the average citizen,  there 
is an  ostensible  lack of consensus with 
regards to the terminology.  Guidelines and 
recommendations use a  wide variety  of 
terms, and as a consequence,  many 
recommendations target overlapping,  but 
slightly different groups.4 
The use of broad definitions for  planning 
purposes has the potential  to result in 
imprecise preparation  and poorly  targeted 
measures. For  example, the general term 
“special  needs population”  is used in  the 
National Response Framework  (NRF) to 
designate all  individuals “who may  have 
additional needs before,  during, and after  an 
incident.”  Official  guidelines operationalize 
the definition  to include, but not be limited 
to,  those who are elderly, children, 
institutionalized, have limited or no English 
proficiency,  or  lack  transportation. As 
pointed out  by  others,  this term  may  in  its 
widest  sense encompass more than  half the 
United States population.5
As stated above, we seek to focus this text 
on  those classified as having  a  “medical 
dependency,”  who we have defined more 
formally as:
Individuals  who rely on  specialized 
equipment, medications, or caregivers  in 
order to sustain  life, minimize deterioration 
in  health  status, and/or retain  some degree 
of personal independence in  performing 
activities of daily living. 
This segment  of the population is more or 
less universally  included in  the terms often 
used for  emergency  planning (e.g., “at-risk,” 
“vulnerable,”  “access and functional needs,” 
or  “special needs”),  but  the above definition 
subsets these broader terms to apply  to 
people who require mobility  or  other 
functional aids, medications,  or  portable 
medical equipment, or  rely  on  a  caregiver for 
maintenance of their health. 
However,  despite being  featured in  most 
planning  guides and recommendations, the 
targeted group is complex to delineate, as the 
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degree of medical  dependency  is dependent 
on  baseline resilience and time. An  individual 
with  type I diabetes mellitus may  require 
minimal support  from  the community  in 
everyday  life,  but would decidedly  qualify  in 
terms of the above definition  if access to 
medications was blocked in  the aftermath of 
a  disaster. Similarly,  loss of electrical  power 
beyond battery  life on  specialized equipment 
in  an  area  could rapidly  alter  the composition 
of population  with  medical dependencies. 
The extent  and urgency  of medical 
dependency  thus have a  substantial  temporal 
factor, and a  functional  definition  with  tiered 
categories def ined by  t ime may  be 
appropriate. However, due to the scarcity  of 
knowledge on  the dynamics of vulnerability 
among  people with  medical  dependency 
during  disasters,  we limit ourselves to note 
this aspect  without  attempting to partition 
the above definition with regards to time.
IDENTIFYING AND LOCATING 
THE POPULATION WITH 
MEDICAL DEPENDENCIES
To ensure compl iance wi th  federa l 
regulations aimed at providing  universal 
access to services and shelters, emergency 
p lanners need e i ther knowledge or 
reasonable estimates informing  them  of the 
size and composition  of the people with 
access and functional needs. FEMA  guiding 
documents such  as Guidance  on Planning for 
Integration of Functional Needs Support 
Services in General Population Shelters 
emphasize that identification  and planning 
for  this population  segment  cannot wait until 
disaster  occurs,  and need to be planned well 
in advance.6 
Considerable uncertainty  exists with 
regards to the size of the People with  Medical 
Dependencies (PMD) population,  regardless 
of the exact  definition  used.  Data  from  the US 
Census Bureau  (American  Community 
Survey) indicate that  roughly  12  percent  of 
the population  falls into one of six  disability 
categories (hearing,  vision,  cognitive, 
ambulatory, self-care, or  independent living 
difficulty),  although this proportion rises to 
about  37  percent  when looking at those over 
sixty-five years.7 Ambulatory  difficulties were 
found to constitute the biggest  single 
disability  category, constituting 24  percent  of 
the elderly. Similar  estimates have been 
found for  the sixty-five years and older 
population using  the CDC’s Behavioral  Risk 
Factor  Surveillance System  survey, which 
estimated about  32  percent  of the population 
in  2003-04  to have a  disability  and 17  percent 
to be in  need of specialized equipment.8 
Other  methods have concluded with  even 
higher  estimates for the general  population. 
A  study  of St.  Louis County, which  is fairly 
representative to US demographics as a 
whole,  found medical dependencies to 
account for  18 percent of the population,  and 
personal communication with  six  subject-
matter  experts yielded estimates in  the range 
of 15-20 percent of the total seeking shelters.9
FEMA lists the Center  for Personal 
Assistance Services as a  resource for 
disability  statistics when anticipating and 
planning  shelter  capacity. 10  However,  as 
there is no accepted best  practice for 
emergency  planners for estimating and 
i d e n t i f y i n g  p e o p l e w i t h  m e d i c a l 
dependencies, we will review  some of the 
suggested methods to accomplish  this.  For  all 
of these methods, there is unfortunately 
limited,  if any, peer-reviewed literature on 
their  effectiveness in identifying  and locating 
people with  medical  dependencies in  mass 
emergencies.  Some potential resources that 
have been suggested to fill this knowledge 
gap include surveys,  registries, community-
based organization engagement, and even 
door-to-door registrations.
SURVEYS
When developing  plans to include the needs 
of evacuating  and sheltering-in-place people 
with  medical dependencies, FEMA  suggests 
using  survey  data  on disabilities for 
estimating  resource needs.11  The advantages 
of such  an approach  are that  underlying  data 
is generated at regular  intervals with 
considerable attention  to methodological 
aspects of sampling, the surveys in question 
have national  coverage, and it is readily 
available for  state or  local planners over  the 
internet. 
However,  for  practical planning  purposes 
the use of surveys have several obvious 
limitations.  Granularity  is often limited to the 
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state level,  and there may  be considerable 
regional  and local variation within  a  state. 
National surveys often  employ  dialing  to 
household landline phones as their  interview 
method, a  method that  excludes those who 
use cell  phones exclusively  or  are without a 
permanent  residence.  Surveyors may  also not 
be prepared to communicate us ing 
Teletypewriter  and Telecommunications for 
the Deaf Device (TTY/TTD) technology, 
missing  a  critical  cohort  of the population. 
Since data  is linked to permanent  residencies, 
rates may  be inaccurate for local areas that 
experience substantial seasonal  fluctuations. 
For  planning  purposes, disability  statistics 
within  these surveys is often  built  around a 
set  of few  and fairly  general questions,  and as 
a  consequence do not  identify  specific 
medical support requirements. 
REGISTRIES
Several local  jurisdictions have established 
dedicated registries of people with  medical 
dependencies in  their  community,  and this 
has been suggested as a  means to locate those 
who have special medical  needs in  the 
aftermath  of disasters. 12 In  the event  of an 
incident  requiring  evacuations, such 
registries may  provide an  easily  accessible list 
identifying  individuals in  need of additional 
support.  However, such  registries have not 
been  universally  established across the 
nation, and even  if they  were,  there are 
numerous caveats with  this approach. 
Established registries typically  rely  on 
voluntary  sign-up at  the initiative of those 
with  additional assistance needs,  and as a 
consequence, coverage is likely  to depend 
heavily  on how  the registry  is marketed 
towards people with medical dependencies. 
Limited published experience indicate that 
such  registries may  only  capture a  fraction  of 
the true population.13  Low  coverage rates 
represent  a  problem  if emergency  planners or 
responders start  viewing  those on the registry 
as the only  ones in need of assistance,  and 
inappropriately  narrow  their  attention  and 
efforts solely  towards the registrants. 
Registrants also may  perceive participation 
as a  promise of evacuation  services that may 
be beyond the planning  and capacity  of the 
jurisdiction. Registries of this kind inherently 
deal with  protected health  information, and it 
is highly  uncertain  to what extent  planners 
have incorporated routines to ensure 
compliance with  the legal framework for such 
data .14  Maintaining  registr ies with 
information  that  is up to date is generally 
labor-intensive and costly,  and the absence of 
plans and budgets to do so will quickly  cause 
information to be outdated and unreliable. 15
One special strategy  for  creating and 
maintaining  registries has been employed in 
Texas,  a  state frequently  affected by 
h u r r i c a n e s .  S e v e r a l  c o u n t i e s h a v e 
implemented a  policy  where the community’s 
Fire Chief organizes a  task force  to go from 
door  to door  in  order  to identify  individuals 
who may  require additional  assistance during 
a  mass emergency. 16 This is typically  done at 
the start  of hurricane season, and the chief 
elected official or  county  judge subsequently 
validates the numbers. Such an  approach  is 
likely  to counter  problems such  as a varying 
p o p u l a t i o n ,  p e o p l e w i t h  m e d i c a l 
dependencies relocating, and undocumented 
residents who would otherwise not  self-
report. However,  the method employed by 
Texas may  be considered too resource-
intensive by  officials in areas where the need 
to evacuate is less frequent. 
ESTIMATING RESOURCE NEEDS
Despite advance planning by  the authorities 
and personal preparedness for  the 
community,  a  disaster  will almost  certainly 
result  in  people with  medical  dependencies in 
need of durable medical equipment  and 
medications or  other  consumable medical 
supplies. Emergency  plans must  estimate 
what  resources will  be needed, and establish 
a  process in  advance to locate, purchase and 
store necessary  supplies, in  order  to ensure 
that  they  are available during  and after  a 
disaster. 
However,  for  the individual  emergency 
planner,  who typically  lacks logistics training 
or  expertise, it can  be challenging  to convert 
rates of disability  and functional needs into 
adequate estimates of resource needs. 
Beyond some suggested lists from  FEMA  of 
possible medications and equipment one 
might  need,  with  no quantification of the 
number  of these items needed,  the official 
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guidance on  resource  planning for  people 
with  a  medical dependency  is virtually  non-
existent. In  addition, these lists provide no 
evidence base for their  composition, and 
evaluations on  how  well  the suggested 
selections cover  the needs in  real  disasters 
have not been published.17 
BASELINE RESILIENCE
Improving  self-sufficiency  and increasing 
community  resi l ience has become a 
f u n d a m e n t a l  c o n c e p t  i n  d i s a s t e r 
preparedness for  the general  population.  For 
people with  medical dependencies,  personal 
preparedness may  reasonably  be one of the 
most effective strategies to improve resilience 
during  a  shelter-in-place or  evacuation event. 
If a substantial share of this population have 
spare medical supplies and backup power 
supply  for  vital equipment capable  of 
sustaining  them  for  some days,  the strain  on 
emergency  efforts would be reduced and the 
probability  of survival  greatly  increase in  the 
event  that  caregivers, delivery  people,  or 
emergency  responders were unable to reach 
them due to the disaster. 
Unfortunately,  knowledge on the level of 
baseline resilience for  this population  is 
inadequate. Emergency  planners have limited 
data  on  what  proportion  of the population 
with  medical  dependencies can be expected 
to be independent  in  terms of medical 
supplies for  seventy-two hours,  an  often  used 
recommendation  for  self-sufficiency  in  the 
general  population,  for  notice or  no notice 
events. The limited number  of studies we 
identi f ied which  looked at  disaster 
preparedness among dialysis patients, 
wheelchair patients,  families with  special care 
children, diabetics, and other populations 
with  medical dependencies, all pointed 
towards an insufficient  level  of preparation, 
regardless of other  demographic  and 
socioeconomic predictors. 18 In  addition, the 
implications of medical dependency  are 
temporal; a  ventilator  may  have sufficient 
backup power  to safely  endure a  short outage, 
but the urgency  of restoring  electricity  to 
such  life-saving  equipment rapidly  increases 
with  time.  Unfortunately,  little is known  of 
the vulnerability  dynamics of a  community 
with  regards to disruption in power  or  the 
supply  of critical  medications. There is also 
scarce data  on the extent  of people with 
medical dependencies and their  ability  to 
prepare by  storing  up food, water, and other 
necessities for  shelter-in-place during  a 
notice event,  the lack of which  could 
compound their baseline illness. 19
ALTERED COMPOSITION AFTER 
VOLUNTARY EVACUATION
There are indications suggesting that the 
composition  of the remaining  population may 
change markedly  after  an  evacuation event, 
and that those remaining  afterwards the 
evacuation  are disproportionately  vulnerable 
to the effects of a  disaster. 20  However,  the 
e v i d e n c e i s c u r r e n t l y  l i m i t e d a n d 
methodologically  lacking. There is a  need for 
better  understanding  of which  factors 
determine willingness to evacuate, and with 
regards to people with  medical dependencies, 
the factors that  may  impede their  ability  to 
c o m p l y  w i t h  e v a c u a t i o n  o r d e r s o r 
recommendations. 
STRATEGIES FOR IMPROVEMENT
The growing interest  to incorporate  strategies 
and capabilities aimed at  people with  medical 
dependencies in emergency  preparedness is 
decidedly  welcome. However, it  should be 
evident  from  our  review  of off ic ial 
suggestions that  current  evidence is woefully 
inadequate to identify  and test  best practices 
in  the field.  We also contend that  evaluation 
of existing  strategies for  communicating with, 
transporting,  and sheltering this population 
during  mass emergencies will be ineffective 
unless a  better  picture is formed of those with 
medical dependencies,  where to find them, 
and what  type of assistance they  can  be 
expected to require. In order  to develop 
planning  recommendations backed by 
empirical  evidence, there is a patent need to 
fund research  into emergency  preparedness. 
Based on our  review  of the published 
literature, we conclude that  the knowledge 
gap may  be most  effectively  plugged if efforts 
are focused on  exploring  what  strategies work 
a t  ide nt i fy ing  pe ople wi th  me dica l 
dependencies in  the community  and 
ascertaining  precisely  what assistance it will 
RISOE, SCHLEGELMILCH, & PATURAS, EVACUATION AND SHELTERING 5
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME 9, ARTICLE 2 (FEBRUARY 2013) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
be necessary  to provide.  When  the target 
population  and their  baseline level  of 
resilience is established it  will be possible to 
revisit more specific  questions such  as how  to 
ensure enough  appropriate transportation 
assets,  what  shelter modifications are 
necessary, and which  level of care  generalized 
shelters should be prepared to handle.
EVALUATION OF EXISTING STRATEGIES 
FOR IDENTIFYING THE POPULATION 
WITH MEDICAL DEPENDENCIES
Based on our  review  of the available 
literature,  we believe the current  official 
suggestion in Guidance on  Planning for 
Integration  of Functional Needs  Support 
Services  in General Population Shelters  of 
using  survey  data  is highly  unlikely  on  its 
own  to yield good results in  terms of practical 
planning.21  Available surveys on  disability 
may  provide some indication  of rates on  a 
national and state  level, but  the granularity  is 
insufficient both  at the level of geography  and 
in  terms of medical needs. However, these 
surveys duly  demonstrate that the problem  is 
sizeable enough  to justify  more intense 
research  effort  into what produces better 
plans, and ultimately,  better  response during 
disasters.
In  order  to gain a  better evidence-base for 
i d e n t i f y i n g  p e r s o n s w i t h  m e d i c a l 
dependencies in  the community,  we suggest 
that  a  fact-finding  effort  should be made to 
map what  practices are currently  being  used 
in  areas where disasters frequently  occur. 
Jurisdictions with  prior  experience in 
organizing  mass evacuations are more likely 
to have developed approaches to the problem 
at  a  local level,  and practical know-how 
present  among officials,  planners,  and 
responders in  such  communities should be 
systematized for evaluation. 
Attention should also be devoted to 
evaluate the use of registries,  as this is an 
approach  a lready  adopted by  many 
jurisdictions.  However,  such  registries can  be 
expected to be highly  diverse in  coverage, 
content,  and maintenance. It  is therefore 
important  that  research  efforts try  to 
estimate what fraction  of the total community 
population with  medical  dependencies are 
captured, using  either  local  surveys or  a 
method like door-to-door  registration, and 
that  policies for  recruitment  of individuals 
and regularly  updating  the information  is 
well  described. These studies would provide a 
basis for  evaluating  whether  registries are 
worthwhile and if so,  help elucidate  what 
practices are needed to make them  useful and 
e f f i c i e n t .  G o o d k n o w l e d g e o f h o w 
comprehensive registries are would also 
make it  possible to conduct  retrospective 
inquiries post-disaster  to determine how  the 
composition  of the population with  medical 
dependencies changes in response to 
governmental alerts of impending  mass 
emergencies such as hurricanes.
IMPROVED ESTIMATION OF RESOURCE 
NEEDS
Although  the information on  baseline 
resilience is scarce,  a handful of publications 
clearly  suggest  that the level of preparedness 
among  persons and households with  medical 
dependencies are vastly  inadequate.22 
Increasing  the level of self-sufficiency  in 
terms of supplies within  this population  is 
likely  to yield substantial  benefits in  terms of 
their  resilience. Consequently,  research into 
the effectiveness of different practices and 
communication  strategies that jurisdictions 
can  employ  to help people with  medical 
dependency  become aware of the need for 
personal preparedness should be a  priority. 
Thus, surveys to assess community  resilience 
should plan to repeat the same survey  in 
order  to test  the effectiveness of interventions 
to improve preparedness among this 
population.
There is also a  discernible need to better 
understand how  the population  with  medical 
dependencies translates into actual resource 
needs, both  for  planning and post-disaster 
response. Efforts should be made to establish 
a  system  of good resource tracking  in  a  few 
“learning”  communities where mass 
evacuations happen with  some frequency  and 
door-to-door  registrations are practiced, in 
order  to allow  for  retrospective assessment  of 
what  resources are being  used. This could 
p r o v i d e a n  e v i d e n c e - b a s e f o r 
recommendation  on what durable equipment 
and consumable medical supplies are critical 
for  local  preparedness; however, due to the 
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inherent  hectic  work environment  mass 
emergencies represents,  plans for  data 
collection must be laid prior to the event.
Another  approach  that  may  help resource 
planning  in  areas where disasters are less 
frequent  is research  into mathematical 
modeling  of the relationship between  persons 
with  medical dependencies and resource use. 
Such a  model could be based on  baseline 
supply-side inputs that  are routinely 
generated, such  as pharmacy  sales within a 
community.  Over  time,  predictions from  the 
model could be matched with real-life 
experience on  actual resource use, and the 
results could be used to refine the model. 
Although  the construction  of a  robust model 
would take sustained effort over  time,  the 
outcome could be an  invaluable tool for  use 
by emergency planners.
CONCLUSIONS
Emergency  plans are mandated by  a  number 
of federal  regulations, often with  conflicting 
definitions, to incorporate people with 
medical dependencies. However  targeted 
planning  for  this segment is presently 
hampered by  substantial  knowledge deficits 
in  defining this population  and the potential 
resource requirements in a  disaster.  These 
gaps prevent the development of evidence-
b a s e d b e s t p r a c t i c e s f o r  l o c a t i n g , 
communicating with,  transporting,  sheltering 
and ensuring the safe recovery  of those with 
medical dependencies. 
To facilitate adequate  integration  of those 
with  medical dependencies into the 
emergency  response,  we believe it  is critical 
to align  working  definitions of people with 
medical definitions as well  as prioritize 
knowledge on  the size,  composition  and 
baseline resilience of this population,  and we 
suggest  doing  this through  a  systematic 
assessment of existing strategies for 
identifying  and locating  those with  medical 
dependencies in jurisdictions that frequently 
respond to natural hazards. Once a  better 
understanding  of these aspects has been 
achieved,  it  can be used to evaluate strategies 
on  how  to increase personal preparedness 
and establish  a  better  link between  the target 
population and resource requirements. We 
believe that  efforts aimed at  developing 
evidence-based best  practices in  these 
fundamental areas will be an  important  first 
step towards addressing  wider  preparedness 
i s s u e s f o r  p e r s o n s w i t h  m e d i c a l 
dependencies,  leading  to more effective 
national policies and recommendations for 
local  emergency  planners working to protect 
our most vulnerable populations. 
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Homeland Security Education: A Way Forward
William V. Pelfrey, Sr. and William D. Kelley, Jr.
ABSTRACT
While there  is  nothing particularly  wrong 
with proceeding forward into  the uncertain 
future of homeland security education, much 
of the  movement has  been without 
directional evidence and debates  as to 
direction have generated more heat than 
light.  We conducted research to help us 
determine trajectory  based on evidence. This 
research produced findings  informed by 
three groups  of homeland security 
professionals. One  group, consisting of 382 
respondents, represented homeland security 
leaders and administrators  graduating from 
the master of arts  program  at the Naval 
Postgraduate School.  The second group 
consisted of faculty  teaching in that 
graduate program.  The third group was a 
subject matter expert panel of national 
leaders in homeland security.   Surveys  were 
conducted across these groups,  asking that 
they score the importance of objectives and 
capabilities  associated with the multitude of 
disciplines  comprising homeland security. 
We found that strategic  collaboration, 
critical thinking and decision-making, 
foundations  of homeland security, and 
analytical capabilities are the  most 
important attributes  of a graduate program 
dedicated to  homeland security.  Cognate or 
specific knowledge,  the  category frequently 
argued about in the literature, was  scored as 
the least important category for graduate 
education.  These capabilities  and attributes 
represent a “way forward” that is  research- 
and evidence-based, but questions remain.
INTRODUCTION: A WAY 
FORWARD
In  a  remarkable occurrence, the American 
people over  the past  decade have come to 
value the set  of activities that comprise 
homeland security  and the related tasks of 
emergency  and crisis management.  In  the 
wake of terrorist  attacks, hurricanes,  and 
earthquakes,  a  more genuine appreciation 
has developed for  prevention, preparedness, 
response,  mit igat ion, recovery,  and 
consequence management. More to the point, 
most people seem  to realize these activities 
significantly  contribute  to the quality  of life 
or  lack  thereof in  our  communities, today  and 
in  the future. Accordingly,  an  unusual 
importance has attached to these tasks.  Their 
performance is less and less seen  as an 
aspirational goal and has moved toward 
becoming  at  least  an  expectation if not a 
mandatory  requirement.  It  is a  worthwhile 
exercise to identify  and nurture the catalysts 
t h a t  a r e c a p a b l e o f e n h a n c i n g o u r 
government’s abilities to successfully  execute 
these tasks.
There is significant evidence that 
education is a  potent and durable contributor 
to changing  and enhancing performance in  a 
wide range of endeavors in  which  excellence 
is sought.1 This fact, coupled with what has 
been  a  significant  investment in  homeland 
security  education  for  the past  several  years, 
suggests two lines of inquiry. 
• First,  what  is the value of homeland 
security education? 
• Second, and perhaps more importantly, 
what is it  that  homeland security 
education ought  to be doing  – and ought 
not  to be doing – to ensure better 
solutions or  performance in  the face of 
more challenging threats and incidents? 
Absent this inquiry, the potential for  being 
"prepared" is not  high  and the opposite is 
possible. 
To conduct this exploration  of what 
homeland security  education  ought to be in 
order  to best address the exigencies of a 
better-prepared nation,  ongoing  research  was 
synthesized and new  research conducted in 
2010  and 2011. It is important  to clarify  that 
the exploration focused on education, not on 
training.  Education  intends to enhance the 
performance of strategic,  complex cognitive 
tasks,  such  as planning,  coordination,  and 
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME 9, ARTICLE 3 (FEBRUARY 2013) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
achievement  of consensus. Training is best 
suited to improving  the performance of more 
tactical,  simpler  tasks such  as using  weapons 
or  equipment,  entering  dangerous "hot" 
zones, or  negotiating  physical barriers,  all in 
conformity with existing standards.
To focus and guide the discovery  of a 
plausible way  ahead for  homeland security 
education, the research  addressed five 
fundamental questions, with  each  question 
asked in  the context of an  overarching  goal  of 
national preparedness.
1. Who should be the consumers of 
homeland security  education? Or, asked 
differently: Who are the most appropriate 
s t u d e n t s f o r  h o m e l a n d s e c u r i t y 
education?
2. What  is the effect of homeland security 
education? Or: What  does homeland 
security  education best  prepare students 
to do?
3. What  learning  objectives and capabilities 
should be the foundation of homeland 
security  education? Or: What  should 
courses and curricula  for  homeland 
security education teach?
4. What  courses and curricula  best  serve as 
vehicles for  educating the appropriate 
students on  the appropriate objectives 
and capabilities?
5. Other  than  homeland security  programs, 
are there established,  more mature fields/
disciplines/programs that  provide 
education to appropriate  students on the 
appropriate capabilities for  homemade 
security?
RESEARCH METHOD
These fundamental questions were posed 
adhering  to a  methodology  significantly 
impacted by  what is best characterized as 
"research informed curriculum  design." The 
key  feature of this methodology  is the use of 
expert  judges.  The curricular  elements are 
derived through  research  processes using 
subject  matter  experts to judge the worth  and 
importance of the elements to them  and 
other homeland security  professionals like 
them.
Three distinct  groups were surveyed for 
this research: (1)  graduates of the master  of 
arts degree program  in  National Security 
Affairs,  Homeland Security  and Defense,  at 
the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS); (2) 
faculty  teaching in  this program  at  NPS; and 
(3) subject matter  experts outside of the NPS 
graduate degree program.  
The largest group was the graduates of the 
master’s degree program  at the Naval 
Postgraduate School. These graduating 
cohorts of homeland security  leaders 
represent  a  proxy  for  iterative subject matter 
expert  panels.  The first cohort completed the 
program  in  2004 and the most recent cohort 
(for  the purposes of this study) graduated in 
2011.  A  total of 427  homeland security 
leaders and administrators have completed 
the graduate program  (as of June 15,  2011) 
and a  total  of 382  completed surveys were 
used in  the analysis.  The survey  completion 
rate was 89.5  percent,  high  enough  to allow 
the researchers to generalize to the entire 
population of graduates. The importance of 
all  objectives was assessed on  a  nine-point 
scale from  low  to high.  (These data  are 
idiosyncratic  to the graduate academic 
program  offered at  only  this one institution, 
but the longitudinal nature of the research, 
the professional heterogeneity  of the 
respondents,  and inclusion  of competencies 
and objectives not  part  of the program,  make 
these data compelling.)
A  second group surveyed was faculty 
teaching  in  the graduate  program  offered by 
the Naval Postgraduate School. Based on  the 
items from  the subject  matter  expert panel 
described above, this survey  was conducted 
in  May  2010. Twenty-four faculty  members 
were surveyed with  the results compared to 
those of the graduating  student  surveys. 
While  there might  be contamination  of the 
importance of some items taught by  these 
faculty  and experienced by  the graduates, 
each  group is independent  enough  to assess 
each  item  on  its own  merits. The results of 
the survey  were presented to the faculty 
during  a one-day  session  held in  June 2010, 
allowing  debate and discussion regarding  the 
implications of the results.  The fact  that  the 
results included strong  ratings for  capabilities 
not included in  the instruction  offered by 
these faculty  increases the face validity  of the 
results. 2
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The third group of subject  matter  experts 
surveyed to assess the importance of 
knowledge, skills,  tasks,  and capabilities was 
larger  and more diverse in terms of 
professional disciplines represented. Surveys 
were received from  selected homeland 
security  leaders representing  the following 
professional disciplines:
• EMA Leaders 
• Law Enforcement Leaders 
• Fire Leaders 
• Public Health and Health Care Leaders 
The survey  items consisted of 124  core 
tasks and objectives.  These were identified 
through  a  merging  process that  included 
screening  575  tasks from  the original and 
revised ODP Training Strategy,3 and the ODP 
Prevention  Guidelines, 4  and identifying 
leader’s tasks appropriate for  education,  not 
training.  These were merged with  eighty-one 
learning  objectives from  graduate homeland 
security  courses offered at  the Naval 
P o s t g r a d u a t e S c h o o l a n d f o r t y - o n e 
D e p a r t m e n t  o f H o m e l a n d S e c u r i t y 
capabilities and related homeland security 
objectives. Duplicates were then  consolidated 
to produce 124  Core Tasks, Objectives,  and 
Capabilities. This survey  was conducted in 
2009  and two Subject Matter  Expert  Panels 
were convened to assist  in  interpreting  the 
results and identifying  the professional 
disciplines likely  benefiting  from  the 
education.
These three sets of surveys represent both 
longitudinal  expert  panels and cross-
sectional focus group research  approaches. 
Individually  each of these approaches has its 
limitations.  However, when  used in  tandem 
the limitations are reduced and the benefits 
of comparisons over  time are joined with  the 
advantage of review  of the comparisons by 
heterogeneous groups seeking  to crosscheck 
and validate data.
RESULTS
A  formative, rather  than  summative, 
assessment perspective underlies this 
research. In  a  rapidly  changing  and evolving 
field like  homeland security,  summative 
evaluation  may  not be feasible,  may  be 
inappropriate,  and may  lead to a  misdirection 
of preparedness, if not  contraindicative 
approaches.  Formative evaluation, however, 
is evolving  and must be perpetual to be truly 
successful.  Conclusions or certainties arrived 
at  through  summative evaluation  seem  to 
misunderstand this.
Application  of this study’s methodology  to 
the five fundamental  research  questions 
revealed the following answers.
Who should be the consumers of 
homeland security education?
The most appropriate students for  homeland 
security  education are homeland security 
practitioners in  leadership positions. 
Individuals aspiring  to be homeland security 
professionals are not  the most appropriate 
students.
The most critical,  and perhaps the 
exclusive, consumers for  homeland security 
education today  are practitioners with 
homeland security  administrative or 
leadership responsibilities, working  in  the 
fifty-one professional disciplines or  groups 
identified in  the research.  Additionally, the 
most appropriate tier  of education is at  the 
first  graduate level (master's degree). 
C o m m i t t e e s s p o n s o r e d b y  t h e U S 
Department of Homeland Security,  meeting 
in  2004  and 2005,  identified some core 
elements of a  homeland security  curriculum. 
However,  the report  stated clearly  and 
unambiguously, “Not  a  single workshop 
participant,  or  any  of the committee 
m e m b e r s , v o i c e d s u p p o r t  f o r  a n 
undergraduate degree program  focused 
specif ical ly  on  homeland security.” 5 
Additionally,  if a  later  recommendation for 
homeland security  education to foster  "post 
formal thought" is credible,  that education  is 
best provided at the graduate level. 6 Training 
is appropriate for  many  others in  the 
professional disciplines but the objectives 
and capabilities described below  are most 
appropriate for graduate education.
What is the efficacy of such education? 
Homeland security  education  best prepares 
appropriate students to perform  complex, 
cognitive tasks.  It  is not  appropriate for 
simple, tactical tasks.
The research  suggests that  graduate 
education could prepare professionals in 
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homeland security  leadership positions to be 
much  more effective in  their  capability  to 
operate in  an ambiguous environment  (37.7 
percent  more effective after  the graduate 
education), engage in  strategic  collaboration 
(54.39  percent  more effective after  the 
graduate education),  and engage in  critical 
thinking  (53.72  percent  more effective after 
the graduate education).  These data were 
collected from  end-of-program  assessments 
of the graduate program  in  homeland 
security  offered at the Naval  Postgraduate 
School,  with participants who were selected 
because they  were already  in  leadership 
positions in their  local, state, tribal,  or  federal 
agencies.  
It  would appear  that undergraduate 
vocational education in  homeland security, as 
an  employment  opportunity,  is not central to 
the largest  potential  employment  – law 
enforcement  – even though  the professional 
discipline is engaged in  homeland security 
preparedness activities.  Of the 463,000 
sworn officers employed at  the local law 
enforcement  level,  about  4,000  (less than  1 
percent) were serving  in  intelligence 
positions related to combating  terrorism  in 
2007, the most recent  year  for data. "Overall, 
11  percent  of departments had sworn 
personnel serving  in  this capacity  with  a total 
of about 4,000 nationwide." Only  one percent 
of local  law  enforcement  agencies employed 
n o n - s w o r n  i n t e l l i g e n c e a n a l y s t s . 
"Nationwide, an estimated 238 civilian 
personnel from  local police departments 
served in this type of position."7  
The Department of Homeland Security, 
Transportation  Safety  Administration  (TSA), 
another potential  vocational  outlet  for 
undergraduates,  employs about  55,000 
Transportation  Security  Officers (TSO). 8  As 
stated by the TSA, such an employee must:
• Be a  US Citizen  or  US National at time of 
application submission;
• Be at least  18  years of age at time of 
application submission;
• Be proficient  in  the English  language (i.e., 
able to read, write, speak, and listen);
• Have a  high  school diploma or  General 
Educat ional Deve lopment  (GED) 
credential  OR at  least  one year  of full-
time work experience in  the security 
industry,  aviation  screening,  or  as an X-
ray technician. 9  
It would appear  that  homeland security 
vocational education at  an  undergraduate 
level would not be effective in  enhancing 
employment as a  TSO.  Arguably,  X-ray 
technician  curricula  would be a  better 
vocational preparation  for  the TSO jobs in  the 
Department of Homeland Security.
W h a t  l e a r n i n g o b j e c t i v e s a n d 
capabilities should be the foundation 
of the education?
Objectives and capabilities that should be 
emphasized in  homeland security  education 
steer  away  from  specific knowledge, 
centering  instead on more complex, cognitive 
tasks.
Based on  data  gathered since 2004  from 
nineteen  independent  survey  groups,  across 
all  major professional disciplines in 
homeland security,  the most  important 
objectives and capabilities for  homeland 
security leaders and administrators are:
(1) Strategic  collaboration,10  which  involves 
the following capabilities:
• C o o r d i n a t e , c o l l a b o r a t e ,  a n d 
communicate across agencies;
• Identify  and build strategic  relationships 
within  the individual’s homeland security 
organization  and across the homeland 
security community;
• Demonstrate ability  to build,  sustain,  and 
operate within  interagency  teams/task 
forces;
• Improve efforts for  collaboration, 
information-sharing, threat  recognition, 
and target  hardening  between various 
disciplines;
• Communicate appropriately  with  other 
agencies and organizations to insure the 
sharing  of critical  information  during and 
following  a homeland security  threat  or 
incident;
• Explicitly  develop “social capital”  through 
collaboration  between  the private sector, 
law  enforcement and other  partners so 
that  data,  information, assistance,  and 
“best  practices”  regarding  prevention  and 
PELFREY & KELLEY, HS EDUCATION  4
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME 9, ARTICLE 3 (FEBRUARY 2011) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
vulnerabilities may  be shared and 
collaborative processes developed;
• A s s e s s t h e o p p o r t u n i t i e s a n d 
impediments to collaboration  between 
and among the various disciplines;
• Participate in  intelligence sharing with 
other appropriate agencies as part  of a 
response to a  homeland security  threat  or 
incident;
• Understand interagency  coordination and 
the flow  of intelligence for  Homeland 
Security;
• Understand the confluence of law 
enforcement and the intel l igence 
community;
• Foster and reward communication  and 
collaboration  across agency  boundaries at 
all levels;
• Coordinate local, state,  and federal  assets 
in  preparation  for  a homeland security 
threat or incident.
(2) Critical thinking  and decision-making, 
which includes the following:
• Ability  to think about  complex  issues 
using  scientific/critical thinking approach 
to solving  problems and make sound 
judgments;
• Capability  to take action  that  is consistent 
with  available facts,  constraints, and 
probable consequences;
• Ability to operate in extreme ambiguity;
• Ability  to respond quickly, effectively, and 
proactively  to ambiguous and emerging 
h o m e l a n d s e c u r i t y  c o n d i t i o n s , 
opportunities, and risks;
• Willingness to use creative problem 
solving  techniques to respond to 
homeland security  issues in  the most 
effective manner.
The entire  list  of categories of capabilities, 
from most important to least important, was:
1. Strategic collaboration
2. Critical thinking and decision-making





8. Cognate or Specific Knowledge
Arguably, these top two categories – 
strategic  collaboration and critical thinking 
and decision-making  – could be imbedded in 
every  course in a graduate curriculum  and 
the results would enhance practitioners' 
capabilities regardless of their  professional 
discipline.
Is there sufficient agreement as to the 
homeland security  courses serving as 
the vehicles for educating appropriate 
s t u d e n t s i n t h e a p p r o p r i a t e 
capabilities? 
There is little agreement  on  what courses/
curricula  best  serve the needs of homeland 
security  professionals. A  "cook book" of core 
courses is at best aspirational and at worst 
misleading or misdirected.
Based on  available literature,  it  appears 
that  there is no more agreement  on homeland 
security  core curricula  today  than  in  2007, 
when  Rollins and Rowan found "The 
homeland security  academic discipline is 
c u r r e n t l y  a n  e v o l v i n g u n g o v e r n e d 
environment of numerous programs 
purporting to prepare students for  various 
positions of responsibility."11   Fundamental 
debates over  vocational education  versus 
civic  education, graduate only  education 
versus undergraduate and graduate are still 
being conducted with  little resolution  of the 
i s s u e s ,  w h i l e s o m e a r e c a l l i n g  f o r 
accreditation  standards to mitigate the 
uncertainties (although  accreditation  prior  to 
r e s o l v i n g  t h e i s s u e s s e e m s t o b e 
anachronistic).
Are established, more mature, parallel 
disciplines better  capable of educating 
s t u d e n t s i n t h e a p p r o p r i a t e 
capabilities?
It appears that established programs in  other 
fields and disciplines do not offer  the 
requisite objectives and capabilities of 
homeland security education.
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While  it  was initially  expected that existing 
programs such  as public policy  and public 
administration  would better  accomplish  the 
two most important  elements and cognates 
could address the remaining  ones , 
examination of the core courses in those 
disciplines seems to suggest otherwise. 
Consider  one respected program, Harvard 
University's, John  F. Kennedy  School of 
Government,  Master  in  Public Policy. 12 The 
core elements addressed by  the coursework 
i n  t h a t  p r o g r a m  c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e 













Strategic collaboration, largely  an  affective 
capability, is not present in  this or  other 
similar  programs of study.  Additionally, 
valuable but  largely  extraneous topics are 
included as core in  these degrees,  e.g., 
economics. The conclusion,  therefore, is that 
these parallel programs do not  suffice in 
meeting  the needs of homeland security 
graduate education.
Homeland security  education,  as the 
answers to the fundamental questions to our 
exploration  suggest,  may  not  be what  many 
presume it  to be. These presumptions are 
that homeland security,  as an  academic 
discipline,  is without  much  coherence, it 
borrows its personnel  from  many  disciplines 
(most noticeably  law  enforcement  and fire), 
and it  lacks heritage,  theory, and recognition. 
Consider,  for  example, the list  of things 
homeland security  education  is missing, 
according to Linda Kiltz: 
To date, there is no agreed upon definition 
of homeland security, no grand theory 
explaining the phenomenon  of homeland 
security, no standardized curriculum, little 
discussion of the history, paradigms and 
philosophies of the field, and ill  defined 
faculty roles.13
Nonetheless, abandoning homeland 
security  education  would widely  miss the 
mark.  There is a clear and present  need for 
graduate education  focused on  homeland 
security  professionals representing  the 
professional disciplines. The data  from  the 
nineteen  surveys, particularly  those since 
2007, show  convincingly  that  the objectives 
and competencies for  graduate education  for 
those in homeland security  leadership 
posit ions within their  agencies and 
organizations are known, can  be taught 
through  graduate education, and will  produce 
benefits in  the preparedness of those 
organizations.  It  would,  therefore,  be a 
mistake not  to continue that instruction. It 
would also be ludicrous to replicate the same 
education at  the undergraduate level,  since 
the objectives appear  to be at  the analysis, 
synthesis, evaluation, and metacognitive 
levels, where students are educated in 
thinking  critically  and utilizing  the affective 
domain  to engage in  strategic collaboration. 
Graduate certificate programs could, and are, 
being used to address the same key  objectives 
and competencies for  those not interested in 
completing  a  graduate degree or  already 
holding  a  graduate degree. The formative 
environment of the Naval Postgraduate 
School’s homeland security  graduate 
curriculum  remains a  viable location  to test 
courses and instructional techniques to 
infuse the key  elements into graduate 
education  and share the successes and 
failures with  others in  academe.  As 
curriculum  planners engage in  the graduate 
versus undergraduate homeland security 
education debate,  the prevailing  question 
should continue to be: Education for  what 
purpose? Armed with  the data  from  this 
research, we can  articulate both  the purposes 
and the capabilities to address those 
purposes in  the venue of graduate education. 
There appears to be little vocational support 
for  undergraduate education in homeland 
security  but  there may  be stronger  academic 
objectives,  such  as critical thinking  and 
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critical writing,  embraced and explicitly 
articulated in  the courses developed for 
advanced undergraduates.  
The lingering  larger  question  of our 
exploration  is what direction  should 
homeland security  education  take if we are to 
fulfill the promise of moving  our nation’s 
preparedness level beyond its current 
unacceptable level?14  Here, the exploration 
has much  to suggest,  although  it will not  be 
achieved in  short  order.  The way  forward 
suggests a dependence on  evidence rather 
than  opinion,  and reality  rather than belief. 
The way  forward,  more specifically, would 
include efforts to:
• C o n t i n u e t o e n c o u ra g e g ra d u a t e 
education,  but strongly  encourage the 
inculcation  of the key  objectives and 
capabilities identified in  this research, 
particularly  the development of strategic 
collaboration capabilities, the ability to 
think  critically and analytically,  and the 
capability  to  operate in the ambiguous 
environment of homeland security;
• Assess the courses and the program  using 
those key  variables as dependent 
variables in the assessment processes;
• Assess the impact  of homeland security 
education  using  disciplined,  reliable 
methods that can  discriminate effects 
based on  the current  and future attributes 
of curricula;
• Disseminate the results to other 
u n i v e r s i t i e s a n d c o l l e g e s w i t h 
recommendations of smart practices, as 
well  as the theories and methods used to 
develop and test the capabilities in  both 
homeland security  and emergency 
management academic programs;
• Encourage (through  special journal 
issues,  fellowships, and proactive 
r e c r u i t m e n t ) f a c u l t y  i n  e x i s t i n g 
disciplines to adopt homeland security 
issues and problems within  their  research 
agendas so that  those expert  in  these 
disciplines can  contribute to the progress 
of research  and theory  development  in 
homeland security;
• Encourage the Department of Homeland 
Security  to partner  with  the US 
Department of Education, Health  and 
Human  Services,  and other federal 
agencies, to take a  leadership role in  a 
process similar  to the Bologna Process.15 
This would involve  identifying – with 
some particularity  – the roles and 
objectives of undergraduate and graduate 
education,  using  homeland security 
education as the example since it  is in  the 
germinal stages of development;
• Engage representatives of more mature 
disciplines,  already  contributing  to 
homeland security  education  and 
research, to be manifestly  involved in  the 
development of theories,  methods, and 
analytical capabilities that  should be 
considered in  the development  of 
graduate homeland security  education. In 
doing  so, these individuals could 
articulate the theories,  analytical 
capabilities,  and research  methods 
appropriate to contribute to the paradigm 
of homeland security.
CONCLUSION
Much  of what is stated above is conclusory 
and this article is brief enough  that  no 
"recap" is needed. One unstated but 
underling  issue has not  been broached: Is it 
time for  homeland security  to be considered 
an academic discipline?  
Determining the degree to which  the 
"discipline" of homeland security  is 
c o a l e s c i n g i s m o r e d i f f i c u l t  a n d 
methodologically  uncharted.  Rollins and 
Rowan's work represented a  strong 
methodological  model. The literature on 
"model" curricula,16  along with  the cross 
tabulation-like tables used to present some of 
the academic homeland security  programs 
and public policy/public  administration 
programs mentioned in  the literature,  was 
used in interpreting some of the survey  data. 
This type of assessment  is not  likely  to 
provide "clear  and convincing" insight  but 
will suggest  certain  recommended steps or 
actions.
The literature also suggests that  academic 
journals are an  element  of an  academic 
discipline.   The Journal Citation Reports  has 
been  used as a  bibliometric to assess the 
progress of some disciplines and the respect 
the disciplines seem  to be developing  among 
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researchers. 17  That method to test the 
development  of homeland security  (and 
emergency  management) as a  viable 
discipline in  academe shows rather starkly, 
that  homeland security  is immature.  A search 
of citations in  July  2011, using  PAIS 
International, 18  indexed by  ProQuest  and 
available through  CSA, yielded 409  citations 
for  “homeland security.”  These citations 
began  in  2001  and regressed across time. 
Screening  these articles by  the category 
“scholarly,”  generally  meaning the articles 
were in  peer-reviewed journals, produced a 
list  of ninety-seven  articles.  While there is no 
benchmark or  standard for  the number  of 
scholarly  publications necessary  as a 
predicate for  an  academic discipline, an 
average of fewer than ten a year is suspect.
Whether homeland security  is an 
interdisciplinary  or  a  multi-disciplinary  study 
area can  be debated,  but it  appears not to 
have evolved to a  point  where idiosyncratic 
theories and methods of research  specific to 
h o m e l a n d s e c u r i t y  a r e b e t t e r 
paradigmatically  than those of the disciplines 
initially  producing them  and coming  together 
to address or  assess the issues in homeland 
security. Homeland security  education 
appears to be too immature and amorphous, 
with  its educational goals in  dispute,  to merit 
proceeding vigorously  in  the development  of 
new  programs beyond those providing  the 
knowledge and capabilities needed by  those 
leaders already  in  defined homeland security 
roles and key public safety positions.
Faculty  in  the emerging  discipline of 
homeland security,  seeking  to craft  (or  cobble 
together)  courses and coursework may, in 
their  zeal  to incorporate and homogenize the 
theories and research  of others,  drift  away 
from  their  areas of expertise and do a  less-
than-creditable job  instructing students when 
faculty  more central  to the disciplines being 
taught  are  available.  A  quote attributed to 
Paul Samuelson, the Nobel Laureate 
Economist,  in  his Collected Scientific Papers 
on  the state of the discipline of economics 
seems appropriate: "Economics has never 
been  a  science,  and is even  less now  than  a 
few years ago."19
It is more useful to doubt the coagulation 
of courses and curricula into a  discipline or  a 
science than to proclaim  success and rigidly 
hold to rapidly  outdated foundations.  At  this 
stage in the development of “homeland 
security  education”  a  wiser  approach  would 
be to capitalize upon  the development  of 
homeland security  imperatives and research 
within  existing  disciplines, thus building  a 
firm  foundation  for  a  more mature discipline 
of homeland security.  To do otherwise risks 
taking  the path  away  from  science and a 
discipline, as observed by Samuelson.
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Ending America’s Energy Insecurity:




The homeland/national security threat 
posed by the United States’  dependence on 
foreign oil has  been part of the American 
discourse for years; yet nothing has  been 
done.  No  pragmatic, realistic step-by-step 
plan has  been pursued to end this  scourge on 
the American people.  The solution can be 
found in the  problem.  Net imports  of oil 
account for approximately 50 percent of the 
oil the United States  consumes. Likewise, 50 
percent of oil consumed in the United States 
is consumed as  motor gasoline.  If, overnight, 
the United States  stopped using oil to power 
its unleaded gasoline driven vehicles, if 
overnight drivers  switched to electric 
vehicles,  then overnight the United States 
would become energy independent. Using 
historical data to establish the effect of 
gasoline price changes on consumer vehicle 
choice,  a predictive  model has been created 
showing the expected switch to  electric 
vehicles  if the price of gasoline increases and 
the cost of electric vehicles decreases.  There 
is a cost to energy independence: two to five 
dollars  per gallon of retail gasoline sold.  If 
monies  raised from  the tax are  used to lower 
the price of electric vehicles, build recharge 
infrastructure, and dampen the regressive 
nature of the tax, energy independence is  a 
few short years away.
PROLOGUE
Tomorrow: On  a  beautiful October  morning 
in  North Carolina, you  wake up and turn on 
the news.  Iran  has declared war  on  the west. 
They  have mined the Straight  of Hormuz and 
their  naval  commandos have attacked and 
sunk  multiple oil tankers.  You  sip your  cup of 
morning coffee, watching the world response 
and the talking  heads analyzing  the situation, 
and then  you  head to work.  On your  way  to 
work  you  notice that  every  gas station has a 
line of cars.  Reassuring  yourself that your 
tank  is full,  you  do a  double  take as you  catch 
sight  of the price of gasoline: overnight it  has 
increased by a dollar a gallon.
Three days later  you  cannot  put it  off any 
longer,  you  need gasoline. Your heart sinks as 
you  see the line,  then it sinks even  lower  as 
you  see the price. Gasoline is now  double 
what  it  was four  days ago. Sitting  in  line, 
waiting an  hour  for  your  turn at  the pumps, 
you  listen to the news and hear about the 
combat operations underway  to clear  the 
Straight  of Hormuz and bring  Iran to 
account. The CENTCOM Commander  sounds 
optimistic,  but  he is noticeably  vague about 
when  he expects oil  to flow  freely  again.  As he 
describes all  the bombing sorties and boat 
sweeps for  mines, you  glance at  the line 
creeping  forward and cannot  help but think 
of all the gasoline the military must be using. 
The news turns to the weather  and that 
hurricane that had been  headed to Florida. It 
has taken a  sharp turn  North  and is now 
expected to make landfall in  North  Carolina, 
tomorrow. The governor  speaks and you 
nearly  choke on  your chewing  gum  as he tells 
folks that  they  need to evacuate inland if they 
can, but  not  to count on  finding  gasoline on 
the road. He goes on  to warn that 
communities need to support  each other.  The 
state will  do what  it  can, but  the governor  is 
worried the National  Guard will not have 
enough  gasoline to conduct its usual post-
hurricane rescue and clean  up activities.  You 
think longingly  of the generator  you  bought 
last hurricane season,  and the empty  jerry 
cans you  keep in  the trunk for just  such  an 
emergency.  Just  as it’s your  turn  at  the gas 
pump,  the lights are turned off as the station 
manager announces they are out of gasoline.
While  this sounds like bad science fiction, 
these or  similar  events will happen  at some 
point  in  the future if the United States does 
not shed its dependency on foreign energy.
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INTRODUCTION
This article is focused on  one thing: 
describing the most  plausible,  ready  to 
implement and truly  achievable method of 
enhancing our  national and homeland 
security  by  ending  America’s dependence on 
foreign  oil.  This article provides the tools 
policy  makers can use to bring about  energy 
independence,  it  gives the electric vehicle 
(EV)  and utilities industries an  idea  of the 
opportunities energy  independence would 
provide to them, and it  explains to the 
general  public both  the true nature of the 
threat  posed by  US energy  dependence as 
well as a path for eliminating that threat.
The amount  of oil imported by  the United 
States is roughly  equal  to the amount  of oil 
used in the United States for  motor  gasoline. 
A  shift  to EVs would end our  dependence on 
foreign oil.
Dependence on  foreign  oil threatens US 
national and homeland security.  This threat 
manifests itself in  several ways: it  places 
unhealthy  restraints on  US and allied nations’ 
policy  choices; it weakens the nation 
economically  by  adding  to the trade deficit; it 
forces our  military  to protect  vital oil  trade 
routes; and it  strengthens our  enemies by 
providing  funding  for  their  adversarial 
activities.  
Too often the term  “energy  independence” 
is used as a  proxy  for other  interests, 
misdirecting  the discussion away  from  the 
grave threat  dependence on  foreign  oil poses 
to our  nation’s security. For  example, 
environmentalists appropriate the moniker  of 
security  in  their  efforts to develop renewable 
energies,  though  we cannot  yet harness the 
sun  and wind in sufficient  quantities to end 
our  dependence on foreign  oil.1  The US oil 
lobby  wraps their  persuasion  in  the patriotic 
visage of energy  independence in  their  efforts 
to expand domestic  oil production, though  we 
cannot  drill  our  way  to true energy 
independence.  These movements are topics 
worthy  of their  own  consideration,  but  by 
superficially  attaching  their  agendas to 
America’s energy  insecurity  they  hyper 
politicize what should be an  issue of near 
unanimous agreement: the need to end our 
n a t i o n ’ s e n e r g y  d e p e n d e n c e . T h i s 
politicization  makes a meaningful and 
narrowly  focused discourse on  solving  the 
security  threat  posed by  energy  dependence 
nearly impossible.
For  purposes of this article,  “dependence 
on  foreign  oil”  is the situation where the 
domestic demand for  oil exceeds the available 
domestic supply.  When  the domestic  supply 
is insufficient,  some domestic  consumption 
of oil  must be satisfied by  sources that 
originate in  locations other  than  the states, 
territories,  and possessions of the United 
States.  
The remainder  of this article is organized 
into five sections.  First  is an  examination  of 
the scope and nature of US dependence on 
foreign  oil, including  an  historical look  at 
how  fuel  prices affect  consumer  vehicle 
purchases.  Following that  is an explanation 
of how  those consumer  choices can  be 
influenced and mathematically  predicted by 
changes in  the price of gasoline and the price 
of EVs. The article then describes policy 
c h o i c e s t h a t  w o u l d l e a d t o e n e r g y 
independence. The final  sections discuss 
critical secondary  considerations and offer  an 
a n a l y s i s o f p o t e n t i a l u n i n t e n d e d 
consequences from  the recommended policy 
choices.
THE SCOPE, RAMIFICATIONS, 
AND INTERCONNECTEDNESS OF 
DEPENDENCE ON FOREIGN OIL
The 1973/1974  oil  embargo provides 
historical  precedence for  foreign  nations 
using  oil as a  lever  to affect  US national 
policy.2  In 1973/1974, the United States 
imported approximately  28 percent  of the oil 
that  it  consumed. 3 The embargo,  sometimes 
referred to as “Energy  Pearl Harbor  Day,” 4 
was sufficiently  severe to serve as the catalyst 
for  legislative action concerning  the use of 
fuel. Gas shortages were significant enough 
that,  along  with  a  tripling  of world oil  prices, 
gasoline consumption in  the United States 
actually  decreased by  2  percent  in response to 
the embargo.5  The situation was so severe 
that naval oil  reserves were tapped for 
emergency civilian supplies.6
The economic cost of dependence on 
foreign  oil is staggering.  The United States 
has an  oil trade deficit  of approximately 
$1,000,000,000 per  day, larger  than  our 
trade deficit  with  China, 7 which  in 2010 was 
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approximately  $748,000,000 per day. 8  Oil 
consumption  represents 40  percent  of 
America’s energy  needs,  with  20 percent  of 
the oil the United States consumes coming 
from  the Persian  Gulf Region.9  The cost  to 
the United States is compounded. Not only 
do we send one billion  dollars out  of our 
economy  every  day,  but much  of that same 
money  is then  used in a  manner  that directly 
threatens our security. Time and again,  US 
military  and national  security  leaders have 
warned of the substantial risk this outflow  of 
capital poses to the security  of the United 
States. For  example,  Vice Admiral Dennis 
McGinn  has cautioned that the oil trade 
deficit, much of it enriching  nations that  wish 
us harm, is an  unsustainable transfer  of 
wealth  that  has us literally  funding  both  sides 
of the conflict  in the “war  on  terror.” 10 Former 
national security  adviser  Robert McFarlane 
and former  CIA director  R. James Woolsey, 
have recently  described our  dependence on 
foreign  oil  as “the well  from  which  our 
enemies draw  their  political  strength  and 
financial power: the strategic importance of 
oil, which  provides the wherewithal for  a 
generational war against us.” 11 
The restraints oil dependency  places on 
US foreign  policy  decisions are untenable. 
Hugo Chavez, president  of Venezuela, has 
threatened to cut the supply  of oil to the 
United States,  not because of the threat of a 
US invasion, but  as leverage to prevent 
Colombia  from  invading  Venezuela.12 
Similarly, Russia  has shown  it  may  be willing 
to take military  action to control  the supply  of 
oil flowing to the West.  The invasion  of 
Georgia  may  have been  more about the Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline  (a  conduit  of oil  to 
the West  owned by  US and British  energy 
firms) than  about support  of the separatists 
in South Ossetia.13 
Similar  threats have come from  non-state 
actors like Osama  bin  Laden and Ayman  al-
Zawahiri, who have called for attacks on 
economic  assets,  especially  energy  sources.14 
In  a  tape aired by  Al-Jazeera in  February 
2006,  Zawahiri said, “I call  on  the 
mujahedeen to concentrate their  attacks on 
Muslims’ stolen  oil,  most  of the revenues of 
which  go to the enemies of Islam  while most 
of what  they  leave is seized by  the thieves 
who rule our  countries.” 15  The non-state 
threats are broader  than just  al Qaeda,  with 
groups specifically  attempting  to wreak havoc 
in international markets.16
These attacks have real consequences, and 
the world oil market recognizes the risk 
posed by  these attacks. In  February  of 2005, 
a  failed al  Qaeda  attack  on  the Aramco facility 
in  Abqaiq,  Saudi Arabia,  caused the price of 
oil on  international  markets to jump nearly 
two dollars per barrel.17
As significant  as those threats are, perhaps 
the single greatest  threat comes from  Iran. 
Iran has expressed its intention privately  and 
publicly,  and possesses the ability  to disrupt 
world oil  supplies should it be attacked. 18 
With  tensions rising  as the United States and 
other nations attempt  to limit  Iran’s nuclear 
program, Iran's navy  chief,  Adm. Habibollah 
Sayyari,  has said that  closing  the Persian  Gulf 
choke point  "is very  easy  for  Iranian naval 
forces." It  was the second such  threat  in  as 
many  days after  Vice President Mohamed 
Reza  Rahimi vowed to close the strait, cutting 
off oil  exports,  if the West imposes sanctions 
on Iran's oil shipments.19 
These are not  idle threats.  If Iran 
retaliated and shut down the Strait of 
Hormuz, it would mean the temporary  loss of 
more than  15  million  barrels of oil a  day. 20 
Iran has built  a  military  arsenal with  this 
capability  in  mind.  There are reports that 
Iran has purchased the SS-N-22  Moskit/
Sunburn  anti-ship missile,  designed to strike 
ships defended with  the Aegis weapon control 
system. 21 Iran  also has a  large supply  of anti-
ship mines, including  modern mines that 
remain stationary  on  the sea floor  and fire  a 
homing  rocket  when a  ship passes overhead. 
In  the deep waters in  the Strait  of Hormuz, 
such  a  weapon could destroy  ships entering 
or  exiting the Persian  Gulf.22  Furthermore, 
Iran’s naval commandos are trained to attack 
shipping  and offshore oil platforms.23  Even 
with  the United States’ extensive military 
power, US intelligence estimates that Iran’s 
military  rearmament  has given  it the ability 
to shut off the flow  of oil  from  the Persian 
G u l f t e m p o r a r i l y . 24  A s s e s s i n g  t h e 
contemporary  threat  from  the tensions over 
Iran’s nuclear  ambitions, General Martin 
Dempsey, chairman of the Joint  Chiefs of 
Staff,  reiterated that  Iran has the capability  to 
close the Strait of Hormuz.25
The looming  Iranian  threat to the oil 
supply  places real restraints on  US security 
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policy  choices. In  considering an  appropriate 
response to Iran’s nuclear  ambitions, US 
administration  officials are wary  of enacting 
sanctions on  Iranian  oil exports. Officials fear 
that  it might  drive up oil  prices when  the US 
and European  economies are weak. As the 
United States and her  allies consider  the 
probable impacts, they  are forced to conclude 
that  in  the end, they  simply  cannot  predict 
what would happen.26 
World oil  supplies continue to be fungible. 
Though  the United States imports much  of its 
foreign  oil  from  friendly  nations like Canada 
and Mexico,27 the entire world supply  would 
be impacted by  a  significant  disruption 
anywhere in  the oil market.28  Should any 
state or  non-state actor  temporarily  interrupt 
the worldwide flow  of oil,  if the United States 
chooses to respond (for example to open the 
Strait of Hormuz),  the government  will  be 
forced to make very  difficult choices. 
“Reserve stores of petroleum  and petroleum-
based fuels would dwindle quickly  – 
particularly  during wartime operations – 
leaving the US military  unable to obtain 
suitable alternative fuels and rendering  it 
virtually  immobile.” 29  Therefore, it  is not 
sufficient  simply  to be dependent  on 
“friendly”  nations for  oil; it  is critical that, 
when  necessary, the United States can fully 
supply  its own  oil needs.  This is discussed 
more fully  below,  in  the consideration  of 
secondary concerns.
There are also less obvious threats to 
homeland security  from  a  reliance on  foreign 
oil. If the military  is demanding  all available 
petroleum  resources, fuel  for  fire, police,  and 
ambulance services will be in  short  supply  in 
the United States. Other,  non-critical, 
demands for  petroleum  would be left 
completely  unfulfilled (e.g.,  commuters, 
truckers, and the air l ine industry) . 
Emergency  services in  the United States are 
delivered via fire trucks, ambulances, and 
police cars; all of those vehicles depend on 
access to gasoline or  diesel fuel;  therefore, 
delivery  of emergency  services in  the United 
States depends on oil.  
On  August  14, 2003, over  9,300  square 
miles, covering  eight states and portions of 
Canada  lost  electrical power  with  virtually  no 
warning. 30  In  New  York  City  alone, 
emergency  services responded to 91,000  911 
calls during the outage.  Even  in  their  reduced 
capacity,  emergency  services were called on 
to perform  more than  thirty  distinct tasks, 
inter  alia: elevator  rescue; subway  rescue; fire 
suppression; hazard calls; traffic accidents; 
welfare checks at  hospitals,  senior  citizen 
homes, day  care centers,  and prisons; 
providing power  to critical  care facilities; 
distributing  water; opening  emergency 
shelters for the elderly; and helping the 
elderly  up and down stairs. The firefighters 
were able to perform  these actions because 
they  had fuel  in their  vehicles and because 
most of their  911  dispatch  centers and many 
fire stations had emergency power. 31 
When Hurricanes Rita  and Katrina  made 
landfall oil  and gasoline production  was 
virtually  halted as production  facilities were 
evacuated and wells were closed. By 
September  1, at least  one county  in  North 
Carolina  was faced with  60  percent  of its gas 
stations out  of fuel.32 Had the fuel  shortages 
persisted or  worsened, North  Carolina would 
have been  unable to provide the National 
Guard (which  obtains its fuel through  the 
state) with  fuel for  very  long.  The shortage 
occurred hundreds of miles from  the storm. 
North  Carolina  was fortunate  that  it  did not 
need to rely  on  the services of its National 
Guard during this crisis.  
Imagine what might happen  if an 
intentional  disruption  of the oil supply 
coincided with  a  widespread power outage or 
natural disaster. Imagine the National  Guard, 
fire services, EMS, and law  enforcement 
becoming essentially incapacitated.
US OIL IMPORTS AND OIL USES
The United States is the third largest 
producer  of oil  in  the world. 33 For  2009, EIA 
data  shows that the United States had net 
imports of 9.7  million barrels of crude oil  per 
day.34  The 9.7  million  barrels of crude oil 
imported per  day  was from  a total  of 18.7 
million barrels of crude oil used per  day.35 
During  the same year,  13.3  million  barrels of 
oil were used per  day  for  transportation 
purposes in  the United States,  with  nine 
million barrels per  day  specifically  used for 
motor gasoline. 36  The nine million  barrels 
used every  day  for  motor  gaso l ine 
represented 48  percent of all  US petroleum 
consumption.37  The relative numbers have 
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held fairly  constant.  In  2010,  the United 
States consumed 19.1  million  barrels of oil 
per  day, 38 with nine million barrels per  day 
used for  motor  gasoline.39  In  2010, net 
imports accounted for 49  percent of US oil 
consumption.40 Figure 1  below  describes the 
uses of oil in greater detail.
Importantly, very  little of the oil 
c o n s u m e d i n  t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s 
(approximately  1.11  percent in  2009)  is used 
for  electricity  production.41 That  means that 
adding  nuclear  or  clean  coal facilities, 
building  wind farms,  installing  solar  panel 
fields, etc., do little to foster energy 
independence.  Those technologies do not 
replace oil combustion  in  a  manner  that  can 
currently  be utilized by  most  of the 
transportation sector. 
By  focusing  on  the single greatest  use of 
oil – the nine million  barrels that are used as 
motor gasoline every  day  – the solution 
emerges from  the problem  itself. Figure 2 
below  graphically  illustrates the problem  and 
in so doing, the genesis for  a  solution 
emerges. 
Figure 1. Uses of Oil 42
1 Liquefied petroleum gases.
2 Asphalt  and road oil, aviation gasoline, kerosene, lubricants, naphtha-type jet fuel,  pentanes plus, petrochemical 
feedstocks, special naphthas, still gas (refinery gas), waxes, miscellaneous products, and crude oil burned as fuel.
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Figure 2. Oil  Imports, Consumption and Amounts 
Used for Motor Gasoline43 
If the United States  stopped using 
gasoline to  power its  automobiles,  it would 
essentially become energy independent 
overnight.  While it  may  not  be possible to 
transform  literally  overnight, it  is possible  to 
transition to EVs in  a  few  short  years, cease 
using  motor  gasoline, and thereby  become 
energy  independent in  a  few  short  years. 
Although  the move to EVs is likely  to occur 
slowly  in  response to market  forces alone,44 
given  the urgency  of the security  threat  posed 
by  dependence on foreign  oil,  market  forces 
need to be stimulated to rapidly  bring  about 
the change.
CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING THE 
ADOPTION OF AN EV FLEET 
Electric vehicle technology  has advanced to 
the point  of providing  a driving experience in 
both  range and performance that  is 
comparable to that  provided by  internal 
combustion passenger  vehicles. The high 
performance Tesla  Roadster  sports car  is 
quite  literally  where the rubber  meets the 
road. It  is an  EV  capable of traveling 300 
miles on a  single charge.45  The primary 
difficulty  in  providing  mainstream  vehicles of 
similar  performance capability  is the cost  of 
EV  batteries.  Fortunately,  EV  battery  prices 
are falling  and falling  quickly.  One prediction 
is that  a  battery  capable of powering a  vehicle 
100 miles,  which  cost  $33,000 in  2011, will 
cost just $16,000 by the end of 2013.46
Analysis of historical  fluctuations in 
gasoline prices demonstrates that with long-
term  price increases in  the cost  of gasoline, 
people will  reduce their  consumption  of 
gasoline,  at least  partially, by  moving  to more 
fuel-efficient vehicles.47  However, speeding 
up EV  adoption  depends on several factors, 
including: improving  battery  efficiencies and 
capacities to increase range; bringing  the 
total cost  of EV  ownership in  line with  or 
below  the total cost  of gasoline powered 
vehicles; and increasing  the pace of EV 
infrastructure development  (e.g., recharge/
refuel facilities). 48
GASOLINE PRICE AND VEHICLE CHOICE
Around the turn  of the millennium,  carbon 
tax and other  policy  discussions about global 
warming  brought  the question  of gasoline 
elasticity  into sharp focus. Rather  than look 
just at  traditional measures of elasticity, the 
literature evolved in  an effort  to account for 
income disparities, miles driven  and, 
ultimately, vehicle choice. Gasoline demand 
and the demand for  automobiles were 
modeled as a  joint  decision.  By  also 
accounting  for  income,  it emerged that there 
was not a uniform  elasticity  measure,  but 
rather  elasticity  varied across the income 
distribution. 49  Importantly, it  was also 
determined that  gasoline demand responds 
to changes in  the price of gasoline in  large 
part by  modifying  the fuel  efficiency  of the 
car  fleet  rather  than  through an  adjustment 
of miles traveled.50  An  historic review, 
looking  at  the  period from  2003  through 
2007, determined that  the 100 percent 
increase in  gasoline prices over that  time had 
induced motorists to adjust  the types of 
vehicles they  purchased.51  One study 
determined that if gasoline price increases by 
10 percent, the demand for  SUVs will 
decrease by  13.7  percent  and the demand for 
hybrid cars will increase by  9.1  percent. 52 The 
report  specifically  notes the potential policy 
advantages that  tax  increases on  the price of 
gasoline have over  increasing  the federal 
corporate average fuel  economy  (CAFE) 
standards. That  advantage stems from  more 
direct alignment with market forces.53  
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A PREDICTIVE MODEL
Recognizing  that  changes in  the price of 
gasoline will result  in  changes in  the vehicles 
consumers purchase,  a  logical progression  is 
to examine the possibility  of predicting  the 
extent of that  change in  purchasing  behavior. 
In  order to provide a  rigorous basis for 
federal  policies that  would accelerate the 
nation’s transition  from  gasoline internal 
combustion  engines to a  national fleet of EVs, 
it  would be useful to develop a  model to 
predict the effect  various policy  choices 
would have on EV  adoption.  The model 
developed here examines the basic costs of 
vehicle ownership as well as the more 
complex  factors of vehicle choice.  The 
methodology  provides a  model  that should be 
reasonably  accurate at lower  volumes of 
sales, recognizing that given  the overall 
complexities of the system, it  cannot  predict 
precise sales numbers.  The model will also 
create a  general methodology  where any 
practitioner  can  incorporate additional 
factors, or  utilize different assumptions,  and 
have a  grounded basis to predict  the results 
flowing from those choices.
The model development  is described in 
detail in  Appendix  1.  It  relied on  the 
theoretical  framework developed by  Jeihani 
and Sibdari. 54 Though they  chose to calculate 
the relative probability  of choosing one car 
over  another, the model developed here 
solves for  sales volume of a  particular  vehicle 
class. In all,  three vehicle classes are included 
in  the analysis: SUV,  hybrid,  and EV.  Though 
the relationships established by  hybrid data 
serve as reasonable proxies for  EVs,  because 
the influencing  factors are somewhat 
different (e.g., the price of electricity  can  be 
expected to effect EV  purchasing  more than 
hybrids),  EVs require their  own equation. 
Historical data on  both  SUV  and hybrid 
vehicle  sales is used to determine coefficients 
whereby  the mathematical equation  most 
closely  aligns with  a  graph  of actual  historical 
car purchase data.
The coefficients that multiply  other terms 
are proportionality  factors.  That  is,  they 
measure the direction  and strength of the 
effect  of the term  they  multiply.  By  way  of 
example,  in  Equation  1  below, the coefficient 
B multiplies household income. A  change in 
household income is expected to cause a 
change in  sales of a  particular  class of 
vehicles,  but  whether  it causes more sales or 
less sales, and how  much  more or  less,  is 
captured by  the coefficient  B. There is one 
stand-alone coefficient. It  is a  catchall. There 
are certainly  factors that  influence the 
purchase of vehicles that are not  included as 
factors contained in the equation. For 
example,  an  advertising campaign  may 
impact  vehicle sales but is not  one of the 
factors analyzed using  historical  data.  Some 
factors effecting sales could be determined 
while others are probably  unknowable.  The 
models in  this article use the factors 
identified as relevant by Jeihani and Sibdari.
Where specific vehicle averages are 
necessary  (for  example, average sales price of 
the class of vehicle)  a  representative vehicle 
was chosen. The Ford Explorer  represents the 
SUV class of vehicles, and the Toyota Prius 
represents the hybrid class of vehicles.  The 
SUV was modeled to test the framework 
against a  more traditional  class of vehicles, 
one whose sales likely  have a  stronger 
correlation  to the price of gasoline than  other 
vehicle classes.
There is insufficient data  for  a  meaningful 
historical analysis of EV  sales, due to the low 
number  of EV  sales. Until  sales are robust 
enough  that it  appears the modeling  factors 
are measurably  impacting  total EV  sales, a 
meaningful historical  sales analysis,  using the 
factors contained in  this article,  cannot be 
accomplished.  Therefore,  the coefficients 
derived for  hybrid vehicles are used as a 
proxy  in  predicting EV sales,  assuming  the 
two are closely  related.  Those coefficients are 
then  used in  the model to predict  future sales 
of EVs.  Appendix 1  describes in  detail  how 
the formulas were derived.  The equation for 
hybrid vehicle sales is:
 (1)
The equation representing  the sales 
figures of SUV vehicle sales is:
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 (2)
The coefficients derived for the hybrid 
vehicle  will be used as proxies for  the EV 
sales volume model. It  is reasonable to 
presume that factors influencing  people’s 
decision  to purchase hybrid vehicles will 
similarly  influence their  decision  to purchase 
EVs. As with  hybrids,  it is likely  that the first 
consumers to purchase EVs do so for  a 
myriad of concerns and motivations (e.g., 
environmental, status). As sales of hybrids 
grew,  economic forces such  as declining 
vehicle  price and increase in  gasoline price 
likely  have become the dominant market 
drivers. The same is presumed to be true with 
EVs. Therefore, only  one parameter  from  the 
hybrid model,  Equation 1,  was replaced. 
CPMhy was replaced with  PMEV, which  was 
derived using  the representative cost  of 
electricity  per  kWhr and the number  of miles 
driven  by  the EV  per kWhr. Accordingly, the 
model describing  the sales volume of electric 
vehicles is represented by:
 (3)
• Ahy = all  consumer  preferences and 
choice factors not  specifically  addressed 
elsewhere in the equation,
• SEV = the sales volume of electric 
vehicles, 
• Bhy = weight factor  for  societal annual 
income, 
• I = societal average annual income,
• Chy = weight factor for unemployment,
• U = total unemployment, 
• Dhy = cost of locomotion factor,
• PMEV = price per mile for locomotion,
• Ehy = weight factor for price of hybrid,
• PEV = price of hybrid vehicle
Appendix 2  contains the historic data  used 
to derive the constants,  encompassing  the 
years 1991  to 2010 for  SUVs and 2000–2010 
for  hybrids, as well  as a  description  of the 
process used to determine the coefficients. 
The resulting  coefficients are contained in 
Table 1.
Note that  Dhy,  which represents the 
response of the hybrid vehicle sales figures to 
gas prices,  is positive whereas DSUV is 
negative.  This is intuitively  plausible and 
represents the expected fact  that  higher  gas 
prices provide an incentive for the purchase 
of hybrid or  electric vehicles whereas they 
provide a  disincentive to the purchase (or 
ownership) of SUVs.  At  it  most  elemental, 
this is the  basis for  the government  policy 
proposed below.
APPLICATION OF THE MODEL TO 
FORECAST SALES
At this point, the equations have been  derived 
and the coefficients describing  the direction 
and strength  each factor  has on  the sales of a 
class of vehicles has been determined from 
fitting  a  mathematical curve to a  graph  of 
historical sales.  Using  the relationships 
captured by  those coefficients,  the models 
can  now  be applied to predict  future sales by 
estimating  the future value of the causal 
factors described in  the equations (e.g., 
expectations of the future price of gasoline 
and of the future cost of the various classes of 
vehicles).  It  is therefore necessary  to project 
the data  into the future.  Various government 
policy  choices,  (e.g.,  the gasoline excise tax 
per  gallon  and the rebate to the buyers of 
EVs) are parameters that can  be adjusted by 
the user  to achieve a  desired result affecting 
the consumption  of gasoline and the 
purchase of vehicle types.  
Table 1. Coefficients of the Sales Volume Models (Equations 1 and 2) of Hybrid and SUV Vehicles as 
Derived by Fitting The Equations to Historical Sales Data (Appendix 2)
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A B C D E
Hybrid/electric 3.6 2.16*10–4 -1*10–13 31.1 -1.66*10–4
SUV 13.36 2.01*10–4 -1.4*10–7 -10.8 -1.97*10–4
Although  the model was tested using  a 
wide variety  of parameters,  those chosen 
were ultimately  selected because they  seemed 
to represent a  good balance of the positive 
and negative effects of available policy 
choices and conservative assumptions about 
future economic conditions. The assumptions 
applied to the predictive model (Equation  3) 
to produce the predictive result  can  be found 
in Appendix 3.
Applying the policy  (most  notably  a 
gasoline excise tax  starting  at  $2  and rising  to 
$5  per  gallon  of gasoline, and an  EV  purchase 
r e b a t e o f $ 1 5 , 0 0 0 ) a n d e c o n o m i c 
assumptions to Equation 3,  provides the 
following  projections of EV  sales between 
2011 and 2018 (Figure 3).   
Figure 3  shows that  EV  sales will begin 
rising rapidly  in  a  “hockey  stick”  manner 
once the policies choices listed above are 
introduced in  2012. A  substantially  higher 
gasoline price as well as a  rebate of $15,000 
to each  EV  buyer is expected to induce this 
“hockey  stick”  effect. The rebate is funded 
entirely  from  the revenue generated by  the 
gasoline excise tax. (Note: policies that  will 
lessen the regressive nature of this tax  are 
discussed below.)
Table 2  shows the annual  excise taxes 
predicted to be collected each  year  through 
2018,  the amounts to be distributed as 
rebates for  EV  purchases, and the remaining 
sums to be used to implement  other  EV 
adoption  policies (e.g.,  refunds to low-income 
families and recharge infrastructure build out 
incentives).   Note that  until 2017, the 
incentive rebates represent  less than  25 
percent of the collected tax.
Figure 3. Predicted EV Sales for the Period 2011-2018 in Response to Taxation and Subsidy Policies as 
Projected by the Model
STEIN, ENERGY INDEPENDENCE  9
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME 9, ARTICLE 4 (FEBRUARY 2013) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
Table 1. Excise Tax Collected
Year Total Gasoline Excise Tax 
Collected
Tax Used For EV 
Rebates
Gas Tax Net of EV 
Rebate
2012  $34,534,635,600  $3,982,118,284  $30,552,517,316 
2013  $68,548,941,078  $5,438,617,192  $63,110,323,885 
2014  $84,797,868,872  $7,405,192,521  $77,392,676,352 
2015  $83,588,354,094  $10,054,056,083  $73,534,298,011 
2016  $81,946,191,600  $13,613,986,738  $68,332,204,863 
2017  $79,722,573,766  $18,388,609,526  $61,333,964,241 
2018  $76,719,100,877  $24,780,556,145  $51,938,544,732 
Any  effort  at  predicting  future behavior  is 
a  risky  proposition. The mathematical 
equation used here is no different.  Due to the 
dearth of data  relating  to EV  sales, it was 
necessary  to presume that the hybrid 
coefficients will translate to the EV  model,  it 
fails to reflect  the bounded nature of the 
vehicle  market,  and it presumes that  past 
linear  relationships will  be maintained into 
the future.  All this is to say,  the model is not 
intended to be provide an  actual,  exact 
number  of EVs that  will be purchased.  The 
numbers themselves are less important than 
the trends, the general magnitude of the 
results,  and the relationship of the factors to 
each  other. Graphically, it  is the bend in  the 
hockey  stick of Figure 3  that is important. 
The bend represents the rapid change that 
can  be brought  about  if the policy  levers 
discussed are utilized appropriately.
POLICY CHOICES
SUGGESTED COURSE OF ACTION
The modeling  results demonstrate that  it  is 
possible to alter  consumer  behavior 
significantly  in  favor  of EV  purchases by 
using  an  excise tax to raise the price of 
gasoline and using  those funds in  part to 
bring down the cost of EVs. Each  step in 
lowering  the use of gasoline by  automobiles is 
a  step towards energy  independence and 
greater  national and homeland security. 
Therefore, in  a program  announced 
significantly  ahead of time, the federal 
government  should implement an  excise tax 
on  retail  gasoline purchases. In  order  for 
elasticity  to strengthen, consumers must  have 
substitutes that are easy  to switch  to.  That is, 
if there are not  readily  available alternative 
choices to driving  a  vehicle that  uses gasoline, 
consumers will not be able to change their  car 
purchase choices even  if gasoline is extremely 
expensive.  Therefore,  a  portion  of the funds 
raised by  the excise tax should go directly 
towards a tax  credit  or  point  of purchase 
credit for  the purchase of EVs. The additional 
funds raised should be used to offset the 
effect  of the tax  on  the lowest  income 
segment in the population.  That concern  is 
addressed in  more detail below. Additionally, 
it  is important to use those funds as incentive 
to propel the creation  of a  recharging 
infrastructure in  the United States. The 
ultimate goal is an all EV  automobile market 
and the end of motor  gasoline powered 
vehicles,  without diminishment  of the US 
driving experience, and without a  switch  to 
vehicles powered by  other  forms of oil  (e.g., 
diesel). As stated previously, tax  increases on 
the price of gasoline create a more direct 
alignment  with  market  forces (as compared 
with  CAFE standard increases).55  The policy 
choices described herein  accelerate market 
forces, but  in  the end, it  is a  policy  reliant  on 
market  forces to drive the change to EVs. It  is 
not recommended that  government  mandate 
that  only  EVs are  sold,  rather  that with 
appropriate and limited pressure, the market 
will determine which  and what type of 
vehicles are available for sale.
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EXCISE TAX ON RETAIL GASOLINE 
PURCHASES
A  tax on  the sale of retail gasoline should be 
implemented.  As was demonstrated by  the 
model, an  excise  tax  of between  two and five 
dollars raises more funds than  is required for 
rebates, even  where the rebate is $15,000, 
double the historical rebate on  new  EV 
purchases.  In  order to allow  consumers to 
prepare for  the economic consequences of the 
excise tax, and with  the goal of seeing change 
at  the beginning of implementation,  it is 
important that the policy  be announced 
ahead of time.  It  takes one to two years of 
gasoline price increases before there are real 
shifts in purchase behaviors. 56  
Phasing  in  the tax serves two purposes. 
First,  though  announcing  the increase ahead 
of time should allow  for  a  more immediate 
response to the price increases,  there are 
inevitably  consumers who cannot or  will not 
react immediately.  A  phase-in allows some of 
those consumers to adjust  before the full  tax 
is in  place.  Additionally,  a  phase-in  would 
allow  any  unanticipated consequences to 
occur  in  a  more controlled manner, 
diminishing  their  magnitude and allowing 
more time to respond appropriately.
Eventually,  economies of scale should 
bring down  the price of EVs so that  they  are 
sufficiently  competitive without  government 
rebates. According to the DOE, just  the 
creation of battery  manufacturing plants, 
spurred by  Recovery  Act matching  funds,  is 
lowering  battery  prices through  economies of 
scale. 57 As demand increases and production 
rises to meet the demand, prices should fall 
allowing  market forces to drive the price 
reductions.
RECHARGE INFRASTRUCTURE
If EVs are to be adopted nationwide,  a  well-
designed and widely  distributed network  of 
charging  stations is imperative.58 A  portion of 
the funds collected by  the excise tax  net  of EV 
rebates should be used to assist  in  the 
creation of this infrastructure. The fourth 
column  of Table 2  illustrates the additional 
monies that  will be available to policymakers. 
A  portion  of those funds will also be required 
to offset  the economic hardship the gasoline 
tax may  create for  low-income families. That 
issue is discussed in more detail below.  
Range anxiety, a  term  described by 
Bostford and Szczepanek, 59 is a  phenomenon 
not  present  with  hybrid vehicles and, 
therefore,  not  captured by  the coefficients 
developed from  hybrid vehicle historical data. 
Range anxiety  is particularly  troublesome 
because it  is more than  a  reflection  of the 
ability  of a  driver  to go from  point A  to point 
B. It reflects that  a driver  may  choose not  to 
try  to go from  point A  to point  B even  when 
the EV is fully  capable of traveling  that 
distance. Bostford and Szczepanek describe 
range anxiety  using an  anecdote from  the 
Tokyo Electric Power  Company  (TEPCO).  In 
2007,  TEPCO introduced electric  service 
vehicles and tracked employee usage of the 
vehicles over  an  8 x  15  km  service area. 
Initially, overnight  charging  was the only 
option.  A  few  months into the program  they 
realized that  EV  drivers were only  covering  a 
small portion  of the service area. TEPCO 
responded by  adding  a  fast charge station 
that  could be used any  time of the day. After 
its installation,  EV  drivers accessed the 
service area in  a  similar  manner  to 
c o n v e n t i o n a l v e h i c l e d r i v e r s .  M o s t 
interestingly, the fast  charger  was rarely 
used. 60 The point is that  the fast charger  was 
not necessary  to meet  the actual  needs of the 
E V ,  i t w a s n e c e s s a r y  t o m e e t  t h e 
psychological needs of the EV drivers.  It was 
necessary  to counter  range anxiety.  If range 
anxiety  is not addressed, it  may  have a 
significant deleterious effect  on  the accuracy 
of the EV model.  
There are various types of recharge 
facilities.  The cost  of the slow  charge facilities 
is significantly  cheaper than  for  fast  charge. 
In  fact,  some EVs can  slow  charge without 
any  change to a  standard electrical  outlet.61 
As shown  in  Figure 4, as the speed of the 
charge goes up, so does the required voltage/
amperage output,  which  necessitates more 
expensive facilities. 
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Typical	 set	 of	 charging	 options	 developed	 for	 an	 EV.
EVSE Utility Service Usage Charge Power 
(kW)
Time to Charge
Level 1 110 V, 15 A Opportunity 1.4 18 hours
Level 2 220 V, 15 A Home 3.3 8 hours
Level 2 220 V, 30 A Home/Public 6.6 4 hours
Level 3 480 V, 167 A Public/Private 50-70 20-50 min
Figure 4. Recharge Levels and Time to Charge62
One estimate of the cost  of recharging 
stations can  be taken from  a  project 
underway  in  Portland, Oregon.63  Oregon  is 
using  a  two million  dollar  federal grant 
(stimulus money)  to build  forty-two “quick 
charge”  stations along  the I-5  corridor, 
ensuring  no gap greater  than fifty  miles.  That 
averages out  to $47,619  federal  dollars per 
station.  These stations are designed to charge 
an  EV  battery  to 80  percent  capacity  in a 
twenty to thirty minute period. 64
A  project  funded in  part by  the US 
Department of Energy  (DOE) provides an 
estimate for  the cost of building  slow  charge 
stations. Given  the total cost  of $230 million 
(of federal  money) to build 15,000  charging 
stations, each  station  costs approximately 
$15,333; however,  that also includes 310 
quick  charging stations,65  which  are more 
expensive.  Assuming  the quick charging 
stations cost $47,619  each,  the cost per 
station  of the ordinary  charging  stations 
would be approximately  $14,652  federal 
dollars. 
Fortunately,  recent  stimulus funds have 
established the efficacy  of dollar-for-dollar 
g r a n t s i n  e s t a b l i s h i n g a  r e c h a r g e 
infrastructure.  As described previously, with 
two million  dollars of stimulus funds Oregon 
has created a recharge infrastructure 
covering  all  of Interstate 5  that runs through 
the state.  It is not expected that funds will be 
required to incentivize all recharge stations. 
As EV  sales increase,  market  forces may  lead 
to the development  of the infrastructure as 
well.  Already  some retail establishments have 
determined that  it  is in  their  interest to put  in 
recharge parking spaces. 66   Nevertheless, 
especially  given  the concerns of range 
anxiety, to truly  jump start US energy 
independence,  significant investment should 
be put  into creating  a  recharge infrastructure, 
fully funded by the retail gasoline excise tax.
NEW POWER STATIONS AND 
INFRASTRUCTURE
EVs use far  more energy  than  may  be 
obvious.  Adding  an  EV to a  neighborhood 
will increase the demand for  electricity  to the 
same or  greater  extent  of adding a  new  house 
to the neighborhood. For  example, the Tesla 
Roadster  contains a  56  kWh  battery. 67  By 
comparison,  consumption by  residential 
utility  customers averaged 908 kWh  per 
month,68  meaning  that the  average house 
uses about  30 kWh per  day  versus the 56 
kWh  per  day  if a  person  fully  drained the 
Tesla  Roadster  battery  each  day.  The energy 
currently  provided by  gasoline will  have to 
come from  power  stations. This means the 
United States will  need not only  additional 
stations but  also additional transmission 
infrastructure,  as the current infrastructure is 
not sufficient.69
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Fortunately,  power  companies are largely 
financially  successful. 70  If the regulatory 
obstacles are diminished,  private industry 
should take over  the building  of generation 
and transmission capabilities to meet  the 
demand created by  EVs;71  however,  it  takes 
time to build power stations and the 
transmission  infrastructure to support it. If 
the regulatory  obstacles are removed,  and the 
government’s plan to encourage EV  adoption 
is transparent, unambiguous,  communicated, 
and publicized one to two years before it  goes 
into effect, that will  allow  market forces to 
begin responding  so they  are prepared to 




Will the US citizenry  accept  a  substantial  tax 
on  the sale of gasoline? There is a  historical 
basis to believe they  might, if citizens accept 
the security  implications that  are alleviated 
by  the tax.  A  parallel  can  be drawn  to 
economic  events during  and after  WWII. 
Between  the purchase of government war 
bonds,  and the substantial federal  income tax 
paid by  Americans, federal  revenues were 
raised to never  before seen  amounts, “$98.3 
billion  by  1945,  nearly  half the war-swollen 
GDP.” 72  Although  the government’s 
propaganda  campaign  centered on  the ethical 
imperative  to counter  the Axis tyranny, 
combined with  the self-interest  realized by 
investing  in  war  bonds,  research  has shown 
that  the government  missed the mark. The 
real reason  citizens accepted the fiscal 
hardship was not  for  abstract  ideals; rather  it 
was the chance to help someone they  could 
identify  with.  The idealized all-American  GI, 
the boy  next door,  was who they  were 
helping. By  paying  taxes and buying bonds, 
people saw  themselves putting a  gun  and 
bullets directly  in  the hands of a  GI. This 
allowed for  a  sort  of indirect participation in 
the war itself. 73
A  similar view  of the same social/
psychological phenomena has been referred 
to as the post-tragedy  opportunity  bubble. 74 
Breckenridge and Moghaddam  look  at  the 
psychological similarities between  the attacks 
of 9/11  and the attack on Pearl  Harbor.  They 
describe the fleeting  moment of opportunity 
where the populace rallies around its leaders, 
trusts them  more, and, because they  are 
looking  for  a specific way  to help,  can  be 
directed in a manner not usually possible.  
In  the first State of the Union  Address 
after  9/11,  President  Bush  called on 
Americans to give at  least  two years over  the 
course  of their  lifetimes to the service of their 
neighbors and nation.75  Unfortunately,  that 
message did not  resonate with  Americans in  a 
way  likely  to make them  feel  like part  of the 
fight  against those who attacked us. The 
success of fiscal participation  during WWII 
turned on  personalizing the response, 
allowing  the citizenry  to feel it  was truly 
participating  in  defeating the great evil. The 
urgent desire to participate was given  outlet 
in  a  contemporaneous ability  to aid in  the 
defeat  of the enemy. The outlet  was 
immediate and direct, not an ephemeral and 
vague channeling  of that desire to some 
general  purpose,  at  some undetermined time 
in the future.  
In reviewing  the post 9/11  response, 
Breckenridge and Moghaddam  show  that the 
government’s failure to provide meaningful 
participation resulted in a  failure to capture 
the public’s long-term  engagement and 
support.  There was no mechanism  for  the 
citizenry  to help defeat  the great  evil. 
Furthermore,  the opportunity  to harness the 
public sentiment is fleeting.   Once the bubble 
pops, the opportunity is essentially lost. 76
Taken  together,  these examples show  an 
uphill,  though  not  impossible,  task of moving 
the citizenry  of the United States to accept 
the sacrifice of a  significant tax on  gasoline. A 
simple and straightforward message needs to 
make the case that there is an  ongoing  and 
real evil threatening the nation,  caused by 
dependence on foreign oil.  In  countering  this 
threat, the link  must  be clear  in  the minds of 
the citizenry: money  spent at  the pump (in 
the form  of an  additional  tax) is buying back 
the very  guns and bombs that are killing 
Americans.  Secondly,  a  personal  and clear 
image must  be established between  the 
money  paid and the lives saved. While paying 
the tax  may  not  put a  gun  in the hands of a 
GI, it can  be shown  to take a  gun  out of the 
hands of the enemy. No more traumatic  head 
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injuries,  no more amputees, no more 
sophisticated plots to attack America.
Currently  the country  may  not  be ready  to 
view  the threat of dependence on  foreign oil 
in  the same concrete terms as the bombing of 
Pearl Harbor  or  the events of 9/11.  If that  is 
the case,  the government  should nonetheless 
begin  building the framework described 
herein. With  so many  enemies funded by  oil 
sales,  it  is unfortunately  only  a  matter of time 
before another  tragic  event  disrupts the 
landscape of the United States. When that 
happens, leadership should be ready  to ask 
for  the participation  of the citizenry,  to ask 
for  their  shared sacrifice as a  direct  and 
meaningful way  to participate in defeating 
those who seek to do us harm.
PUBLIC SUPPORT POLITICALLY
By  using  EVs as the mechanism  to end energy 
dependence, this paper  promotes a solution 
that both  the political  right (ending 
dependence on  foreign  oil) and the political 
left  (environmental  benefits of EVs) have 
vocally  supported in  the past.  Though  this 
article is solely  focused on  the detrimental 
effects energy  dependence has on US 
security, proposing a  solution  that is 
agreeable to both  sides of the political 
spectrum  should ease adoption  by  the 
political system  that  must choose whether  or 
not and how to implement the plan.
SOURCE OF ENERGY STORAGE 
MATERIALS
The current  technology  of choice for 
powering  EVs is the lithium  ion  battery.77 
There are several problems with  reliance on 
lithium  for  energy  storage. First,  there is 
d i s a g r e e m e n t  w i t h  j u s t h o w  m u c h 
economically  available lithium  there is in  the 
world,  with  some experts saying  supplies are 
quite  limited,78  and others saying there are 
ample supplies available.79  More troubling 
for  national  and homeland security  is the 
location  of the largest known  deposits of 
lithium.  They  are not in  the United States. 
The Andes Mountains in  South  America, 
specifically  the  area  where the borders of 
Chile, Bolivia, and Argentina  meet, contain  a 
large majority  of the world’s usable lithium,80 
with  Bolivia  containing  the largest  known 
deposits in  the world.81 Recent  discoveries in 
Afghanistan suggest  that  it  too may  possess 
significant deposits of lithium. Additionally, 
current battery  technology  relies on  magnets 
of a  type that  depends on  rare earth  metals 
like neodymium,  95  percent of which  are 
produced in China. 82
It defeats the goal of energy  independence 
if the United States simply  trades one energy 
dependency  for  another.  “We know  that 
Bolivia  can become the Saudi Arabia  of 
Lithium.” 83 Policymakers must  be mindful of 
this potential development,  but  it is still 
preferable to dependence on  vehicles that 
derive locomotion  through  oil, and there are 
reasons to believe it  is avoidable.  In  the first 
instance,  unlike reliance on oil (where the 
resource is consumed with  each  trip)  EVs 
consume locally  produced electricity  with 
each  trip and additional  lithium  is only 
required when  the battery  is replaced or  a 
new  vehicle is purchased.  To put this in 
perspective, consider  the difference between 
events that squeeze the supply  of oil and 
those that  would squeeze the supply  of 
lithium. A  shutoff of oil  has an  almost 
i m m e d i a t e d e l e t e r i o u s e f f e c t  o n 
transportation.  A  squeeze on  the supply  of 
lithium  means that  fewer  new  batteries can 
be produced. The batteries in  existence will 
continue to function.  Over  a  period of weeks 
or  months a  lessening  in  the efficiency  of 
vehicles may  be seen, but there will  not  be a 
fundamental disruption  of the transportation 
sector.
There are also other  potential sources of 
lithium.  The Institute of Ocean  Energy  at 
Saga University  in  Japan has described the 
research  being  conducted by  Japan  and 
South  Korea  to enable harvesting  of the 230 
billion  tons of lithium  present in seawater. 84 
Similarly, lithium  may  not  be the one and 
only  source of energy  for EV  batteries.  The 
history  of the EV battery  shows a progression 
every  few  years to a  different  source material, 
from  lead acid to nickel metal hydride and 
now  to lithium-ion. 85  Development  is 
constantly  progressing  on  a  variety  of 
alternatives like aluminum  air  batteries. 
Some research  has shown  reason to believe 
that  metal air  batteries – where the cathode 
of the battery  is air  – could provide up to 
eleven  times the energy  density  of the best 
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lithium-ion batteries currently  available. 86 
Variety  should be strongly  encouraged, with 
appropriate nudges to help orient  the 
market’s focus towards resources available 
within the United States. 87
WHY NOT NATURAL GAS?
Proponents of natural  gas have touted it as 
the best  alternate method of powering 
vehicles.  There are a  number of factors that 
make natural  gas less appealing, at  least at 
this point  in time,  than  electric  vehicles.  First, 
to achieve equivalency  to the range of today’s 
gasoline powered vehicle, the natural gas 
must  be in a  liquefied form.  The technical 
c o m p l i c a t i o n s o f u s i n g a n d w i d e l y 
distributing  liquefied natural  gas at refueling 
stations has roughly  the same challenges as 
establishing a  recharge infrastructure for 
electric vehicles.  Except, of course, that home 
charging  an  electric vehicle overnight  is no 
more complicated than  plugging  in  a 
household dryer, so in  effect a  portion  of the 
recharge infrastructure is already in place.  
Second, using natural  gas as the direct 
source  to power  vehicles locks the country 
into a  single source replacement for  oil. 
Though  estimates suggest  America’s natural 
gas resources are quite large,  it does not 
make sense to create an infrastructure that 
limits the country’s flexibility, and not all 
estimates describe such  robust stores.88 What 
if estimates are wrong? What  if the difficulty 
of extracting  the natural gas proves greater 
than  currently  believed? What  if the 
environmental affects are so ruinous that  the 
country  rejects some forms of extraction? 
What  if we simply  run  out  of this non-
renewable source? Electric  vehicles are a  far 
more flexible option.  The electricity  to charge 
the batteries can  come from  any  source of 
domestically  supplied energy  and still yield 
energy  independence. If natural gas supplies 
are as bountiful and available as currently 
thought, natural gas could fuel the power 
plants that  charge the electric vehicles.  The 
great  flexibility  of the electric vehicle is that  it 
can  just as readily  incorporate energy  from 
coal,  solar  power, wind or  any  other  source or 
combination of sources of energy.
FUNGIBLE NATURE OF THE OIL MARKET
Oil is part  of a fungible world market.89 That 
means that reducing oil  to levels where the 
United States is capable of providing all its 
petroleum  needs does not  necessarily  mean 
that  the oil used in  the United States will  be 
100 percent  domestically  produced. As it 
stands currently,  the United States exports 
two million  barrels of oil per  day. 90  As US 
demand decreases with the roll  out  of EVs, 
the United States may  begin to export  more 
of its oil. As a  fungible product, domestic oil 
prices will  not necessarily  be protected from 
the effects of international  disruption  of oil 
supplies. However, if the United States is 
c a p a b l e o f s u p p l y i n g  i t s o w n  o i l 
requirements, then with proper  planning it 
can  ensure a  relatively  uninterrupted supply 
of oil regardless of international supply 
disruptions.  
For  example, in  considering  what  first 
responders can  do to offset  the impact on 
their  operational capabilities in  the event of 
localized fuel  shortages, it  has been  suggested 
that  they  should enter  into firm  contracts for 
fuel.91  At present, firm  contracts would not 
solve the problem  for  the country  as a  whole. 
If the world supply  were disrupted,  domestic 
sources could not fulfill  the contracts, 
because there simply  would not be  enough 
fuel to go around. However,  once energy 
independence is achieved,  firm  contracts with 
domestic suppliers could all  be fulfilled. 
Those portions of the government  or  private 
sector  that  wish  to hedge against  supply 
disruptions could enter  into futures contracts 
or  other  contractual  arrangements to ensure 
a given supply at a given price.
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
A REGRESSIVE EXCISE TAX
A  tax is regressive when  it  causes lower-
income families to pay  a higher  percentage of 
their  income to the tax than  higher-income 
families.92 By  adding a cost-per-gallon  tax  on 
gasoline,  the financial effects would have a 
disproportionate impact  on  lower-income 
families. A  simple way  to lessen  the impact 
would be in  the form  of a  tax  credit  that  is 
phased out over  a  particular  income level. To 
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avoid bureaucratic expenses, a national or 
regional  average of both  the price of gasoline 
and of the average gallons consumed can be 
used.  The credit will not  precisely  match the 
expense incurred,  but can be sufficiently 
harmonized to minimize the harm  to lower-
income families.
For  example, in  2009, there were 8.8 
million families living below  the poverty  line. 
For  an  idea  of what  that  measures,  for  a 
family  of four made up of two adults and two 
children  the poverty  line was $21,756.93 For 
purposes of this example,  assume that each  of 
those families had one vehicle.  As explained 
in  Appendix  3, the average driver  uses 490 
gallons of gasoline a  year.  Assuming 
policymakers felt that  all  families below  the 
poverty  line should receive a  rebate, then  in  a 
year  where the gasoline excise tax  was two 
dollars, 8.8 million  families would receive a 
rebate of $980. That  would be a  total  rebate 
to those families of $8.624  billion.  If the 
rebate was phased out  incrementally  for 
families above the poverty  line, even 
assuming  another  $8.624  billion was 
returned to those families, Table 2  shows that 
there would still be $13.3  billion  left to use to 
promote recharge infrastructure growth 
($30.55  billion  left  after  EV  rebates,  minus 
$8.624 billion times two).
RISK OF INCREASING COST OF GOODS / 
INFLATION
Recent  gasoline price increases have caused a 
corresponding  increase in the cost  of goods, 
and may  diminish  consumers’ savings.94 
Rising  gasoline prices can  contribute to 
higher  transportation costs,  thereby  raising 
expenses at  all stages of production. 95 The 
course  of action proposed herein  minimizes 
that  threat  to an  extent. In  the first instance, 
the excise fee is only  levied on  motor  fuel. 
This does not  include diesel  fuel,  the form  of 
oil used by  the semi-trailer  trucks that 
transport  much  of the goods across the 
nation. In  2009, in  the United States, there 
was approximately  16,878,000  gallons of 
diesel fuel sold per  day,96  compared to 
approximately  49,798,000  gallons of retail 
u n l e a d e d g a s o l i n e s o l d p e r  d a y . 97 
Furthermore,  the 49,798,000 gallons of retail 
gasoline subject to the excise  tax  is only  about 
one sixth  of the motor  gasoline sales each 
day.  The other categories of motor  gasoline 
sold each  day  are DTW,  rack,  and bulk. 98 
Therefore,  governments and businesses that 
obtain  their gasoline in bulk would not be 
subject  to the excise tax  under  the 
implementation proposed herein. Since the 
price increase will  not be on  oil  in  general, 
but  on  a subset  with  less impact  on 
commerce dependent  on oil,  the forces that 
would otherwise push  the price of goods 
higher are diminished.
SIGNIFICANT DROP IN THE PRICE OF OIL
A  switch from  vehicles using motor  gasoline 
to EVs may  also be a  victim  of its own 
success.  With  sufficient numbers of EVs on 
the roads,  the demand for  gasoline will take a 
measurable decline.  Should a  significant 
number  of other  nations follow  a  similar 
course,  the worldwide demand for  gasoline 
may  drop significantly,  thereby  reducing  the 
price of oil. As the price of oil and therefore 
gasoline drops,  the effect of the program  may 
also decline.  Determining  an  appropriate 
f loor  for  the price  of gasol ine and 
automatically  increasing  the excise fee to 
maintain that floor could remedy this effect.
CONCLUSION
For  forty  years, every  president of the United 
States has proclaimed the critical importance 
of energy  independence. Time and again, the 
chains of foreign  oil  have shackled the 
decisions of American  officials; yet,  nothing 
has been  done.  No pragmatic,  realistic  step-
by-step plan has been  pursued to end this 
burden  on the American people. America  can 
break  free of those artificially  imposed 
restraints.  There is a  cost  to achieving  energy 
independence,  and as shown  herein, that  cost 
is two to five dollars on  each  gallon  of retail 
gasoline sold. 
Two to five dollars per  gallon  of gasoline 
will bolster  the nation’s critical infrastructure 
by  expanding and upgrading the production 
and transmission of electricity.  Two to five 
dollars per  gallon  of gasoline will bring an 
end to funding  the very  terrorists we then 
spend billions trying to defeat. Two to five 
dollars per  gallon  of gasoline will bring an 
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end to tortured national policy  decisions and 
the otherwise nonsensical strategic military 
decisions.  With  conviction,  determination, 
and selfless leadership – and two to five 
dollars per  gallon  of gasoline – the United 
States can  achieve energy  independence in  a 
few short years.
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Appendix 1 – Premise and Development of the Model
PREMISE
The model developed by  Jeihani and Sibdari provides the conceptual basis for development 
of a  predictive model. 99  They  utilize a  binary  vehicle choice model  in  order  to provide a 
quantitative framework  to assess the various factors that  might  influence consumer  transition 
choices.  In  their  work, the relative probability, P,  of choosing one type of car, denoted by  the 
subscript  e, to another  type of car, denoted by  the subscript c,  for  any  given  household, i,  is 
captured by the following formula:
 (4)
Where A,  B,  and C are constants, K represents the characteristics of the buyer, and L 
represents the characteristics of the car.  The constant A  in Equation  4  can be related to the type 
of car  that, in  effect,  represents a  bias that  a  consumer  might have towards a  vehicle.  For 
instance,  range anxiety  might  well make a  consumer  wary  of an  EV  and this may  be captured in 
the constant A,  driving  down  the probability  of choosing an  electric  car. Likewise,  styling,  or  fuel 
economy might well have an influence, as could environmental considerations.
The constant B weights the characteristics of the buyer  towards certain  car  types,  while the 
constant C weights the vehicle characteristics.
The constant  Ki captures household characteristics including both  employment  status and 
income while L captures the initial vehicle cost and the cost per mile for vehicle locomotion. 
Though  Jeihani and Sibdari  used only  one standalone constant,  A,  one could imagine 
including a  great  many  such constants in  an attempt  to capture a  greater  range of consumer 
biases.  One could imagine developing an input to the car  characteristics that  would include a 
national defense cost  per  vehicle, where that cost  reflects the investment  made by  the DoD to 
maintain  shipping  lanes, providing  support  to governments that are critical for  oil imports,  etc. 
Those costs would then  appear  as a  price per  vehicle, which could be denoted as a  national 
defense cost,  ND,  that  is weighted by  the fuel efficiency  of a  particular  vehicle.  Likewise, one 
could attempt  to capture the economic costs of the oil trade deficit  to the nation,  the 
approximately  one billion  dollar  daily  deficit. Those costs could also appear  as a  price per  vehicle 
and, denoted as a trade imbalance cost, TI, would also be weighted by a vehicle’s fuel efficiency.
Notably, Jeihani  and Sibdari did not adjust  for  inflation when analyzing  historical data  they 
collected.  Adjusting  the historical data  used herein  was considered; however,  the model is 
designed to reflect  people’s choices at a  fixed point in  time.  When  consumers go to purchase a 
vehicle  they  are considering  what  the price of gasoline currently  is,  what their  income currently 
is,  etc.  They  may  also be considering  what  they  expect the value of those items to be in the 
future,  but  they  are concerned with  absolute amounts. The model  shows fixed choices from 
moment to moment.   If high levels of inflation  were anticipated going forward,  that could 
influence consumer  purchasing  decisions in general (e.g., buy  assets rather than  hold onto 
money),  but none of the purchase periods analyzed in  this paper took place during periods 
where inflation  was particularly  high.   From  1991  through  2010, no calendar  year  saw  inflation 
greater  than  4.2  percent.100  In  fact, adjusting  for  inflation  would flatten  the changes in  the 
economic  data. Rather  than  reflecting  reality,  it  would actually  skew  the reality  that the 
consumer faced at the time of their purchase decision. 
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DEVELOPMENT OF PREDICTIVE MODEL
Assuming  a  linear relationship between  the change in  the number  of hybrid vehicles sold in 
any  year,  ΔShy,  and any  of the influencing  parameters,  as was the basis for  the Jehani and 
Sibdari model,  the number  of hybrid vehicles sold in  any  year, Shy,  can  be modeled and the 
model be used to project  future sales.  Future sales depends on  many  economic and perception 
factors. Among  the national economic parameters the Jehani and Sibdari model  included were: 
the median  household income I,  in the modeled year, the unemployment  level U,  and the price 
of gasoline G.  For  the vehicular  economic parameters the model included the gas mileage, Mhy, 
as represented by  the number  of miles the vehicle can  travel per  gallon of gasoline and the 
hybrid vehicle price Phy.  Finally,  all parameters associated with  customer  perception  such  as 
comfort, reliability,  social appearance,  environmental  stewardship, etc.  were lumped into a 
single coefficient  Ahy.  In  essence, the coefficient represents the total combination  of factors the 
consumer is considering that have not been specifically accounted for elsewhere in the equation.
One way  to look  at  the effect  of policy  choices is by  examining  the fraction of new  sales, 
ΔSannual,  in  any  year relative to the total sales Sannual.  This fraction  is the sales strain, and is 
represented by:
 (5)
A  linear  relationship between  the sales strain  and any  influencing  parameter  is the simplest 
approach  to modeling  the sales figures.  For  example,  the effect of household income,  I,  on the 
sales strain  of hybrid vehicles when  isolated from  other  parameters that influence sales,  would 
be:
 (6)
Where ΔSIhy  is the change in  the sales figures of hybrid vehicles due to the change in 
household income.  As the overall sales figure  Shy increases so does the change in  that  figure due 
changes in  any  parameter  such as I. The fundamental  assumption  in  Equation   (6) is that  ΔSIhy 
varies linearly  both  with  I and Shy. The coefficient  Bhy is a proportionality  factor to be derived 
empirically using historic data.   
Dependences similar  to Equation 6  for the effects of U, CPMhy and Phy on  the sales figures 
can  be derived to provide ΔSUhy,  ΔSCPMhyhy and ΔSPhyhy, which  are the change in the sales figures 
when  each  of the representative parameters is isolated from  the others.   The proportionality 
coefficients to be assigned to these dependences are Chy, Dhy and Ehy respectively.  All three 
coefficients need to be determined empirically using historic data.  
The combined effect  of all  these parameters on the annual sales figures of hybrid vehicles can 
be obtained by superposition or a simple addition:
  (7)
Where Δt is the period over  which  sales occur.  Since this model looks only  at  year-over-year 
sales,  Δt=1  and can  be dropped for  simplicity  from  future derivations.  Equation  7  can now  be 
integrated for Shy, then  adding Ahy,  the integration  coefficient,  which  is described above, to 
provide:
STEIN, ENERGY INDEPENDENCE  19
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME 9, ARTICLE 4 (FEBRUARY 2013) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
 (8)
Notably, this approach  results in  an exponential relationship between  sales volume and 
income,  unemployment, fuel  costs and purchase price.  Taking  the natural  log of this equation 
yields:
 (1)
Note that  Equation  1  is the immediate result  of the integration of Equation  7.  However, 
Equation  8 was shown  first  to show  the relationship between  this derivation and the model 
presented by  Jehani and Sibdari.  This expresses the relationship between  the various 
parameters that  are likely  to influence the sales volume and the sales volume itself.  Actual 
numerical values can  be determined after  obtaining the values of the coefficients Bhy,  Chy,  Dhy 
and Ehy, with an  offset factor  given by  Ahy.  To derive the five empirical coefficients of Equation 
(1),  one needs to obtain  historical  data  concerning  household income, unemployment,  price of 
gasoline,  gas mileage and car prices for  at least  five years.  To the extent  data  is available, a 
similar equation can be derived for each vehicle model or model group.  
In  order  to check  the methodology  against  a  more traditional  vehicle class,  a  similar  process 
was undertaken  for  the SUV  class of vehicles.   The equation representing  the sales figures of 
SUV vehicles was derived similarly to Equation (1) to yield:    
 (2)
Again, the coefficients ASUV,  BSUV,  CSUV, DSUV,  and ESUV are  empirical coefficients. Similar  to 
those of the hybrid vehicle, they are to be derived using at least five years of historical data.  
Unlike SUVs and hybrid vehicles, the available historic data  on  the sales volume of EVs is 
inconsistent with extremely  small numbers.  Consequently,  those figures were not  considered 
reliable for  the purpose of projecting  future sales of EVs and the potential response to market-
changing  policies.   Instead,  the coefficients derived for  the hybrid vehicle  using historical data 
were retained as proxies for  the EV sales volume model.  It  is reasonable to presume that  factors 
influencing people’s decision to purchase hybrid vehicles will similarly  influence their  decision 
to purchase EVs.  As with  hybrids,  it  is likely  that  the first  consumers to purchase EVs do so for  a 
myriad of concerns (e.g.,  environmental, status). As sales of hybrids grew,  economic forces such 
as declining  vehicle price  and increase in  gasoline would have become the dominant  market 
drivers.  The same is presumed to be true with  EVs. Therefore, only  one parameter  from  the 
hybrid model Equation  1  was replaced.   CPMhy was replaced with  PMEV,  which  was derived using 
the representative cost  of electricity  per  kWhr and the number of miles driven by  the EV per 
kWhr.  Accordingly, the model describing the sales volume of electric vehicle is represented by:
 (3)
As previously explained:
• Ahy = all consumer  preferences and choice factors not  specifically  addressed elsewhere 
in the equation,
• SEV = the sales volume of electric vehicles, 
• Bhy = weight factor for societal annual income, 
• I = societal average annual income,
• Chy = weight factor for unemployment,
• U = total unemployment, 
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• Dhy = cost of locomotion factor,
• PMEV = price per mile for locomotion,
• Ehy = weight factor for price of hybrid,
• PEV = price of hybrid vehicle
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Appendix 2 – Deriving the Constants with Historical Data
To derive the five empirical coefficients of Equation  1, Ahy. Bhy, Chy,  Dhy and Ehy,  it  is 
necessary  to obtain historical data  concerning  household income,  unemployment, price of 
gasoline,  gas mileage, and car  prices for  at least five years.  To the extent  data  is available, a 
similar  equation  can  be derived for  each vehicle  model or  model group.  More than  five years of 
data  was available for each  vehicle group. With  only  five years available,  the five coefficients of 
each  model (Equations 1  and 2) could be determined by  solving five algebraic equations. With 
additional years available,  the coefficients could be determined by  fitting ln(Shy)  and ln(SSUV),  as 
determined by  Equations 1  and 2  respectively,  to the sales volumes as shown  in  Table 3, through 
adjustment of the coefficients of these equations until the overlap between the historic data  and 
the analytic data is optimized.
Historical Data for SUVs and Hybrid Vehicles





in US$ *1 $/gallon *2 *3 *4 *5 in US$ *6 in US$*7 *8 *9
‘91 30,126 1.10 1,095,000 8,628,000 15,747 16
‘92 30,636 1.09 1,003,000 9,613,000 16,692 16
‘93 31,241 1.07 1,311,000 8,940,000 17,550 17
‘94 32,264 1.07 1,623,000 7,996,000 18,860 16
‘95 34,076 1.10 1,816,000 7,404,000 22,305 16
‘96 35,492 1.19 1,890,000 7,236,000 21,170 16
‘97 37,005 1.19 2,450,000 6,739,000 21,485 16
‘98 38,885 1.02 2,581,000 6,210,000 21,560 16
‘99 40,696 1.12 2,831,000 5,880,000 22,070 16
’00 41,990 1.46 3,143,000 9,350 5,692,000 23,480 19,995 41 16
’01 42,228 1.38 3,450,000 20,282 6,801,000 25,210 19,995 41 17
’02 42,409 1.31 4,191,000 36,035 8,378,000 24,585 19,995 41 16
’03 43,318 1.52 4,118,000 47,600 8,774,000 26,285 19,995 41 15
’04 44,334 1.81 4,713,000 84,199 8,149,000 26,600 20,295 46 15
’05 46,326 2.24 4,084,000 209,711 7,591,000 27,165 21,275 46 16
’06 48,201 2.53 3,757,000 252,636 7,001,000 26,530 16,213* 46 16
’07 50,233 2.70 4,231,000 352,274 7,078,000 25,370 20,601* 46 16
’08 50,303 3.26 3,987,000 312,386 8,924,000 26,495 21,500 46 16
’09 49,777 2.36 2,296,000 290,271 14,265,000 28,470 22,000 46 16
’10 50,000 2.79 3,000,000 274,210 14,825,000 29,280 22,800 50 17
* Includes weighted average of rebate that was offered during some or all of the year.*10
*1 US Census Bureau, Median Household Income by State: 1984 to 2009, 
 http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/data/historical/household/H08_2009.xls
 (only applicable to years 1991–2009. Year 2010 is an estimate).
*2 Jeihani and Sibdari, “The Impact of Gas Price Trends;” EIA, Data I: All Grades Conventional EIA,
 http://www.eia.gov/oog/ftparea/wogirs/xls/pswrgvwag.xls 
*3 US Department of Energy, www.afdc.energy.gov/afdc/data/docs/ldv_sales.xls (only applicable to years 
 1991–2009. Year 2010 is an estimate).
*4 U.S. Department of Energy, http://www.afdc.energy.gov/afdc/data/vehicles.html#afv_hev
*5 Bureau of Labor Statistics, http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat1.pdf 
*6 Retrieved from www.autotrader.com
*7 2002, 2003, 2005, 2011 retrieved from www.epionions.com/specs/auto
 2004 retrieved from http://consumerguideauto.howstuffworks.com
 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010 retrieved from www.web2carz.com/toyota/prius
*8 Retrieved from http://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/findacar.htm
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*9 Retrieved from http://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/findacar.htm
*10 Information to perform weighted average for rebate: http://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/tax_hybride.shtml
Figures 4  and 5  graphically  represent  the outcome of the optimal fit between the actual  sales 
figures and the modeled figures. Optimization  was achieved by  minimization of the root mean 
square of the differences between  actual  and modeled figures.  Table 1  shows the coefficients of 
the two models as derived through this analysis.
Figures 4  and 5  show  that, after  optimization  of the coefficient, Equations 1  and 2  yielded 
generally good approximations of the actual sales data.  
Figure 4. Comparison of the Variation of ln(Shy) with Year of Sale as Derived by Model (blue) with 
Historic Data (red)
Figure 5. Comparison of the Variation of ln(SSUV) with Year of Sale as Derived by Model (blue) with 
Historic Data (red)
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Although  the match between the actual  and modeled sales volume is good, its application  is 
limited.  One should note that the two models (Equations 1  and 2) are independent  of each  other 
(i.e.,  as modeled,  the sales of one group does not  affect the sales of the other  group (non-
cannibalization)).  Such  independence is justified when the sales volume of hybrids or EVs is 
small relative to the total  vehicle market; however, when the sales of one group overwhelm  the 
market,  the model must be reexamined. This failure of the model  would occur at  some point  as 
the market  responds so favorably  to government  policies that  the use of internal combustion 
engines is almost completely  abandoned in  favor  of EVs. Lacking  a  detailed analysis of the 
points of failure, it  is assumed herein that the model should be used primarily  as the predictor  of 
trends (i.e.,  significant increase or  decrease in  the sales of certain  vehicle groups,  rather  than the 
predictor of actual sales volumes).  
Table 1. Coefficients of the Sales Volume Models (Eqns. 1 and 2) of Hybrid and SUV Vehicles as Derived 
by Fitting These Equations to Historical Sales Data
A B C D E
Hybrid/electric 3.6 2.16*10–4 -1*10–13 31.1 -1.66*10–4
SUV 13.36 2.01*10–4 -1.4*10–7 -10.8 -1.97*10–4
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Appendix 3 – Future Assumptions Used To Predict EV Sales
1.  The gasoline excise  tax  is $2  per gallon  in  2012,  $4  the following year, and $5  in  2014  through 
2018. 
2. The EV  price for  2011  uses the Manufacturer’s Suggested Retail Price (MSRP) of the entry-
level 2012  model year  Nissan  Leaf,  $35,200  (Nissan) and a  three percent annual  decrease in 
price thereafter.101  The expected MSRP does not  include the government subsidy  described 
below.  This decrease is a  conservative number  considering  the anticipated rapid change in 
volume,  which will create economies of scale.   However, this reflects a  similar  conservative 
determination  made by  Brooker,  that the price of EV  batteries will  decrease by  three percent per 
year. 102
3. Though  soon  after  publication  of this work,  actual 2011  sales volumes may  be available for 
EVs, the 2011  sales volume used here was obtained from  the predictive model.  The 2010 EV 
sales were estimated as 10 percent of the hybrid vehicles sales volume of 274,210. 103
4. The 2011  total  sales cost of the EV  reduces the MSRP described above by  the $7,500  tax 
rebate that has historically  been  available for  purchase of an  all-electric  vehicle.  Beginning  in 
2012  and thereafter,  the total cost  of the EV  begins with  the MSRP price described above and 
reduces it by $15,000, the amount of tax rebate used for this particular predictive analysis.
5.  Beginning in 2008  with  an EV cost  per  mile  of three cents,104  the model  assumes a  three 
percent  annual increase in  the price per  mile for  the EV.  This presumes the cost  of electricity 
will increase with  increased demand,  though this could be offset  if batteries become more 
efficient at recharging or otherwise become more efficient.
6. Gallons of gas sold per  year  begins with  the actual gallons sold at  retail in  2009, 
18,176,124,000 gallons,105 leaves the amount  constant  for  2010 and 2011, and assumes a  five 
percent  decrease in  2012, the first year  a  gasoline tax is imposed in this model.  The five percent 
decrease assumes that  imposition  of the two-dollar  tax will induce a  decrease in  the demand for 
gasoline.  Each  year  beyond 2012, the decrease in  gasoline sales is determined by  multiplying  the 
number  of EVs sold the prior  year by  490 gallons.  The average driver drives 13,476  miles per 
year. 106  Current CAFE standards provide for  an  average vehicle gas mileage of 27.5  mpg.107 
Dividing average miles driven per  year  by  average gas mileage provides an  estimate of the 
gallons of gasoline used by  each  vehicle per  year.  Assuming  that each  EV  sold the previous year 
will reduce sales of gasoline-powered vehicles by  one that equates to 490 fewer  gallons of 
gasoline sold in  the current  year for  each EV  sold the prior  year. In  fact, the decrease is likely 
higher  due to drivers who purchase EVs throughout the year  and other  factors,  but  this is the 
estimate used in  the model.  A  further  benefit  of this assumption  is that  it  indirectly  introduces a 
coupling between  the sales volume of EVs and sales of other  vehicles. It  assumes that  sales of 
EVs will cannibalize sales of all other  vehicles; however,  this is an incomplete and very  partial 
coupling that does not overcome the weakness of the model as indicated above.
7.  The unemployment factor  begins in  2010 with  the published total unemployment  figure of 
14,825,000, 108 and assumes a one percent reduction each year.
8.  The income factor  uses the 2009  median  annual income of $49,777,109  and assumes a  one 
percent increase each year.
9. The base price of gasoline,  prior  to the introduction  of the excise tax, begins with  an  average 
price of three dollars per  gallon  in  2011  and increases the price by  five percent per  year. That 
assumes that  the world oil  market  will  continue to see an increase in  demand even  as demand 
in the United States declines.
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Visa Diplomacy vs. Visa Security
James Hernandez
ABSTRACT
This article presents an analysis of the 
current policy governing the visa issuing 
function (currently divided between the 
Department of Homeland Security and the 
Department of State) and proposes  a policy 
under which the  Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) assumes operational and 
tactical level control of the visa issuing 
function from  the Department of State 
(DOS).  The current system  results  in a 
duplication of effort,  unclear responsibilities, 
an increased need for communication and 
c o l l a b o r a t i o n b e t w e e n g o v e r n m e n t 
departments,  and a loss  of mission focus.  In 
an effort to  increase security, streamline the 
immigration process, and address the above 
issues,  this  article recommends that the visa 
issuing function should be  the exclusive 
responsibility of, and performed by, DHS.
INTRODUCTION
Let’s say  you  live with  your family  in  a nice 
home, but  in  a  bad neighborhood.  You  work 
outside of the home, and you  need someone 
to let  good people in  and to keep bad people 
out.  Two people show  up to interview  for  the 
position. The first  candidate’s name is 
Diplomacy. The second is Security.
Diplomacy  believes strongly  in  leveraging 
your  neighbors to help with your  security 
using  various sticks and carrots and 
promoting  your family’s values throughout 
the neighborhood. Although Diplomacy 
values the family’s security,  he sometimes 
places security  below  other priorities such  as 
the promotion  of neighborhood rights, 
strengthening and spreading  the way  your 
f a m i l y  i s m a n a g e d t h r o u g h o u t t h e 
neighborhood, and ensuring the success of 
your  economic  interests. By  manipulating  all 
of these levers,  Diplomacy  seeks to deny  bad 
people a  safe haven  in which  to operate 
within  your neighborhood. Diplomacy  is 
willing to screen  people who wish  to visit  you, 
and to check  with  Security  to ensure that  the 
proposed visitor  is not dangerous.  This is all 
desirable to your  family’s well  being, but will 
it actually keep bad people out of your house?
Security  stands at  the gate and checks 
every  individual before they  are allowed 
inside. These checks utilize law  enforcement 
and terrorist  databases,  a  brief personal 
interview  by  a  trained law  enforcement 
officer, and various searches.  Security’s focus 
is simple and narrow: keep bad people from 
entering your home.
What  if you  could allow  Diplomacy  to 
continue doing its good works abroad, but 
also push  Security  out  with  him? Allow 
Security  to do the vetting  out  in  the 
neighborhood before people even  arrive at 
your  door,  and then  vet  them  again  when 
they  do. This would allow  Diplomacy  to 
narrow  the focus of his mission,  and result  in 
both  candidates being  more effective in 
keeping your family safe.
BACKGROUND
Prior to 9/11, the Department of State (DOS) 
was almost  exclusively  responsible for  the 
disciplines of diplomacy  and security  where 
visas were concerned. However,  the security 
aspect  of the visa  function  during  this time 
was more focused on keeping  out visitors 
likely  to overstay  their  visas and become 
illegal immigrants.  The procedures in  place 
did not have an  adequate  focus on  identifying 
individuals who posed a  security  threat. 
However,  this was not  always the case.  After 
World War  II,  the visa function  was placed 
under the DOS Administrator  of the Bureau 
of Security  and Consular  Affairs.  As the name 
suggests,  this bureau  comprised both  security 
and consular  functions. The mission  of the 
security  function was to identify  potential 
espionage agents and communist  party 
members applying  for  visas. In  the 1970s and 
1980s, the security  function  was formally 
separated from  visa  issuance in  an  effort  to 
facilitate travel  to the United States. 
Streamlining  an increased workflow  took 
p r i o r i t y  o v e r  t h e s c r u t i n y  o f v i s a 
applications.1  
The 1993  World Trade Center  attacks 
called attention  to vulnerabilities in  the 
pre-9/11  visa  process; however, the priority  of 
the State Department, where visas were 
concerned, remained the facilitation  of travel. 
This led to the creation  of a  streamlined 
application  process for  countries of particular 
geographic or  economic  interest  to the United 
States.2 During  the period leading  up to 9/11 
personal interviews for certain  types of visas 
were often  waived.  US ambassadors were 
concerned about long  visa  lines and the strict 
enforcement  of visa denials. These concerns 
put  political pressures on  visa officers within 
the DOS to manage the visa  function  more as 
a  service than as a security  screen.3  This 
prioritization  of diplomacy  over security  in 
the issuing  of visas led to significant 
vulnerabilities in  the visa  process and 
contributed to the creation of the now 
infamous “Visa  Express”  in  Saudi Arabia  that 
many  of the 9/11  hijackers exploited. In  the 
Visa Express of Saudi Arabia, civilian travel 
agents would pre-screen visa  applicants and 
submit petitions on their behalf.4 
Clearly, a  better  balance between 
diplomacy  and security  in  the visa  issuing 
process was needed. When too much 
emphasis is placed on  diplomacy,  security  is 
decreased at  the operational  and tactical 
levels.
In  the aftermath  of 9/11,  the US 
government  has worked to improve the level 
of security  for  the visa issuing  process as 
conducted by  the DOS prior  to 9/11.  A 
number  of legislative and organizational 
activities, including  the creation of the 
Department of Homeland Security  (DHS), 
occurred after  the attacks of 9/11  to ensure 
that  government failures leading  up to 9/11 
were not  repeated.  All immigration law  is 
codified in  the Immigration  and Nationality 
Act (INA) of the United States (as amended). 
Title II of the INA  regulates visa procedures 
as they  pertain  to admissions criteria, 
required entry  documents, and the selection 
system. 
POST-9/11 REFORMS 
New  legislation  since 9/11  includes the 
Uniting  and Strengthening  America by 
Providing Appropriate  Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism  (USA 
PATRIOT) Act,  the Enhanced Border Security 
and Visa  Entry  Reform  Act  (EBSVERA),  the 
Homeland Security  Act  of 2002, and the 
Intelligence Reform  and Terrorist  Prevention 
Act  of 2004. The USA  PATRIOT  Act 
authorized additional funding  for  a foreign 
student  tracking  system, and advanced the 
deadline for  Visa  Waiver  Program  (VWP) 
participants to have passengers submit 
machine-readable passports. EBSVERA 
required DOS consular  officers to send 
electronic  versions of visa  files to (then  INS) 
inspectors at  ports of entry  in  the United 
States. EBSVERA  also made it  more difficult 
for individuals from  state sponsors of 
terrorism  to come to the United States,  and 
increased the security  requirements on  travel 
documents.  
The Homeland Security  Act of 2002 
establ ished DHS within  the federal 
government,  and also authorized DHS to 
participate in  visa  related functions including 
deploying  employees to consular  posts 
abroad, developing  homeland security 
training programs for  consular  officers, and 
developing  performance standards for 
consular  employees. The Intelligence Reform 
and Terrorist  Prevention  Act  of 2004 
mandated and expanded the visa  interview 
requirement  to all persons between  the ages 
of fourteen  and seventy-nine,  and made the 
revocation of a visa a deportable offense.5 
The Homeland Secur i ty  Act  a l so 
d i s m a n t l e d t h e I m m i g r a t i o n a n d 
Naturalization  Service into three separate 
agencies. These agencies are United States 
Citizenship and Immigration  Services 
(USCIS),  Customs and Border  Protection 
(CBP), and Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement  (ICE). CIS  conducts the 
adjudication  function,  CBP conducts 
inspections and border  enforcement,  and ICE 
conducts investigations.  All of these agencies 
fall under  DHS. DOS remained untouched by 
the reorganization  even  though  its policies 
were largely  responsible for  these terrorists 
receiving  visas.  The Homeland Security  Act 
gave DHS exclusive authority  to issue 
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regulations and administer  the visa program, 
but the offices that  perform  these services 
remained in  DOS. 6  This resulted in  DHS 
having  to regulate another  government 
department to ensure there are adequate 
levels of security  in  an  immigration  function 
that belongs in DHS.   
Before  and since the creation  of DHS, 
there has been  debate about the new 
department’s role in the visa  issuing  process. 
The nineteen terrorists who hijacked the 
planes on  9/11  were aliens who entered the 
United States on  temporary  visas. 7 As many 
as fifteen  of the nineteen hijackers were 
potentially  vulnerable to detection  by  border 
authorities currently  under  DHS; more 
closely  analyzing  the terrorists’  documents 
and travel patterns could have allowed 
authorities to interdict  as many  as fifteen  of 
the hijackers.8  
The new  laws enacted since  9/11  do 
provide an adequate framework  to correct the 
problems in  the visa issuing  process that 
allowed all  nineteen  of the 9/11  terrorist 
hijackers to enter  the United States with  valid 
visas. 9  These laws could be leveraged to 
streamline the entire  immigration  process by 
consolidating  the visa  issuing function within 
DHS.    
WHAT REALLY CHANGED AFTER 9/11?
September  11, 2001  brought about sweeping 
changes in  visa  security  and brought  the visa 
issuing  process to the forefront  of public 
policy  and debate. Some of the most 
sweeping  changes to the government 
following  9/11  were contained in the 
Homeland Security  Act  of 2002  (henceforth 
the Act). The Act  resulted in  the immigration 
components of DHS having greater 
responsibilities abroad than the former  INS. 
DHS not  only  had to bring  together  its legacy 
agencies into a  new  department, but  it also 
had to establish  new  business practices for 
functions with  which  its legacy  agencies had 
no experience. Visa  security  within  DOS is 
one of these  functions.  Secretary  Ridge 
established an  office to oversee DHS visa 
activities under the memorandum  of 
agreement with DOS.10  
That  office pursued a  number of measures 
to immediately  increase security  to the visa 
process.  This was largely  accomplished by 
database screening  of visa  applicants. DHS 
officers have full access to a  variety  of law 
enforcement  databases.11  Table 1  identifies 
some of the databases that are used to 
enhance visa  and immigration  security. There 
are multiple systems spread across several 
government  departments, including  the 
Department of Justice  (DOJ) and the CIA. 
This screening  process also requires 
additional communication  and collaboration 
between government agencies.
Table 1.  Immigration Related Databases 
Database Department
Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS) DOJ
National Criminal Information Center (NCIC) DOJ
Treasury Enforcement Computer System (TECS) DHS
Interagency Border Inspections System (IBIS) DHS
National Security Entry Exit Registration System (NSEERS) DHS
US-VISIT DHS
Student Exchange and Visitor Information System (SEVIS) DHS
Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT) DHS
Advanced Passenger Information System (APIS) DHS
Consular Consolidated Database (CCD) DOS
Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS) DOS
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The last  form  of security  scrutiny  that a 
visa applicant must  undergo also resides with 
DHS. Customs and Border  Protection (CBP) 
inspects aliens who seek to enter  the United 
States. This inspection  is performed at  a  US 
port  of entry. Primary  inspection  consists of a 
brief interview  with a  CBP inspector,  a 
cursory  check  of the traveler’s documents, 
and a  query  of various law  enforcement 
databases. Primary  inspections are quick 
(usually  lasting  no longer  than a  minute); 
however, if the inspector is suspicious that 
the traveler  may  be inadmissible under  the 
Immigration and Nationality  Act  (INA) or  in 
violation of other  US laws, the traveler  is 
referred to a  secondary  inspect ion. 
Individuals sent to secondary  inspections are 
questioned extensively, travel  documents are 
further  examined, and additional databases 
are queried.12  This system  is intended to 
compliment  the security  involved in  the visa 
application process performed by  DOS. 
F igure 1  demonstrates a s impl is t ic 
immigration  process, and the general 
responsibilities of each  department.  An 
immigrant  would start  at  the bottom  of the 
pyramid and work his or her way up.
Figure 1.  The Immigration Process
Since 9/11,  DOS has implemented a 
number  of policies to improve the level of 
security  of its visa  services.  These policies 
include the use  of new  technologies that  use 
biometric  identification  data  (to deter  fraud 
and the use of multiple identities) and the 
expansion  of interagency  partnerships and 
agreements with  other governments to build 
data  links for  sharing  real  time information.13 
Due to the diplomatic  mission  of DOS,  the 
department  must  balance security  with 
facilitating  legitimate travel. DOS must also 
consider  the strategic implications of 
international immigration  such  as identifying 
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labor, students,  and other  potential citizens 
who would prove advantageous to the United 
States. Consular  officers around the world 
process more than  seven  million  non-
immigrant  visa  applications, and nearly 
700,000 immigrant visa  applications,  each 
year. 14 Foreign  visitors seeking  to enter  the 
United States meet with  US consular  officers 
for  visa  interviews.15  The high volume of 
applicants results in  short  interview  times for 
face-to-face  meetings. DOS must  rely  on 
other means outside of the personal interview 
to screen  potentially  dangerous applicants. 
These measures include collecting facial 
recognition  and biometric data,  expanding 
interagency  partnerships,  developing 
agreements with  other  governments to share 
information,  and building real-time data 
links. 16 Diplomacy  has an  important  role in 
the operations of our  nation, but  even this 
must  be augmented with  an appropriate 
measure of security.  The above security 
functions are currently  performed by  DOS 
and subsequently  balanced with  their  own 
diplomatic mission.
Historical shifts in  DOS priorities – from 
security  to diplomacy  in  the visa  process – 
created significant  vulnerabilities that were 
subsequently  exploited leading up to the 9/11 
attacks. Although diplomacy  creates a 
strategic-level layer  of national security,  it 
neglects the necessary  security  at the 
operational  and tactical levels in the visa 
process.  To correct  this,  the United States 
instituted a  number  of legislative changes. 
This legislation  resulted in  greater  scrutiny  of 
the visa  function and led to a  massive 
reorganization  of government agencies to 
create the Department of Homeland Security. 
However,  the Department  of State remained 
largely  untouched by  this legislation, even 
though  its policies led to the 9/11  hijackers 
receiving  visas to enter the United States. 
DHS was given  the responsibility  to secure 
the visa  process,  but  DOS retained the bureau 
of consular  affairs and the visa  issuing 
function within  its department.  This resulted 
in  one government department  setting policy 
and conducting oversight  on  another.  It has 
also created an  unnecessary  requirement for 
information  sharing and collaboration  at  the 
operational  and tactical levels between 
government  agencies. This communication 
a n d c o l l a b o r a t i o n b e c o m e s m o r e 
cumbersome as consular  officers must 
process a significant volume of visa 
applicants each  year. This time constraint 
results in  shortcuts in  security  measures that 
are mandated by DHS and legislation.
WHAT IS THE STATUS QUO?
The US immigration  system  mostly  relies on 
the cooperation  and collaboration  of two 
departments when it  comes to the visa 
process.  The Department  of Justice (DOJ) 
Executive Office for  Immigration  Review 
(EOIR)  also plays a  role in  the visa  process 
through  immigration  review.17 This is limited 
to judicial issues on  immigration  decisions 
made by  DHS or  appeals by  immigrants and 
foreign  national criminal convicts. This role is 
not as operationally  problematic  in  that it is 
more of a third party check and balance.  
Operationally, DHS is responsible for 
implementing  policies and security  training 
for  DOS in  the visa  process,  as mandated by 
the Homeland Security  Act of 2002.18  DOS 
handles the actual operational  and tactical 
component of the process through the bureau 
of Consular  Affairs.  There is also a 
“Memorandum  of Understanding  between 
the Secretaries of State and Homeland 
Security  Concerning Implementation  of 
Section 428  of the Homeland Security  Act of 
2002.” 19 Strong  proponents of security  claim 
that  the MOU gives too much  power  to DOS 
in  the visa  process, and they  further  claim 
this was not  the intention  of the legislation 
that  gave DHS authority  over the security  of 
the process.20  According to Carafano, this 
division of labor is far from ideal:
Despite several  efforts  to improve the visa 
process since September 11, 2001, it  is still 
cumbersome, expensive, and inconvenient 
for  many  visitors. Even worse, inefficiencies 
in  the visa  process  and its  management 
detract from efforts to screen  out terrorists 
and criminals who seek to exploit visas…21
There are two predominant opinions 
regarding  who should control the visa 
function: those who argue it should remain  as 
it  is, and those who argue DHS should play  a 
larger  role. Those who support  DHS 
controlling  the entire process point  to past 
DOS failures in  visa security  and cite the 
continuity  that would be gained by  having the 
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entire immigration  process being  controlled 
by  one department.  DOS consulates have 
been  described as business-like in  the issuing 
of visas, rather than  being  concerned with 
security. This is based on  an institutional 
concern  about  visa numbers and efficiency. 
After  September  11,  2001,  the DOS came 
under scrutiny  for  issuing visas to many  of 
the hijackers. The DOS Bureau  of Consular 
Affairs has a critical responsibility  to check 
the backgrounds and confirm  identities of 
persons seeking visas. 22  DOS critics also 
argue that  there are no easy  means of 
redressing subjective decisions made at  the 
consular  level regarding  who should be 
granted visas.23  
Another  area  of concern  is the current 
system’s need for  information  sharing and 
c o o r d i n a t i o n  b e t w e e n g o v e r n m e n t 
departments.  If the law  enforcement  or 
intelligence communities identify  a  person  of 
interest who should not be allowed to enter 
the United States, they  must  communicate 
that  to DOS to ensure that  individual is not 
issued a  visa. Similarly, if DOS identifies 
someone who has been denied a visa  for 
terrorist  or  criminal  reasons,  then  DOS must 
in  turn communicate this back to the 
appropriate immigration,  law  enforcement, 
and intelligence entities to ensure that person 
is not  admitted into the United States.24 
Consolidating  the visa  issuing  function  into 
DHS would eliminate the need for  the timely 
sharing of this information  and close a 
critical gap in  security.  This would also create 
a  seamless immigration  process from  start to 
finish  by  consolidating  the entire process 
from  the visa  application  to the adjustment of 
immigration status under  one government 
department.  
Opponents to moving the visa  function 
under DHS claim  that staffing  250  worldwide 
posts would stretch  DHS too thin, and 
decisions regarding visas are best left  up to 
experts holding country  specific knowledge.25 
DOS also makes a  case regarding  its own 
p e r s o n n e l i s s u e s .  D O S u s e s j u n i o r 
probationary  officers to conduct  visa 
interviews. This has been a  traditional first 
tour  assignment  for  Foreign  Service Officers 
(FSO).26 Losing  the visa function would free 
junior  FSO to conduct  work focused on 
diplomacy.  Gaining  the visa issuing  function 
would require DHS to create an entirely  new 
office.
THE ROLE OF DHS
DHS is responsible for  the discipline of 
security  in  the visa  issuing  process.  DHS is a 
security  centric  organization  as is evident  in 
its mission statement:
We  will lead the  unified national effort to 
secure  America. We  will prevent and deter 
terrorist attacks and protect against and 
respond to threats and hazards to the 
Nation. We  will secure  our national 
b o r d e r s w h i l e  w e l c o m i n g l a w f u l 
immigrants, visitors, and trade  [emphasis 
added].27
One of the strategic  goals of DHS is to 
protect  the United States from  dangerous 
people. In contrast, protecting against 
dangerous people is not mentioned, 
specifically,  in  any  of the seven  strategic  goals 
of the DOS. 28  Like DOS,  DHS must  also 
facilitate legitimate travel  and trade into and 
out of the United States. DHS seeks to 
improve security  by  reducing  the likelihood 
that  terrorists can  enter  the United States; to 
do this,  DHS strives to implement  a  layered 
approach  to this process. Whenever  possible, 
DHS expands the zone of security,  managing 
risks and interdicting  threats before they 
arrive in  the United States. 29  This is 
accomplished with the cooperation of DOS 
abroad on  a myriad of programs, one of 
which is visa security.  
This relates to another strategic goal of 
DHS: strengthening  the screening  of visa-
holding  travelers and workers.  DHS looks to 
improve the security  and mobility  of travelers 
and increase focus on  high-risk  individuals 
through  improved use of data, screening, 
fraud-resistant credentials,  and biometric 
tools.  This will  reduce the risk  of potential 
terrorism  or  other  unlawful activities from 
threatening  the United States. 30 A  review  of 
the DHS mission and strategic  goals reveals a 
focus on  security  and defending  against 
terrorism. These goals become problematic 
when  DHS creates policies, objectives, and 
goals that must be implemented and 
executed by  an  entirely  different department. 
DHS has control over  the strategic  planning 
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in  visa  security  with  no operational or  tactical 
control over the process.
THE ROLE OF DOS
DOS is responsible for  issuing visas to both 
immigrants and nonimmigrants. This is the 
first  step for  someone wishing  to legitimately 
enter  the United States from  abroad; 
however, in  order  to get  a  visa  one would only 
need to convince the DOS consular  officer 
issuing  the visa that one’s story  is legitimate. 
Consular  officers,  like CIS adjudicators,  are 
non-law  enforcement  personnel,  and they  are 
on  a  tight time schedule.  Most  visa  issuing 
processes,  including the interview  and 
database checks,  are done within six 
minutes. 31 As mentioned earlier,  this function 
is largely  staffed by  first tour  junior  FSO in 
order  for  them  to gain experience in  local 
languages, foreign  political  structures, social 
institutions,  and working  with  a  local 
national staff.32 This low  priority  in  personnel 
staffing  demonstrates the lack of emphasis 
DOS places on  the importance of these duties 
and creates the opportunity  for  fraud. A  visa 
allows a  person  to travel to the United States 
and present himself to a CBP officer  at  a  port 
of entry  for  permission  to enter  the country. 
Only  a  CBP officer  has the authority  to allow 
a  person  to enter  the country. 33 CBP officers 
are law  enforcement officers; DOS personnel 
issuing visas are not law enforcement. 
Reviewing  the mission  statement and 
various strategies of DOS shows a  clear  focus 
on diplomacy.  The DOS mission is to:
Advance freedom for the benefit of  the 
American  people and the international 
community  by helping to build and sustain 
a more democratic, secure, and prosperous 
world composed of well-governed states 
that respond to the needs of  their people, 
reduce widespread poverty, and act 
responsibly  within the international 
system.34
Although  the DOS mission  statement is 
clearly  diplomatically  focused,  many  of its 
strategies aim  to improve security,  albeit  in  a 
non-law  enforcement manner.  The DOS 
strategy  for  combating  terrorism  stresses the 
advancement of democracy,  the rule of law, 
and a  global environment described as 
inhospitable to violent  extremism. According 
to DOS, diplomacy  and foreign  assistance 
supports peace and creates the environment 
for  longer-term  developmental solutions to 
prevent  terrorism  from  developing and 
taking  hold.35 DOS recognizes the importance 
of sharing  information  within  and between 
governments, improving  passport  security, 
and implementing  effective visa  adjudication 
processes that deny  access to individuals who 
pose risks to US national security.  
In  contrast  to the more law  enforcement 
centric approach  to security  employed by 
DHS,  DOS seeks to counter  terrorism 
through  sound policy, effective assistance, 
and astute public  diplomacy.36  This policy 
works well to affect security  at the strategic 
level, but it neglects the security  issues at  the 
operational  and tactical levels of the visa 
issuing  process.  Moving  the visa  issuing 
function  under  DHS would not  have a 
significant impact on  any  of the DOS strategic 
goals.  All of its efforts spearheaded by 
diplomacy would largely remain the same.
SHARING RESPONSIBILITIES: THE MOU
The Homeland Security  Act  states that  DHS 
is responsible for  formulating  regulations on 
visa  issuances and may  assign  staff to 
consular  posts abroad to advise,  review,  and 
conduct  investigations.37  DOS Consular 
Affairs continues to be responsible for  issuing 
visas.  The Act  requires DHS and DOS to 
reach an understanding  on how  the details of 
this division of responsibilities would be 
implemented.  In  2003, Secretary  of State 
Colin Powell and Secretary  of Homeland 
S e c u r i t y  T h o m a s R i d g e s i g n e d a 
memorandum  of understanding (MOU).  The 
M O U d e s c r i b e s e a c h  d e p a r t m e n t ’ s 
responsibilities in the visa process.38  
In  stating  how  these responsibilities are 
being  implemented between the two 
departments,  the MOU has raised a  few 
concerns.39 According  to the MOU, DHS will 
establish  visa  policy, review  implementation 
of that  policy, and provide additional 
direction as provided by  the MOU, while 
respecting  the prerogatives of DOS to lead 
and manage the consular  corps and its 
functions,  to manage the visa  process, and to 
execute the foreign policy  of the  United 
States.40  DHS will rely  upon  DOS in  foreign 
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policy  matters,  and DOS will respect  the 
expertise of DHS concerning American 
security.41
The MOU states that DOS may  propose 
and issue visa  regulations subject  to DHS 
consultation  and final  approval. It  also allows 
DHS to assign  personnel  to diplomatic posts, 
but it  specifies that DOS will  determine which 
personnel, how  many, and the scope of their 
functions. 42 This limits the ability  of DHS to 
conduct  thorough  and efficient  oversight  of 
the security  of the visa  issuing  function. At a 
hearing in  September  2003  that  focused on 
the MOU between DOS and DHS, Assistant 
Secretary  of State for  Consular Affairs Maura 
Harty  described responsibilities that  remain 
with the DOS:
T h e S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e w i l l  h a v e 
responsibility over certain  visa decisions, 
including decisions of a  foreign policy 
nature.... He will  also be responsible for 
establishing visa validity  periods and fees 
based on reciprocity. In the case of  visa 
validity  periods, however, he will  consult 
with  Homeland Security  before lengthening 
them, and Homeland Security will  have 
authority  to determine that certain  persons 
or classes of persons cannot benefit from 
the maximum  validity period for  security 
reasons.43
The MOU limits the authority  of DHS in 
the operational and tactical aspect  of issuing 
visas.   It creates a  seam  in  the immigration 
process that can  be exploited. It  allows DHS 
to create policy,  but  relies on  DOS to 
implement  these policies as they  are 
intended.  As stated previously,  regarding 
p o s t - W W I I a n d p r e - 9 / 1 1  D O S , t h e 
department  has historically  shifted its 
emphasis on  visa  security  with  shifting 
diplomatic pressures. This is the result  of 
DOS being  focused on diplomacy  as its core 
mission. The core mission  of DHS is centered 
on security.   
The immigration  process is divided 
between  DHS and DOS. This creates a seam 
that requires additional cross-agency 
communication  and collaboration  to ensure 
security. The MOU between  DHS and DOS 
negates many  of the security  gains made by 
the legislative changes after  9/11.  Contrary  to 
the intent  of the legislation,  DOS retained too 
much  control over  the process,  which 
resulted in  marginal  changes from  the system 
that  was in  place prior  to 9/11.  The MOU has 
sparked debate over  which  department is 
better  suited to handle the visa  issuing 
function.  Leaving  the visa issuing  function 
under  DOS control retains the country 
specific expertise of DOS and allows it to 
exercise diplomacy  through  the allocation  of 
visas.  
Moving the visa  issuing function into DHS 
would e l iminate both  the need for 
information  sharing and the seam  in  the US 
immigration process.  It would also ensure 
that  the right balance of security  and 
diplomacy  resides in  policies regulating  the 
issuing  of visas.  This is due to the mission  of 
DHS being security-centric  versus the 
diplomacy-centric mission  of DOS that led to 
the Saudi Visa Factory. 
A NEW STRATEGY
Arguably,  diplomacy  and security  are 
interconnected and mutually  supporting. 
Diplomacy  seeks to strengthen the image and 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s 
internationally. Diplomacy  is often  the 
alternative to harder forms of influence,  such 
as combat  operations. Effective diplomacy 
can  gain  the United States much  needed 
allies in  the war  on terror,  thereby  increasing 
security. In  the operational and tactical levels 
of the visa  process, however,  security  is more 
beneficial than diplomacy to US interests. 
Because of this, DHS should conduct all 
operational  and tactical  functions related to 
the issuing of visas, thereby  ensuring security 
at  the individual applicant level. The 
operational  and tactical levels of the visa 
issuing  function  refer to the policies and 
procedures governing the screening of 
applicants as well as the physical issuing  of 
the visa. The DHS security  mission  is more 
applicable to the scrutinization of visa 
applicants at the tactical  and operational 
levels. This is due to the law  enforcement 
culture of DHS, and its operational reach,  in 
terms of communication  and collaboration, 
with  the other  agencies involved in border 
and transportation  security. These agencies 
include the Transportation Security 
Administration  (TSA), ICE, CBP,  and CIS. 
Under the current  system  DOS must 
communicate and collaborate with  agencies 
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outside of its department  in  order  to perform 
these functions effectively.  
Figure 2  illustrates the various agencies in 
the departments that  must  communicate 
regarding  immigration  issues.  As illustrated, 
it  is apparent  how  much easier  information 
sharing  would be  if the visa  issuing  function 
currently  handled by  DOS Consular  Affairs 
fell in under DHS.
Figure 1.  Departmental Overlap in the Visa Issuance Process
D O S s h o u l d r e t a i n  d i p l o m a t i c 
responsibility  in  the allocation  of visas, 
thereby  promoting  security  at  the strategic 
level.  This involves determining which 
countries would be allocated how  many  and 
what  types of visas.  DOS would be able to 
utilize the allocation  of visas to promote 
diplomacy  at  the strategic  level.  It  would then 
be the responsibility  of DHS to determine 
which  individuals from  these countries would 
be granted visas based on  security  concerns 
at  the operational  and tactical  levels.  This 
would help provide the process with  the 
necessary  balance between  diplomacy  and 
security.
The current  immigration  process is 
divided between three separate government 
departments: DHS,  DOS, and DOJ.  The role 
of the DOJ is largely  one of oversight  and 
would not  be affected by  this proposed 
strategy. Nevertheless,  it is necessary  to 
identify  all of the stakeholders in  this process 
and how  they  will be affected by  a  change in 
strategy.  It is also necessary  to mitigate any 
potential challenges to implementing  this 
strategy.  In  order  for this strategy  to be 
effective, both  DHS and DOS must be 
convinced that  this will allow  them  to better 
accomplish  their respective missions, and 
Congress must recognize how  this strategy 
will significantly  improve the level of security 
in the visa issuing process.  
MUTUAL BENEFITS
The mutual benefits to this strategy  lie in 
allowing  DHS and DOS to focus exclusively 
on  their  respective core departmental 
missions.  DHS will  be able to concentrate on 
securing  the visa issuing function, and DOS 
will be  able to focus exclusively  on  diplomacy. 
Under  the current memorandum  of 
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understanding  between DOS and DHS,  DOS 
is responsible for  the operational and tactical 
aspects of the visa  issuing  function  and DHS 
plays the role of security  policy  advisor. This 
method of operating  forces DOS to shift  its 
attention  to one of a  security  function  and 
away  from  its core mission  of international 
diplomacy.  Moving  the operational  level of 
the visa issuing  function to DHS would allow 
DOS to focus its resources and attention  on 
diplomacy.  
DHS and DOS should seek to learn  to 
“optimize.”  Optimizing is the process of 
recognizing  and actualizing benefits to the 
larger  system  as a  whole. In  this case, the 
“whole” is enhancing the security  posture of 
the United States with  respect  to the visa 
issuing  system. DHS and DOS could both 
achieve their  own goals and mission  better 
over  the long  term  by  pooling  capabilities and 
optimizing  the benefits of working  together to 
implement this strategy.44  Optimizing  will 
strengthen  the individual  disciplines of 
diplomacy  and security. Diplomacy  plays an 
important role in  visa  security  at  the strategic 
level. DOS should retain the ability  to dictate 
the quantity  of visas by  type that  should be 
issued to what  nations. This decision  is 
largely  a  diplomatic  decision based on  US 
interests overseas.  At  the operational  and 
tactical  levels,  DHS would support and 
undertake the operational aspects of the 
diplomatic policy  decisions by  determining 
which  individuals should be granted or 
denied visas based on  the findings of a 
security assessment.
A SEAMLESS PROCESS
The implementation  of a  new  strategy  will 
consolidate the immigration  process, making 
it  organizationally  seamless and reducing  the 
need for  operational level communication 
and collaboration. Under  the current system, 
the DOS grants visas to immigrant  and 
nonimmigrant  visa  holders coming to the 
United States; these individuals then  present 
themselves and their visas to DHS for 
admission.  For  nonimmigrant  visa  holders, 
the entry  and exit  process will be their  only 
contact  with  DHS. If DHS personnel making 
a  determination for  admission  of an  applicant 
want to obtain  additional  information, they 
must  obtain  that  information from  DOS.  For 
immigrant visa  holders,  a  long-term 
relationship with  DHS is necessary  in  order 
to obtain  immigration  benefits,  such  as lawful 
status and employment  authorization. DHS 
must  obtain  records from  DOS regarding  the 
immigrant  in  order to effectively  adjudicate 
his status. This requires information sharing 
and collaboration between two different 
government departments ,  inc luding 
proprietary  database access. Consolidating 
the visa  issuing  function  with  the admission 
and adjudication functions of DHS could 
create a  seamless process for  the visitor  or 
immigrant  and could reduce the need for 
systems and policies governing  information 
sharing  and collaboration between separate 
government departments.
DOS ROADBLOCKS 
This strategy  presents unique organizational 
challenges within  DOS.  The Department of 
State currently  uses the visa  review  as an 
entry-level diplomatic position  from  which  to 
grow  and develop the future leaders of its 
department. Moving  this responsibility  into 
DHS would require DOS to find another 
avenue through  which  to develop their  junior 
diplomats.
Issuing  visas also generates fees that  are 
currently  kept  by  DOS; however, DOS would 
not require these funds to facilitate  the visa 
process,  as that  would be moved to DHS. 
DOS Diplomatic Security  Service  (DSS) is 
currently  responsible for  investigating  visa 
and passport  fraud. DSS shares the 
responsibility  of investigating  visa  fraud with 
DHS Immigration  and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE)  and the Department  of Labor’s (DOL) 
Office  of the Inspector  General  (OIG). The 
mission  of DSS is to protect  DOS personnel 
and missions and uphold the integrity  of US 
visa and passport  travel documents. 45  ICE 
could easily  become the lead agency  in  visa 
fraud investigations as ICE is the largest 
investigative arm  of DHS and already  has 
attachés stationed at many  US embassies 
abroad. This would allow  DSS to focus more 
on  the mission of protection,  and it  would 
prevent significant  duplications of effort 
between  the two agencies.  This would require 
a  significant transition  period in  order  to 
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ensure that  the new  office within  DHS would 
be fully  trained and prepared to assume these 
responsibilities. The institutional knowledge 
of DOS regarding the issuing  of visas would 
need to be fully  exploited before any  formal 
change in responsibility  could occur. This 
transition  period would,  however,  be 
temporary,  and it  would be offset  by  the 
increase in  security  and continuity  in  both 
the visa and immigration processes.
DHS CHANGES
DHS would also need to undergo significant 
changes to implement  this strategy. These 
changes could be potentially  greater  than  the 
changes required by  DOS.  The two 
departments would have to work together  to 
implement a  training  program  to teach  DHS 
employees the skill  sets required along  with 
the specifics of the duty.  The largest  change 
would be expanding  an  office within  an 
existing DHS agency.  ICE is the principle 
investigative arm  of DHS.  ICE already  has a 
significant footprint  in  Department of State 
embassies and investigates crimes involving 
visa fraud.  ICE is currently  responsible for 
the Visa  Security  Program  (VSP). ICE assigns 
special agents to diplomatic posts worldwide 
to conduct  visa security  activities, such as 
examining  visa  applications in  depth, 
initiating  investigations, coordinating with 
other law  enforcement  entities, and providing 
training and advice to DOS personnel. 46 This 
program  could easily  be expanded to include 
agents whose function  would be to issue 
visas.  Analysis of the ICE Strategic  Plan for 
2010–2014 reveals a  focus on  visa  security 
and preventing  dangerous individuals from 
entering the United States.47 
According  to the Plan,  the primary 
mission  of ICE is to protect  national  security, 
public safety, and the integrity  of the US 
borders through  the criminal and civil 
enforcement  of federal law  governing  border 
control,  customs,  trade,  and immigration. 48 
The first  priority  is to prevent  terrorism  and 
enhance security.  This involves preventing 
terrorists’ entry  into the United States.  ICE 
seeks to expand its efforts to identify  and 
prevent  the entry  of terrorists or  their 
associates into the United States. ICE will do 
this in two ways.  First,  ICE will  expand its 
VSP to those US embassies and consulates 
identified by  the DOS and DHS as having  the 
highest  risk  from  a terrorism  perspective. 
Second, ICE will  strive to use its broad 
criminal  authorities to investigate, disrupt 
and dismantle criminal activities that 
facilitate terrorist  travel to, financing in,  or 
employment  in  the United States. These 
include a  variety  of criminal activities, such 
as alien  smuggling  with  a  terrorism  nexus; 
international  passport, visa  and identity 
fraud; illicit  financing  schemes designed to 
support  terrorists or  their  associates; and 
employment authorization  fraud at  sensitive 
government,  transportation  and industrial 
facilities in  the United States. 49  The 
specificity  of mission  focus outlined in  this 
plan, as it  pertains to visa  security, lays a 
strong foundation  for  ICE assuming complete 
responsibility  for the visa issuing process. 
The fact that  ICE is already  seeking  to expand 
the VSP could also make a  transition  of this 
responsibility more viable.
STAKEHOLDERS
DHS and DOS are not the only  stakeholders 
in  the visa issuing function. Others who have 
an  interest in  the way  visas are issued include 
the US Congress and special interest  groups 
(which  include civil liberties unions),  college 
presidents across the United States, 
migrants,  visitors, and foreign  business 
persons. Congress is responsible for  oversight 
and funding of departmental programs. 
There are multiple  congressional committees 
responsible  for  national security  oversight. 
These subcommittees must  be fully  informed 
and engaged in  any  potential changes within 
the visa  issuing  system. Special  interest 
groups such as civil  liberties unions must be 
engaged to ensure they  understand this 
s t rategy  wi l l  not  add new  secur i ty 
requirements but will instead streamline 
existing  security  procedures.  College 
presidents have a  huge stake in  international 
students receiving visas to study  in  the 
United States. They  should participate in 
working  groups,  to ensure their  concerns are 
addressed and to better  understand how 
improved security  procedures in  the visa 
process could make their  campuses safer.  The 
private sector  will  also benefit  from  improved 
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security  procedures in  the visa  process by 
receiving  guest  workers that  have undergone 
a  more efficient  vetting process. This would 
be the result  of all  DHS indices concerning 
immigration and security  being  referenced by 
DHS personnel versus having  to rely  on 
interagency collaboration. 
A  significant outreach  to each  of these 
stakeholders would be necessary  in  order  to 
create a  “mega  community”  that  could work 
towards achieving this goal. A  mega 
community  is defined as a  collaborative 
socioeconomic environment in  which 
business,  government, and civil society 
interact  according  to their  common  interests, 
while maintaining their unique priorities.50  
All  of the various stakeholders must  be 
reached – in  an  effort  to mitigate potential 
roadblocks to implementing this strategy  – 
and invited to provide input  in the creation of 
the plan.  Informing  and involving the various 
stakeholders early  on  in  the process can 
accomplish  this.  Congressional approval is 
necessary  to attain required funding  and 
legislation  for  this to be effective.  Civil  liberty 
groups and other  special interest  groups must 
be assured that  this will enhance security 
merely  by  streamlining a  process that  is 
already  in  place, and not by  creating  new 
requirements and additional  scrutiny. 
Visitors and foreign  businesspersons must 
also be shown  that  this will make the process 
both more efficient and more secure.  
CONCLUSION
Consolidating  the visa  issuing  process under 
the Department  of Homeland Security  will 
transform  this function  from  a  system  that 
potentially  creates a security  vulnerability 
and communication  seam  to a  more 
streamlined and efficient system. This 
strategy  seeks to raise the level  of security  in 
the visa  issuing  process and efficiency  in the 
overall  immigration process. The strategy 
aims to reduce vulnerabilities to fraud, and 
the likelihood of dangerous persons entering 
the United States.  Lastly, the strategy 
provides an  opportunity  for  DOS to focus 
exclusively  on diplomacy. Table  2  shows an 
Eliminate-Reduce-Raise-Create Grid for  this 
strategy  that can be easily  understood by 
policy makers at all levels. 51 
Table 1.  ER2C Grid
ELIMINATE RAISE
• Diplomacy at the operational 
level
• Need for operational level of 
collaboration and 
communication
• Level of security in the visa 
process
• Efficiency of the immigration 
process
Reduce Create
• Visa fraud vulnerabilities
• Likelihood of dangerous 
persons entering the U.S.
• Seamless immigration 
process from start to finish
• Consolidated immigration 
process
• Opportunity for DOS to focus 
exclusively on diplomacy
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The visa  system  in  the United States is 
currently  fractured between the Department 
of State  and the Department of Homeland 
Security.  This creates extra  requirements in 
terms of interdepartmental collaboration  and 
communication  as well  as duplications of 
effort  in the security  and diplomacy  arena. 
Creating a  seamless process for  foreign 
nationals to enter  the United States will 
increase both  efficiency  and security  that  will 
benefit national security  as well as 
international commerce. Refining  the visa 
p r o c e s s w i l l  r e q u i r e s i g n i f i c a n t 
reorganizations within  DHS and DOS,  but it 
will allow  these departments to focus 
exclusively  on  their  respective missions. 
Nonetheless,  for  this strategy  to be possible, 
all  stakeholders must  be engaged to fully 
understand the benefits of such  a  strategy. 
This strategy  could also solve the current 
p r o b l e m s o f i n f o r m a t i o n  s h a r i n g , 
interdepartmental  collaboration, and 
competing  missions and resources. A 
seamless process emphasizing  a  more 
efficient  and secure visa  issuance system  may 
result in a more secure United States.  
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There’s a Pattern Here: The Case to Integrate Environmental 
Security into Homeland Security Strategy
James D. Ramsay and Terrence M. O’Sullivan
ABSTRACT
The time is  long overdue to acknowledge 
that global climate and resource stresses, 
e n c o m p a s s e d b y t h e c o n c e p t o f 
environmental security (ES), are an 
increasingly important part of “homeland” 
security (HS)  study and practice,  by  even the 
m o s t r e s t r i c t e d d e f i n i t i o n s  o f H S . 
Environmental security  issues will affect 
global economic and political stability, US 
national interests,  and the risk of war and 
terrorism.  Just as  homeland security 
encompasses many complex issues  and 
interconnected subfields, environmental 
security (ES) is  interdisciplinary by nature. 
In essence,  ES is  an emergent discipline 
b o r r o w i n g f r o m a c o m b i n a t i o n o f 
environmental studies  – which decades  ago 
integrated environmental science with 
public policy – and the broader observations 
of how  environmental change,  extreme 
weather events and resource scarcity issues 
impact domestic  and international security. 
In a two-part argument,  we first observe the 
growing environmental and resource-
related security  threats at every level of 
analysis, from  global to individual levels as 
consequences  of warming-induced climate 
alterations.  Next,  given the  significant 
impacts on local,  regional,  and international 
geopolitical stability, we discuss  why 
environmental security threats must be 
incorporated into both homeland and 
national security strategic  planning. 
Developing a theory of environmental 
security seems  central to  a more  complete 
understanding of homeland security  and a 
more modern concept of national security.
“Make  no mistake: without concerted action, the 
very future of our planet is in peril. …”
“Lack of action on climate  change  threatens  to 
make  the world our children inherit a completely 
different world than we are living in today…”
“Climate change is one of the single biggest 
challenges facing development. …Unless we take 
action on climate change, future generations will 
be roasted, toasted, fried and grilled.”1
INTRODUCTION
In  July  2012, amidst the hottest  year 
recorded up to then  in  the continental  United 
States, with  an  extended, record-breaking 
h e a t w a v e a c r o s s t h e c o u n t r y , t h e 
Southwestern  United States at  risk of 
becoming a  new  drought-ridden  “Dust 
Bowl”, 2 historic wildfires raging  in Colorado,3 
and in  the aftermath  of a  destructive multi-
state “derecho”  storm,4  Department of 
Homeland Security  (DHS) Secretary  Janet 
Napolitano made a  link  between  the severe 
weather events and climate change. “You 
have to look at  climate change over  a  period 
of years, not just  one summer,” Napolitano 
said.  “You  could always have one abnormal 
summer. But when you see one after  another 
after  another  then  you  can see, yeah,  there’s a 
pattern  here.”5  Four  months later, 
“Superstorm”  Sandy  – one of the most 
expensive natural disasters in  US history  – 
devastated the Northeast seaboard. 
The DHS secretary’s observation was 
certainly  warranted at a  scientific  level. 
Climate scientists many  years ago reached a 
scientific  consensus  that anthropogenic 
global warming and climate change,  largely 
caused by  human  greenhouse gas emissions, 
is occurring. 6 Global  warming  is the build-up 
of heat trapped in  the atmosphere, land, and 
(90 percent  or  more) oceans as the direct 
result  of a  magnified greenhouse effect that 
traps more solar  energy  than normal. 7 
Climate change is the often  disruptive and 
regionally  variable result of that build-up of 
heat.  Global  warming  contributes to changes 
in  extreme weather events and long-range 
precipitation,  heat and cold variations,  ocean 
level rise and growing  carbon-related ocean 
acidity,  melting  of massive polar  ice 
reservoirs and frozen  permafrost,  and a  host 
of other  effects.8  But because of well-
established scientific  cause and effect,  both 
are at once dependent and independent 
variables,  critical  and inseparable in  analysis 
of the environmental, national, and 
homeland security  implications discussed 
below. 
Scient ists have for  decades been 
predicting  extreme weather  events as well as 
changes in  regional and global climate would 
increase in  response to human-caused (i.e., 
anthropogenic) warming,  and begun to 
directly  tie some specific  recent  extreme 
weather events to climate change. 9  After 
generations of denial by  the fossil fuel 
industry,  even  the CEO of Exxon  Mobil,  Rex 
Tillerson, acknowledged in  the summer  of 
2012  that  human-caused climate change is 
happening.   Sadly  in these same guarded 
remarks Tillerson  suggested that responding 
to climate change would not  require changes 
in  current  policy  or consumption patterns. 
Tillerson  characterized global warming  as a 
solvable “engineering  problem,”  and insisted 
that,  whatever  problems arise from  resulting 
climate change,  “…we’ll adapt  to that.” 10 
What  was notable about Janet  Napolitano’s 
comments was her  public (if oblique) 
recognition  that  DHS, as the primary 
manifestation  of federal  homeland security 
efforts, was concerned about the long-term 
environmental  security  consequences of 
climate change and the disasters that  could 
result from it. 11 
And yet, but  for  the fractured American 
politics of climate change, Napolitano’s 
observation  should have long ago been 
obvious in  the national public  policy  debate. 
Nonetheless , the sc ient i f ic and the 
institutional affirmation  of this growing 
security  problem  has been accelerating. As 
far  back as the 1950s,  thanks to extensive 
scientific research  on  carbon  dioxide 
(including groundbreaking  civilian  studies12 
as well  as military  research) the basic  facts 
about  human  carbon dioxide (CO2) were 
already  established.  Even the Pentagon  knew 
that  atmospheric  CO2 and water  vapor 
blocked heat,  and thus could act  as 
greenhouse gases, after  extensive studies on 
the effectiveness of heat-seeking  missiles.13 
This research  on  those and other  heat 
trapping  “greenhouse gases”  was confirmed 
by  additional research  and beyond a 
reasonable doubt over  the subsequent 
generations.  And analysis of the composition 
of Earth’s principal greenhouse gas – carbon 
dioxide – the carbon  fingerprint,  as such,  has 
c lear ly  shown  that the major i ty  of 
atmospheric CO2 is comprised of particular 
isotopes derived from  the human  burning of 
fossil fuels, and not from natural sources. 14  
Given  the scope of its implications and the 
international nature of its drivers, climate 
change is among the most important issues of 
our  era. 15  There is an  overwhelming scientific 
consensus among  experts on  the basic causes 
and realities of climate change and global 
warming; although, in  political rhetoric 
mostly  confined to the United States,  there 
remains a  modicum  of dissent16 –enough  to 
paralyze most  significant  policy  measures 
aimed at greenhouse gas emissions 
reduction. 
Although  there are still some uncertainties 
(decreasing  every  year)  about exactly  what, 
where located, and how  severe the 
consequences will  be,  current  patterns of 
climate change are sobering. The basic facts 
of climate change have long  ago been  put  to 
rest  in  the scientific and political debate in 
most of the developed world,  despite the 
political  failure in  America  to ratify 
international climate response treaties.17 For 
example,  a  2009 survey  of over 3,000  earth 
scientists asked the question  “Do you  think 
human  activity  is a  significant contributing 
f a c t o r  i n  c h a n g i n g  m e a n  g l o b a l 
temperatures?” Although  82  percent of those 
surveyed answered affirmatively, significantly 
97.5  percent  of climatologists who actively 
publish research  on cl imate change 
responded affirmatively. As the study  authors 
noted,  “...the debate on  the authenticity  of 
global warming  and the role played by  human 
activity  is largely  nonexistent among  those 
who understand the nuances and scientific 
basis of long-term climate processes.” 18 
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This paper  is organized in  two parts.  In 
Part  I we develop the case for  greenhouse 
gas-induced global  warming and resultant 
climate change and its ties to homeland (and 
national) security, economic security, and 
human/public  health  security. Note this part 
will not  include a  thorough  review  of the 
science of climate change, for  that  has been 
well  documented. Rather, Part  I outlines 
recent  studies among  the most important 
American  and international  science,  policy, 
and security  institutions in order  to begin  to 
better  establish  the many  and deep ties 
between  climate change and security.  These 
demonstrate the ominous existing – and 
potentially  calamitous future – results of 
anthropogenic climate change. Part  II 
specifically  develops the concept  and scope of 
t h e e m e r g e n t  d i s c i p l i n e w e c a l l 
“environmental security,” (ES).  Here we 
make the case that climate change is 
inextricably  linked to both  public  health  and 
economic  wellbeing, and therefore is a  bona 
fide homeland security  concern worthy  of 
integration  into HS strategic  planning 
p r o c e s s e s a n d m i s s i o n  s t a t e m e n t s . 
Ultimately,  adequate assessment  of both 
domestic and international  security  risks, 
including proper  development of mitigation 
s trategies , cannot  be done without 
incorporating  the consequences of global 
climate change or  resulting  conflicts that 
arise from  resource scarcity. That is, from  a 
s t r a t e g i c  p l a n n i n g  p e r s p e c t i v e ,  a 
comprehensive view  of national or homeland 
security  cannot  be constructed without 
incorporating  the precepts and drivers and 
mitigating factors of environmental security. 
THE CASE FOR ANTHROPOGENIC 
CLIMATE CHANGE AS A 
SECURITY ISSUE
Why  has environmental security  become part 
of the national  security  and homeland 
security  agendas of all nations, including the 
United States? Until recent  decades exact 
attribution of either  climate change to human 
activities, or  attribution  of climate change to 
security  challenges facing  the United States 
has not  always been easy  or  clear.   The almost 
linear  relationship between  fossil  fuel 
emissions and global  warming,19 despite past 
difficulty  in  attributing causation,  is now  well 
established as a  scientific  consensus, as noted 
above. Anthropogenic  climate change has 
been  a  politically  charged issue nonetheless, 
primarily in the United States.  
Prior  to the 1990s, numerous US 
government  reports and efforts documented 
the science of climate change and reflected 
the growing consensus.20  After  2001, 
however, although US government  reports 
explicitly  tied other non-traditional threats to 
national security,  federal mention  of climate 
change was often  minimized and even 
impeded until recent years.21   
Interestingly,  one example of a non-
traditional threat  has been the realm  of 
public health, exemplified in  the National 
Security Strategy (NSS) of 2006,  which 
clearly  ties naturally  occurring infectious 
disease outbreaks to national  security.22 
Written during  the Bush  administration,  the 
2006  NSS emphasized the importance of 
addressing public health  and pandemics such 
as HIV/AIDS and influenza  as well as other 
natural disasters in  a national security 
context. Among  the other  “challenges of 
globalization”  the 2006 NSS addressed was 
“environmental  destruction, whether  caused 
by  human  behavior  or  cataclysmic  mega-
disasters such  as floods,  hurricanes, 
earthquakes,  or  tsunamis.” 23 This marked a 
significant  enlargement in  the scope of 
national security  concerns,  though  despite 
discussion in  the NSS of weather  disasters 
such  as 2005  Hurricanes Katrina  and Rita, 
prominently  left out of the 2006  NSS report 
was any  mention  of either  the existence or 
the impact on security  from  threats arising 
out of global warming/climate change. Hence 
at  the federal level, for  a  time, the tie between 
climate change and security, including  the 
growing  scientific  linkages between extreme 
weather events and rising  sea  levels (and 
their  causes) to US national security  was 
downplayed or largely ignored.24   
Tying  climate change to security  requires 
at  least  two components to be causally 
related.    First,  human  activities need to be 
tied to greenhouse gas production  that in 
turn  exacerbates the greenhouse effect  and 
thereby  warms the earth  (and, as noted, this 
is now  a  given,  as a  scientific consensus), 
which  subsequently  causes a variety  of 
ecological  and social  impacts. Second, that  a 
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warming  earth  in  turn  causes security 
challenges vis-à-vis destruction  of life, 
property,  and the environment, and 
subsequent  destabilization  of human 
political, social, and economic systems. 25  
IT’S EVEN WORSE THAN WE THOUGHT: 
RELATING HUMAN ACTIVITY TO 
GREENHOUSE GASES TO SECURITY
Since the early  industrial  age, increasing 
greenhouse gas concentrations (GHC) have 
been  correlated to a  rise in the Earth’s 
average surface temperature. Given that most 
carbon  dioxide released into nature from 
human  activities comes from  combusting 
fossil fuels, and that  fossil fuels are the 
primary  impetus for  all modern  economies, 
it’s logical to conclude as consumption, 
production, manufacturing, and lifestyles 
have modernized,  those activities are indeed 
driving climate change.  
Population  and development directly 
predict  carbon  emissions.  Currently, ten 
nations contribute 80 percent of the total 
carbon  emissions on  earth  and among  these 
are the United States,  China and Russia  – 
trends expected to massively  increase by 
2030 given  commonly  projected increases in 
Earth’s population. 26  As Earth’s population 
has grown exponentially  and as less 
developed nations modernize each  year  more 
c o m p l e t e l y , t h e r a t e o f f o s s i l  f u e l 
c o n s u m p t i o n  w o r l d w i d e h a s b e e n 
increasing.27  For  instance, recent  evidence 
suggests that  climate models have been too 
conservative in  their  published projections 
regarding  the severity  of both global warming 
and the coming  changes in  climate and 
weather.  This is evident  given  faster  than 
predicted changes in  sea  level  and glacial ice 
melting in Greenland and the Arctic.28  
Such published results about  changes in 
Earth’s climate have motivated even  some of 
the few  remaining  climate expert  skeptics to 
investigate their  veracity.  Such  was the case 
with  Berkeley  researcher  Richard Muller, 
who conducted a large-scale global  warming 
assessment project  headed by  himself and 
funded in  part  by  high  profile climate change 
denying  billionaires, the Koch  brothers. 
Muller’s study  concluded that  previous 
climate models and calculations were largely 
correct in  establishing  that  overall global 
average temperatures had risen almost  1 
degree centigrade since the 1800s.29 
In  addition  to observed changes in the 
environment, social impacts of climate 
change have been  increasingly  monitored as 
well.  Recent estimates are that  global 
warming/climate change is responsible for 
400,000 deaths per  year  and over  $1.2 
trillion  in  damage – equivalent to 1.6  percent 
of global GDP.  Although  estimates vary,  both 
resultant  fatalities and economic  damage are 
expected to increase over  the next  twenty  to 
forty years.30  
Separately,  air  pollution  from  combusting 
fossil fuels is estimated to cause 4.5  million 
deaths per  year. 31  These connections have 
caused the topic,  writ large, to be highly 
politicized and controversial.  Controversy 
over  the social  causes and consequences of 
global environmental  change aside,  it  is 
increasingly  clear  to the scientific  and 
military  communities that there are deep 
security concerns as well.   
THE SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY SUGGESTS 
TIES TO SECURITY
In  2012  and 2013  a  number  of US-based 
climate change reports highlighted both  the 
scope and criticality  of climate change.  First, 
in  late 2012,  two important studies were 
published involving  dozens of climate and 
security  experts.  Each  study  highlighted 
many  of the same critical points about  the 
growing  social and security  crisis attributable 
to climate change and related drivers.  The 
first  study  was the Harvard University  report 
entitled Climate Extremes: Recent Trends 
with Implications  for National Security.32 
The Harvard study  was the product  of a  series 
of international  climate change workshops 
among  many  top cl imate scientists, 
sponsored by  the National Academy  of 
Sciences, Columbia University, and the 
H a r v a r d U n i v e r s i t y  C e n t e r  f o r  t h e 
Environment,  and funded by  the Central 
Intelligence Agency. Further,  this study 
explored likely  ten-year  scenarios,  and asked 
whether climate extremes seen  up to then  – 
including droughts,  floods, severe storms, 
and heat  waves – would persist,  and if they 
were a  result  of natural variability  or 
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greenhouse warming,  and what  the plausible 
impacts on  US national security  interests 
might  be. The study  concluded “that the early 
ramifications of climate extremes resulting 
from  climate change are already  upon  us and 
will likely  continue to be felt  over  the next 
decade – affecting human security  and 
impacting US national security  interests.” 
More specifically, regarding  the United 
States, security implications included:
 
… more record high temperatures; fewer 
but stronger  tropical  cyclones; wider areas 
of drought and increases in  precipitation; 
increased climate variability; Arctic 
warming and attendant impacts; and 
continued sea level rise as  greenhouse 
warming continues and even  accelerates. 
These changes will  affect water  and food 
availability, energy  decisions, the design of 
critical  infrastructure, use of  the global 
commons such  as the oceans and the Arctic 
region, and critical  ecosystem  resources. 
They  will  affect both underdeveloped and 
industrialized countries  with  large costs  in 
terms of economic and human  security. 
The study identifies specific regional 
c l i m a t e i m p a c t s — d r o u g h t s a n d 
desertification  in Mexico, Southwest Asia, 
and the Eastern Mediterranean, and 
increased flooding in  South Asia—that are 
of particular strategic importance to the 
United States. 33
Study  author  Michael McElroy  added: 
“Lessons from  the past  are no longer  of great 
value as a  guide to the future… unexpected 
changes in  regional weather  are likely  to 
define the new  climate normal,  and we are 
not prepared.” 34  
A  second key  study  was produced by  the 
National Academies of Sciences (NAS) and 
National Research  Council entitled Climate 
and Social Stress: Implications for Security 
Analysis.   Commissioned by  the US 
intelligence community,  the report noted 
that:
T h e U S i n t e l l i g e n c e a n d s e c u r i t y 
communities have begun to examine a 
variety  of plausible scenarios  through 
which  climate change might pose or  alter 
security  risks…to identify  ways to increase 
the ability  of the intelligence community  to 
take climate change into account in 
assessing political  and social  stresses with 
implications for U.S. national security.35 
The NAS report  places into a national 
security  framework  what climate change 
experts have been forecasting  for  some time: 
Specifically,  climate-related events are often 
closely  spaced in time, and can directly  lead 
to cascading failures and crises in  global  food, 
water, trade, commodities,  public health, 
e c o n o m i c ,  a n d p o l i t i c a l s y s t e m s – 
particularly  in  countries and regions that  are 
already fragile, poorly resilient, or stressed. 36
In  2013  the US National Climate 
Assessment (NCA),  overseen by  the sixty-
person Federal Advisory  Committee (the 
N a t i o n a l  C l i m a t e A s s e s s m e n t  a n d 
Development  Advisory  Committee or 
NCADAC),  is a  group that  was established in 
2010  by  the Department of Commerce and 
supported through  the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). 
NCADAC  laid out the likely  implications to 
the US economy  and to society  attributable to 
climate change.  The NCADAC,  with 
contributions by  more than 240  authors, 
projected a  series of likely  social impacts 
based on  low, medium, and high  greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions scenarios. Among  the 
findings, NCADAC observed that climate 
change is not  a  uniformly  distributed 
phenomenon and occurs faster  in some 
places than  others.  For  example, some top ice 
experts believe the Arctic  region,  where 
temperatures have risen much  faster  than the 
global average,  could be almost ice-free in the 
summers over  the next  several years – and 
almost  definitely  so in  the next  twenty 
years. 37   Hence,  purely  as a  result  of 
persistent ice  melt  due to anthropogenic 
warming, the Arctic is fast  becoming  a 
national security  concern.  The geopolitical 
implications for  free navigation  of naval 
vessels through  a  soon-to-be open “Northern 
passage”  are rapidly  creating  a need for 
additional Arctic  and Law  of the Seas-related 
t r e a t y  n e g o t i a t i o n s .  A m o n g  o t h e r 
developments,  Russia  has placed military 
assets in  the region  to leverage control over 
the natural  resources there (particularly 
seafood, fresh  water, oil  and gas), but also to 
stake a  claim  to mineral and territorial  rights 
in this previously forbidding region.38  
In  addition, a  melting  Arctic  promises to 
have a  significant impact  on  the average 
climate and weather  in  the Northern 
Hemisphere.  As the NCA  notes pointedly,  the 
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United States, the largest per-capita global 
emitter  of greenhouse gases,  was going  to 
experience among  the greatest  impacts of 
weather and climate disasters of any  nation 
in  the world given  the idiosyncrasies of North 
American  geography.  Average temperatures 
in  the United States have risen  around 1.5 
degrees F. since 1895  – with  over  80 percent 
of that  increase since 1980.39 Hotter  weather 
and drought will become much  more 
common,  and even  the norm  in  the American 
Southwest,  with  average US temperatures 
likely  to rise another  2  to 4  degrees F.  over 
the next  few  decades,  and from  4  to 10 
degrees F. by 2100. 40  
These est imates carry  s tagger ing 
implications and uncertainties which  will 
a f f e c t  h e a l t h , a g r i c u l t u r e ,  e n e r g y , 
transportation,  water  and food supply, and 
countless other  critical infrastructure sectors. 
And, as the impact of 2012’s “Superstorm” 
Sandy  foreshadowed,  rising sea  levels will 
increasingly  threaten  coastal cities and 
communities with  inundation,  salt  water 
intrusion into water  supplies and farm  land, 
and severe storm  surge damage that  radically 
change a  region’s economic  outlook. Because 
of the quirks of geography  and a warming-
related slowdown  of Gulf Stream  ocean 
currents,  the over  600 mile-long  American 
Atlantic coast,  a  stretch  reaching  from  North 
Carolina  north  to New  York City  and Boston, 
is experiencing  some of the largest  rises in 
sea  levels.41  This observation  is backed by 
other projections, and the US Geological 
Survey  (USGS)  reported that  although  global 
ocean  level increased between  1950  and 2009 
by  an annual  average of 0.02  inches,  Atlantic 
coast levels north  of Cape Hatteras,  NC 
increased on average 0.08 inches a year. 42 
Similarly  in  late 2012,  the World Bank 
report, Turn Down the Heat: Why a 4°C 
Warmer World Must be Avoided,  bleakly 
noted that  the most likely  scenario for  2100 
would be over  7  degrees Fahrenheit  (4 
degrees C.) global average temperature 
increase. As the World Bank’s report  warns in 
what are now frequently repeated themes:
The 4°C scenarios are devastating: the 
inundation of coastal cities; increasing risks 
for  food production  potentially  leading to 
higher malnutrition rates; many dry 
regions becoming  dryer, wet regions 
wetter; unprecedented heat waves in  many 
regions, especial ly  in  the tropics; 
substantially  exacerbated water scarcity  in 
many  regions; increased frequency of high-
intensity  tropical  cyclones; and irreversible 
loss  of  biodiversity, including coral  reef 
systems.43
Increasingly,  government research  entities, 
scholars in  health,  science, economics, and 
military  security  are referencing  climate 
change in  terms of security.44 These sources 
collectively  warn of growing, interactive 
public health  and economic  damage, and the 
subsequent  political upheaval that  will  result 
from  growing  world populations and looming 
resource shortages (especially  oil  and gas, 
food,  and water).  As the social,  economic, 
and polit ical concerns about  global 
environmental change mount,  it  is becoming 
clearer  that  there are profound security 
concerns.
US NATIONAL SECURITY BUY-IN: 
PENTAGON AND INTELLIGENCE 
COMMUNITY ASSESSMENTS45
In  addition to the early  military’s greenhouse 
gas research  noted above,  all of the US 
n a t i o n a l  s e c u r i t y  i n s t i t u t i o n s h a v e 
acknowledged the scope and implications of 
climate change.  Among them, the Pentagon 
has acknowledged the potential impacts of 
the combination  of climate change and 
looming  energy  supply  shortages as 
articulated in the 2010  Quadrennial Defense 
Review  (QDR),  the US Military’s primary 
planning document  published every  four 
years. 46 For  example, DoD is considering how 
best to reassess strategic  priorities, and spur 
new  efforts to find alternative energy 
technologies and improved efficiency  in order 
to reduce military  dependence on  foreign oil/
energy  sources. It  emphasized the likelihood 
for climate change to exacerbate
...poverty, environmental  degradation, and 
t h e f u r t h e r w e a k e n i n g o f  f r a g i l e 
governments… and [t]he rising demand for 
resources, rapid urbanization of  littoral 
regions, the effects of climate change, the 
emergence of new strains of disease, and 
profound cultural  and demographic 
tensions in several  regions are just some of 
the trends whose complex interplay may 
spark or exacerbate future conflicts.47  
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Climate change will have a  significant 
impact  on  its structure,  missions,  capabilities 
and operations in the future.  For example:
Climate change and energy are two key 
issues that will  play  a significant role in 
shaping  the future security environment. 
Although they produce distinct types of 
challenges, climate change, energy security, 
and economic stability are inextricably 
linked. The actions that the Department 
takes now can prepare us to respond 
effectively  to these challenges in the near 
term and in the future.  Climate change will 
affect DoD in  two broad ways. First, climate 
c h a n g e w i l l  s h a p e t h e o p e r a t i n g 
environment, roles, and missions that we 
undertake. The U.S. Global  Change 
Research  Program, composed of  13 federal 
agencies, reported in  2009 that climate-
related changes are already  being observed 
in  every region of the world, including  the 
United States and its  coastal  waters. Among 
these physical  changes  are increases in 
heavy  downpours, rising temperature and 
sea level, rapidly retreating  glaciers, 
thawing  permafrost, lengthening  growing 
seasons, lengthening ice-free seasons in  the 
oceans and on lakes and rivers, earlier 
snowmelt, and alterations in river flows.
Second, DoD will  need to adjust to the 
impacts of climate change on  our  facilities 
and military capabilities. The Department 
a l r e a d y  p r o v i d e s e n v i r o n m e n t a l 
s t e w a r d s h i p a t h u n d r e d s o f D o D 
installations throughout the United States 
and around the world, working  diligently  to 
meet resource efficiency  and sustainability 
goals as set by  relevant laws and executive 
orders. Although the United States has 
significant capacity  to adapt to climate 
change, it will  pose challenges for  civil 
society and DoD alike, particularly in  light 
o f  t h e n a t i o n ’ s e x t e n s i v e c o a s t a l 
infrastructure. In 2008, the National 
Intelligence Council  judged that more than 
30 U.S. military installations were already 
facing  elevated levels of  risk from  rising sea 
levels. 48
In  a  reaction  to the QDR,  former  Senator 
John  Warner  (R-VA), spokesperson for  the 
Pew  Project on  Energy,  Security  and Climate 
noted:
[The] Quadrennial Defense Review, which 
mirrors what leading military, intelligence, 
and security  experts have told us  about the 
impending  threat  of climate change and our 
energy  dependence, clearly exhibits that the 
Department is preparing for the worst  of 
threats… Climate change has  the potential 
to make natural  disasters more frequent, 
adding more missions to the already  heavy 
burdens of our military.49 
This is a  compelling  challenge,  especially 
considering current austerity  measures that 
now  characterize the Department of Defense 
as well as other federal entities.
Affirming  ties to US national security,  the 
US intelligence community  (IC) detailed 
potential implications to the intelligence 
community  of global  warming and climate 
change in  its December  2012  report  entitled 
Global Trends  2030.  In  the Global Trends 
report, the National Intelligence Council 
(NIC) emphasizes that climate change will 
create resource shortages, internal  and 
international  migration  problems, and 
increased political  conflict. Among   projected 
“megatrends,”  the  NIC  forecasts increases in 
water, food,  and energy  demands (40,  35, and 
50  percent,  respectively, by  2030) due to 
global population  increases and demands for 
improvements in  standard of l iving 
(consumption  patterns) among  the growing 
global  middle classes – even as climate 
change negatively  impacts the supply  of those 
resources. Specifically, the Global Trends 
report  observed: “the decline in  precipitation 
will occur  in  the Middle East  and northern 
Africa  as well as western  Central Asia, 
southern  Europe, southern Africa, and the 
U.S. Southwest.” 50  The report also warns 
about  the likelihood of “black  swans”  – 
unforeseen, dangerous crises and tipping 
points that  are already  emerging,  and faster 
than  previously  expected which  may  cause 
large-scale regional destabilization. For 
example, “Rapid changes in  precipitation 
patterns—such  as monsoons in  India  and the 
rest  of Asia—could sharply  disrupt that 
region’s ability  to feed its population” 51  by 
disruptions in  water  access, soil quality,  and 
r e d u c e d c a p a c i t y  t o p r o d u c e f o o d . 
Comparatively,  Africa,  Asia,  and the Middle 
East will be most affected because of the 
combination  of wide-spread poverty, lack of 
critical infrastructure, and a  greater  reliance 
on agriculture,  and thus experience a 
resultant  vulnerability  to extreme weather, 
including  heat disasters, drought, and 
catastrophic floods.52
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Confirming the international nature of the 
security  concerns arising  from  global 
environmental change, the Center  for 
American  Progress concurs with  the NIC 
assessment. In particular,  that south  Asia 
(India,  Pakistan, Bangladesh, etc.) is 
expected to be more severely  affected by 
climate change than most other  areas. 53  This 
expectation  is based on the large regional 
populations (and anticipated population 
growth) characteristic of the region, a 
relatively  underdeveloped infrastructure, 
limited federal ability  to respond to and 
recover  from  larger  scale disasters, and the 
u n i q u e c o m b i n a t i o n  o f g e o g r a p h i c 
vulnerabilities,  including rising  sea  levels, 
tropical cyclones from  the Bay  of Bengal and 
Arabian Sea,  shrinking  of critical  river  system 
water  supplies that  will  come with  receding 
Himalayan  glacier  water  or  disruption  of 
seasonal monsoons, and catastrophic  river 
and coastal flooding.54 And as any  student  of 
geopolitics is aware,  this region  is already 
subject to radicalization and significant 
security  tensions particularly  between 
nuclear-armed enemies Pakistan  and India. 
But  water  resource conflicts are also already 
s t a r t i n g  t o e m e r g e b e t w e e n  I n d i a , 
Bangladesh, and China  to the north,  over  the 
Brahmaputra  River, the headwaters of which 
are in  the Himalayan  Tibetan  Plateau. The 
Brahmaputra  flows through  all three 
countries – which  include the two most 
populous nations in  the world – and all are 
under tremendous resource pressures to keep 
up with  population  growth and rising 
standards of living.55  There are demands for 
increasingly  scarce water  supplies as well  as 
hydroelectric  power  generation, and Chinese 
plans to divert upstream  river  flows for  both 
are enflaming diplomatic relations.56
Below  are other  recent  reports and studies 
that reinforce the place of both  the 
environment  and climate as security  and 
stability  issues. Further,  we observe that 
public health,  strategic planning, intelligence, 
and military  leaders are increasingly  in 
general  agreement  with  climate scientists and 
other environmental leaders: 57
• Britain’s Ministry  of Defense noted in 
a  report “climate change will amplify 
existing social, political and resource 
stresses which  can  lead to the tipping 
point  at which  conflict ignites.”58  In 
addition, the United Kingdom’s 
Foreign  Secretary,  William  Hague, 
was quoted saying  that climate 
disruption is “perhaps the 21st 
century's biggest  foreign  policy 
challenge.” 59
• T h e W a s h i n g t o n D C - b a s e d 
International Institute for  Strategic 
Studies (IISS) asserts,  “Climate 
change will  increase the risks of 
resource shortages,  mass migration, 
and civil conflict. These could lead to 
failed states, which  threaten  global 
s t a b i l i t y  a n d s e c u r i t y . ”  I I S S 
highlighted the need for  “sustained 
investment  in  infrastructure and new 
technologies,”  and within  such  efforts 
“a  shift  to renewable  energy  sources 
will be the most  visible effect of efforts 
t o m i t i g a t e e m i s s i o n s . ”  T h e y 
conclude: 
Although discussion is good, we can no 
longer delay implementing tough  action 
that will  make a  difference, while quibbling 
over minor  uncertainties in  climate 
modeling. Unlike most recent natural 
disasters, this one is  entirely predictable. 
Doctors, often seen as authoritative, 
trusted, and independent by  their 
communities, must make their  voices heard 
in calling for such action.60
The evidence for human-caused warming 
and the already  changing  climate  is 
overwhelming, even  as precise details about 
what  exactly  will  happen  remain  uncertain. 
This is true in  part  because the scope and 
speed of changes to the environment are 
mostly  historically  unprecedented (in  either 
geological or  human history).  Scientists do 
not know  precisely  what  may  occur  under 
various scenarios of stabilized carbon 
emissions vs. unchecked (and increasing) 
increases,  which  will  need to incorporate 
cascading  greenhouse gas emission  feedback 
loops (as from  melting  tundra methane,  lost 
Arctic  ice, etc.), temperature increases,  sea 
level rise,  and other  details.  But they  do know 
that  their  worst  case fears are coming  true, 
and they  are getting  better  at modeling such 
predictions as historical and recent  data 
streams in, validating the models.
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From  a  policy  perspective, environmental 
security  is vexing. From  a  decision  science 
perspective, ES is a  wicked problem.61 That 
is,  ES issues are interdisciplinary  in  nature, 
v a l u e - l a d e n ,  e x h i b i t  c o m p l e x 
interdependencies, are international  in  scope, 
and are dynamic and complex  to solve. 
However,  what  is more clear  is that  in 
addition to human misery  and suffering, 
economic  disruption  and cost,  there have 
already  been  repercussions from  climate 
change affecting  political stability  and the 
potential for  political conflict. This is why  it  is 
essential to define ES in  such  a  way  as to 
facilitate its integration  into national/
homeland security  strategic planning.  In  the 
next  section,  we address why  and how 
environmental  issues should be a  key 
component of homeland security  – and 
security at all levels.
THE SCOPE, DEFINITION, AND 
STRATEGIC CONTEXT OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY (ES)
Many  authors have written  about the 
meaning, components of,  or the varied 
definitions of homeland security. 62 Extracted 
from  the literature as a  whole and bearing in 
mind they  are not the only  elements within 
HS, sub-dimensions of the larger  homeland 
security  enterprise are displayed in  Table 1. 
Note that the larger  construct  of homeland 
security  is effectively  a  composite of many 
complex  dimensions.   In  this sense, 
homeland security  can be considered a 
“meta-construct”  or  a  complex,  value-laden, 
dynamic  construct  that  is in  fact  a  composite 
of many  other complex, value-laden,  dynamic 
disciplines in  much  the same way  as modern 
medicine,  and the even  broader  public health 
system,  are organized as complex  composites 
of many  sub disciplines and systems.  It  is 
inside of this context  that we will define 
environmental security.
Law & Policy Terrorism and Political Violence
Emergency Management Environmental Security
Risk Analysis Intelligence Studies
Critical Infrastructure Protection Strategic Planning
Physical Security Public Administration
Public Health Communications
Organizational & Leadership Theory Systems Engineering
Politics & International Relations Economic Analysis
Science & Technology Public Opinion & Social Psychology
Table 1.  Suspected Dimensions (intellectual domains) of Homeland Security
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The complete scope of the  ES dimension 
of homeland security  is hard to precisely 
define for  primarily  two reasons.  First, the 
security  consequences arising  from  the 
complex feedback  loops of human influence 
on  the natural environment are  complex  and 
change over  time. Second,  the social impacts 
arising  from  the characteristics,  resource 
scarcities, and other  aspects of the natural 
and made environments are not always clear. 
As we’ve seen  above, the principles, causes 
and implications of global climate change are 
becoming  increasingly  important  to a  modern 
conceptualization of US and global security, 
challenging  traditional definitions of 
domestic (homeland) security, national 
(military) security,  and the broader  but 
related notions of human,  economic,  and 
health  security.  In  a  general way,  the totality 
of all these  security  concepts is integral to the 
overall scope of environmental security.  
Following Hurricane Katrina  and the 
resultant  rise in  gas prices,  shortage of 
building  materials,  and the clear  need in  large 
disasters for  federal assistance,  Americans 
began  to realize that  natural disasters could 
be so traumatic,  so expensive, and so 
disruptive that  they  could actually  be 
considered threats to local,  if not regional, 
stability  and security.63  In  order  to develop 
and justify  in  more detail  the concept of 
environmental security as a  critical sub-
dimension  of homeland and national  security 
writ  large, we will  first discuss how  ES might 
fit  into various conceptions of “security”  in  a 
broader sense. 
BROADER CONCEPTIONS OF SECURITY64
Just  as homeland security  is a  contested 
concept, 65  so is the more general  term 
“security.”  In  addition,  both  terms tend to be 
dynamic  (fundamentally  can  change its 
meaning  over  time and in  different  contexts), 
complex (indicating  there are several types 
and levels of security), and value-laden 
(meaning  different things to different 
people).  For  example, security  can be 
addressed in  a  wide spectrum  of levels of 
analysis (ranging  from  individual to global 
security,  to private security,  to military 
security) and developed in  a  variety  of policy 
environments. In  order  to properly  frame the 
importance of global climate and public 
health  in  a  security  paradigm,  there are 
several pertinent frameworks of conceiving 
security  that  would help to contextualize ES. 
These include the concepts of human  security 
(that  of the individual, but in  reference to no 
particular  nation  state), transnational 
security  (beyond nation-states only), 
international security  (involving multiple 
sovereign  nation states),  national security 
(traditionally  involving  the defense of a given 
nation),  and homeland security  (commonly 
conceptualized as relating  to domestic 
issues).  
Human security  is an  emerging  paradigm 
for  understanding  global vulnerabilities. 
Proponents challenge the traditional notion 
of national security  by  arguing  that  the 
proper  referent for  security  should be the 
individual rather  than  the state.66  Human 
security  holds that  a  people-centered view  of 
security  is necessary  for  national,  regional, 
and global stability.
At the broadest,  most complex end of the 
spectrum  is global  security, or  transnational 
security,  which  includes the issues and 
chal lenges o f al l people , inc luding 
governments and nation-states, but  also non-
governmental actors (individuals, groups, 
and organizations) within  and transcending 
national borders.67  Transnational security 
includes the highly  complex,  trans-border 
issues of global climate change and other 
environmental issues (e.g.,  global ozone 
depletion,  fisheries loss,  acid rain,  etc.), as 
well  as globalized economic integration 
( e x e m p l i f i e d b y  t h e W o r l d T r a d e 
Organization, the European  Union,  etc.), 
global terrorism, organized crime, and a host 
of other similar issues. 
International security  as conceived by 
scholars and policy  analysts has evolved since 
the end of the Cold War  conflict between  the 
Soviet  and American  superpowers, and the 
rise  of globalized economic and political 
cooperation and integration to include many 
more issues and actors.68 In the twenty-first 
century, traditional security  notions now 
seem  to include an  expanded list  of 
constituencies and actors including  the 
military  as well  as political, economic, and 
even  social actors.  Such a  development  has 
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fundamentally  changed the strategic thinking 
behind international security. 
A  related term,  national security, 69 refers 
to the security  of nation-states,  or countries, 
as they  are commonly  known. In  the United 
States during  the Cold War, for  instance, 
traditional national security  definitions were 
oriented and aligned with  military  operations 
and objectives.  However,  over  the  ensuing 
twenty  years, the concept  widened over  the 
breadth  of issues that might be included 
within  security  definitions. 70 At  a policy  level, 
US national  security  is funded by  both House 
and Senate financial appropriations and 
historically  relates to a  military  defense of 
national interests from  traditionally  military 
entities implemented and determined 
primarily  at  the level of the executive  branch 
of government.  
Environmental Security (ES)  challenges 
certain traditional notions of national 
security and homeland security because of 
the complex  nature of the issues it 
incorporates as described above. By  necessity 
ES must include many  non-traditional 
security stakeholders, even at  the national 
level alone – including  US agencies such  as 
the Environment Protection  Agency  (EPA), 
the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration  (NASA),  the Department of 
Agriculture, the National  Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration, the Department 
of Energy, and the Public Health  Service,  as 
well  as many  independent  and government 
scientists doing research  on  climate change-
related issues, technologies,  etc.71  For 
example,  some states,  such  as California, 
have independently  enacted climate security 
related legislation to reduce greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions through regulation  and tax 
incentives.72  
To define ES requires an  appreciation  of 
the intersection of human security  and 
human  activity  and wellbeing as they  interact 
with  the global environment,  including the 
causes and effects of environmental 
degradation. Hence,  ES would integrate 
climate science,  critical infrastructure 
protection, emergency  management,  public 
health  and the resulting impact  on  the 
political economies,  governments, and 
societ ies around the world . In  her 
dissertation  research,  Elizabeth  Chalecki 
suggests ES is “the ability  of a  nation or  a 
society  to withstand environmental asset 
scarcity,  environmental risks or  adverse 
changes, or environment-related tensions or 
conflicts.” 73  Though  somewhat dated now, 
the Millennium  Project  surveyed many  of the 
competing  global versions of ES in  a  late 
1990s, 74 looking at various ways the term  was 
used by  experts,  national  governments, and 
international organizations. 
A WORKING DEFINITION OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY
There is no gold standard definition  of ES, 
just as there is none for  HS, but we believe 
good social scientific analysis of such  a 
contested concept,  as a  sub-category  of other 
theoretical  constructs,  should offer  a  working 
definition  – rather  than  assume a  term’s 
meaning  is well-known or well-established. 
We would offer  the following  definition of ES, 
from  an  academic or  practice analytical 
perspective: Environmental security is  a 
process  for understanding how  extreme 
environmental or climatic events,  acting 
locally  or trans-nationally, can destabilize 
countries  or regions  of the world, resulting 
in geopolitical instability, resource conflicts, 
and subsequently enhanced risk  to  critical 
infrastructure, or a combination of these. 
Considering this definition,  environmental 
security  is,  in  many  regards,  the ultimate 
transnational security problem  since it 
addresses security  challenges that  are the 
result  of a  complex  mixture of physical, 
economic  and political  eco-systems issues,  as 
well  as the dynamic and often unpredictable 
interplay  between  natural  and human 
systems. As a  result, ES is often  not  just  a 
localized domestic security  problem  for  one 
nation.  Rather,  ES more often  involves 
complex  global security  policy  issues, 
requiring  the participation  of several 
governments, industrial  organizations and 
non-governmental organizations,  as well as 
many other global, regional and local groups.  
INCORPORATING ENVIRONMENTAL 
SECURITY INTO THE STRATEGIC 
CONTEXT OF HOMELAND SECURITY  
How  might  ES fit  in  within  a  larger  strategic 
context  of national or  homeland security? 
RAMSAY & O’SULLIVAN, ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY  11
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME 9, ARTICLE  6 (MAY 2013) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
Broadly, as defined above, environmental 
security  concerns the domestic security  of 
civilians within  the United States or  any  other 
country, and this includes at  a minimum 
emergency  management activities that  the 
Federal Emergency  Management  Agency 
(FEMA), a  part of the Department of 
Homeland Security,  might  perform  in the 
United States.  Thus,  in  addition  to political 
violence/terrorism, ES includes threats to the 
US economy  from  large-scale environmental 
accidents (such  as the BP Deepwater  Horizon 
Gulf oil  spill); geological  events (i.e., 
tsunamis,  earthquakes) 75  and climatic or 
weather  extremes (such as Hurricane 
Katrina,  and even the 2011-12  US Western 
states’ drought, aptly  illustrated); strategic 
resource shortages (food, water, energy,  etc.); 
and/or deficits to critical  infrastructure (CI) 
– the mechanisms by  which  societies operate. 
In  this sense, ES straddles the realms of 
transnational/trans-border,  traditional 
international,  national, as well as human 
security  problem  sets.  And because it 
addresses both  the risks of natural disasters 
and even  of precursors to political disruption 
that  can  lead to terrorism, environmental 
security  should be considered a  key  element 
of “homeland” security as well. 
Figure 1.  General Structure of the Environmental Security Construct, Drivers & Consequences
ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY IN BOTH 
MDCS AND LDCS
While  not intended to be exhaustive,  Figure 1 
represents the general  structure of the ES 
construct  along  with  many  of its proposed 
dimensions, drivers,  consequences,  feedback 
loops and inherent relationships integral to 
the ES construct  and pertinent to strategic 
security  planning.  It  is important  to recall  the 
proposed definition  of ES when considering 
Figure 1  in  that  ES is suspected of acting 
differentially  across More Developed 
Countries (MDCs) such  as the U.S. versus 
Less Developed Countries (LDCs)  such  as 
Mali.  As such, it is worthy  to note that even 
the wealthiest  nations of the world,  the 
United States, Scandinavia,  Germany, 
Switzerland,  Japan,  etc., are vulnerable to 
major  environmental disasters stemming 
from  extreme weather  events.  Given  the 
interdependencies of energy,  water, and food 
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security, and the economic impacts from 
large-scale natural disasters, global climate 
change in  particular  imparts an important 
range of security  and policy  challenges.  Such 
impacts present  challenges for the broader 
civilian  domestic  security  construct  (aka 
“homeland security”),  as well as for 
practitioners and academic theorists alike. 
E x t r e m e w e a t h e r  e v e n t s o r t h e 
consequences of climate change result  in 
direct threats to any  population’s wellbeing, 
jeopardizing  the health  and physical security 
o f t h a t  p o p u l a t i o n .  I n  t h i s s e n s e , 
environmental threats act as instability 
multipliers in all nations,  but  especially  in 
fragile  nations or  regions characterized by 
pervasive conflict.  As a  result,  climate-related 
crises exacerbate existing  societal challenges 
such  as political instability,  poverty,  health, 
and migration,  ultimately  acting  as catalyst 
for  political unrest and reduced government 
legitimacy  in  the eyes of a  nation’s populace. 
Therefore avoiding  or  offsetting  catastrophic 
environmental changes could result  in  less 
economic  destabilization, less poverty  and 
less disruptive migration, fewer  refugees,  and 
subsequently less regional destabilization.  
For  example, one recent  potential 
environmental security  hypothesis involves 
the “Arab Spring.”  It is probable that 
environmental variables played a  significant 
role  in  at least  some of the triggering  events 
of the now-famous series of political 
upheavals in  the Middle East.  It  is widely 
believed, for instance, that  sharp spikes in 
food prices contributed to the “Arab Spring” 
uprising  in  the Middle East in 2010-2011,  in 
part.  The first manifestation  of political 
turmoil occurred in  Tunisia,  and began  with 
food protests due to rising  food prices. 
Eventually  this led to the fall  of the Mubarak 
government  in  Egypt. 76  The presumed 
linkage between  climate-linked drought and 
subsequent  crop failures in  Russia  in  2010 
led to global  food price increases – and 
political instability  and food protests in 
poorer  countries such  as Egypt.  This 
i n s t a b i l i t y  t h e n  u n d e r m i n e d t h a t 
government’s political legitimacy, and 
arguably  sparked the protests that resulted in 
Hosni  Mubarak’s downfall. Indeed,  the 
continuing  drought-related crop failures in 
the United States in  2012  and those projected 
by  the continuing  2013  drought  had already 
driven up global food prices as of this 
writing.77 This may  present another  real-life 
case to further test  the ES hypothesis 
regarding  food-related political instability 
that might influence HS.
CONCLUSIONS
Ultimately, environmental security  teaches us 
that  just as homeland security  doesn’t  end at 
the border; neither  does national security 
start  at the border.  However,  changes in 
traditional modes of thought  and culture are 
never  easy  to accomplish  as John  Maynard 
Keynes reminds us:
The idea  of  the future being  different from 
the present  is so repugnant to our 
conventional  modes of thought and 
behavior  that we, most of us, offer a great 
resistance to acting on it in practice.78
However,  as documented above,  there is 
mounting  evidence that  the principles and 
lessons ES offers are much more acceptable 
now  to traditional  national security  analysts 
and institutions than has ever  been the case. 
As the National Intelligence Council recently 
observed:
We are at a  critical  juncture in  human 
history, which  could lead to widely 
contrasting futures. It is  our contention 
that the future is not set in  stone, but is 
malleable, the result of  an interplay among 
megatrends, game-changers and, above all, 
human agency. Our effort is to encourage 
decision-makers—whether in government 
or outside—to think and plan for the long 
term so that negative futures do not occur 
and positive ones have a  better chance of 
unfolding.79
Further, the October  2012  Harvard report 
on  climate extremes outlines the US domestic 
“homeland” and national  security  interests in 
combatting  climate  change – both  from 
prevention  and adaptation and response 
dimensions. The report  warns that  the risks 
associated with  extreme weather  necessitate 
sustained and supplemented critical 
infrastructure,  and a  national strategy  to 
improve scientific and technical situational 
awareness – particularly  in  the ability  to 
track  key  variables (greenhouse gases; 
atmospheric, land and ocean  temperatures; 
Arctic,  Greenland, permafrost,  and Antarctic 
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ice melt; species decline and extinction; 
ocean acidification  and coral reefs; and 
decline and collapse of entire ecosystems; 
etc.) and events that  might enable better 
advanced warning  about international 
security  threats arising  from  changing 
c l imate. “Our cr i t ical observat ional 
infrastructure is at risk  from  declining 
funding… Without  that  knowledge,  the needs 
of civil society  and national  security  for 
mitigation and adaptation will go unmet.” 80
Environmental security  has become a 
component of homeland security  and overall 
national security  interests for  all  nations, 
developed and not, if for  no other  reason  than 
environmental  and vital resource access 
issues can  be tied directly  to emergence of 
broader  political  disruption,  violence and 
ultimately  even  terrorism, as well  as rapidly 
growing  threats to critical infrastructure 
protection.  In  this way, ES challenges 
traditional notions of national  security 
because military  prowess may  not be the best 
instrument  of national power  to address – 
and particularly  to prevent – the complex 
global environmental  and resource threats ES 
poses. Further, ES broadens and enriches an 
emergent  (though  currently  unresolved) 
definition  and mission  portfolio for 
homeland security,  in  the face of domestic 
challenges that  require new  models of 
comparative risk  analysis,  budgeting, 
interdisciplinary  policy, and interagency 
collaboration.  
Clearly  the attention  and focus on  the 
policy  consequences of global warming, and 
the scientific  consensus on  the basic fact of 
anthropogenic  climate changes,  goes well 
beyond the academic science communities.  A 
systematic, rigorous study  of environmental 
security  in  the context  of homeland security 
will require embracing  a  diverse collection  of 
disciplines and practitioners to address the 
unique,  important  (and complex)  resource 
scarcity  and climate change problem  sets. 
While  some of this progress will  be made 
quickly, other  aspects will take more time. 
Regardless,  resilient,  sustainable solutions 
are needed now.  
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The Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS)  indicates that the  majority of the 
nation’s critical infrastructure is owned by 
the private sector.  However, from  a policy 
s t a n d p o i n t ,  t h e p o t e n t i a l r o l e t h e 
entrepreneur and the free-market system 
might play in critical infrastructure and key 
resource (CIKR) risk management may not 
be fully appreciated. Recognizing an 
environment of budgetary uncertainty for 
future homeland security expenditures,  this 
article  suggests  the principals of a free-
market system  may be beneficial to national 
CIKR risk management. Furthermore,  the 
concept of “entrepreneurial security”  is 
introduced as  a potential free-market based 
p a r a d i g m f o r n a t i o n a l C I K R r i s k 
management.
INTRODUCTION
Is the Department  of Homeland Security 
( D H S ) ,  s p e c i f i c a l l y  t h e O f f i c e o f 
Infrastructure Protection  (OIP), considering 
a  sustainable national critical infrastructure 
and key  resource (CIKR) risk management 
m o d e l  f o r  a  c o n t r a c t i n g  b u d g e t a r y 
environment? According  to the  Congressional 
Budget  Office (CBO), homeland security 
funding has fallen  from  a  peak of $76  billion 
in  2009,  to $68  billion  in  2012.1  With  the 
nation’s budgetary  picture uncertain, future 
homeland security  funding could conceivably 
be reduced even further. 
The basic assumption  here is that in  a 
contracting  budgetary  environment,  the 
current DHS national CIKR risk management 
a p p r o a c h  w i l l l i k e l y  b e f i n a n c i a l l y 
unsustainable.  Given  this assumption, what 
policy  options are available for  a  national 
CIKR risk management  model that is 
operationally  functional in  a  fiscally  austere 
environment? This article, in  an  economic 
context,  suggests that  the most financially 
sustainable and adaptive national CIKR risk 
management  model will  be based on  the 
principles of a free-market  system. As a 
possible alternative, the concept of 
“entrepreneurial security”  is introduced as a 
sustainable and adaptable  free-market  based 
p a r a d i g m  f o r  n a t i o n a l C I K R r i s k 
management.2 
The Homeland Security  Act of 2002 
designated DHS as the center-of-gravity  for 
the nation’s CIKR risk management. The 
current National Infrastructure Protection 
Plan (NIPP) states that
The act assigns DHS the responsibility  for 
developing a  comprehensive national  plan 
for  securing  CIKR  and for recommending 
the ‘measures necessary  to protect the key 
resources and critical infrastructure of the 
United States in coordination with  other 
agencies of the Federal Government and in 
c o o p e r a t i o n  w i t h  S t a t e a n d l o c a l 
government agencies and authorities, the 
private sector, and other entities.3 
Although  DHS may  be responsible for 
coordinating  the nation’s CIKR risk 
management  activit ies, coordination 
activities and resource allocations for 
national CIKR risk management  are 
fundamentally an economic problem. 
COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEM
For  all intents and purposes, protecting 
infrastructure is synonymous with protecting 
economic  activity. Put another  way, CIKR are 
economic  components created to support 
human activity.4  Infrastructure  was not 
developed for  creating human  activity; 
rather, human activity  is the reason  for 
creating  infrastructure.  Unfortunately,  the 
majority  of DHS CIKR policy  literature 
describing  the nature of how  a  free-market 
economic system functions is anemic. 5 
Very  little policy  guidance has been 
dedicated to expressing the characteristics of 
a  free-market  economic  system,  let  alone 
defining  it.  This is peculiar, since DHS openly 
acknowledges that  the majority  of the 
nation’s infrastructure is privately  owned.6 As 
a  result,  the current DHS national  CIKR risk 
management  model has not emphasized the 
importance of understanding economic 
fundamentals. Without proper  economic 
understanding,  the national CIKR risk 
management  approach  may  therefore not 
correspond with  the attributes of a free-
market system. 
As the definition  of a  free-market  can be 
interpreted as an  idealized type of economic 
system,  a  more scientific  model will  be used 
to articulate the function  of a  free-market 
system.  As a  means for  providing  deeper 
CIKR insight, the function  of a  free-market 
system  will be analyzed through  the construct 
of a complex adaptive system. 7 
In  her book What is  Complexity,  Melanie 
Mitchell defines a complex adaptive system 
as “a  system  [in] which  large networks of 
components with  no central control  and 
simple rules of operation  give rise to complex 
collective behavior,  sophisticated information 
processing,  and adaptation  via  learning  or 
evolution.” 8 In  other  words,  it  is “a  system 
that  exhibits nontrivial emergent  and self-
organizing  behaviors.” 9  Eric  D. Beinhocker, 
in  his book The Origin of Wealth, suggests 
t h a t  t h e f r e e - m a r k e t  i s a n  o p e n 
disequilibrium  complex  adaptive economic 
system,  where disparate economic actors’ 
have the ability  to freely  and subjectively 
process and/or  share information  with  each 
other and randomly  adapt their  behavior. 10 
“In  such  systems the micro-level  interactions 
of the parts or  particles lead to the emergence 
of macro-level patterns of behavior.” 11  
Essentially,  “the economy  is not  a  closed 
e q u i l i b r i u m  s y s t e m ; i t i s a n o p e n 
disequilibrium  system  and, more specifically, 
a  complex adaptive system.” 12 In  describing 
the features of a more non-market  oriented 
system, Beinhocker suggests: 
If an economy  were a  closed equilibrium 
system, its defining characteristic would be 
a trend toward less order, complexity, and 
structure over time, as  entropy  sends any 
closed equilibrium system inevitably 
t o w a r d f e a t u r e l e s s s t a s i s . C l o s e d 
equilibrium systems do not spontaneous 
self-organize; they  do not generate 
patterns, structures, and complexity; and 
above all, they do not create novelty  over 
time.13 
In  1776,  a  seemingly  clairvoyant Adam 
Smith described an idealized economic 
process where individual  economic  activities 
not only  benefit the self-interests of the 
individual, but  also unwittingly  benefit  the 
holistic interests of society.  Smith  suggests 
that  an economic actor who produces goods 
of the greatest  value “intends only  his own 
gain,  and he is in  this,  as in  many  other  cases, 
led by  an  invisible hand to promote an  end 
which  was no part  of his intention. Nor  is it 
the worse for  the society  that  it  was no part of 
it.” 14 The imagery  of Smith’s “invisible hand” 
to describe economic order is, in  many  ways, 
analogous to the function  of a  complex 
adaptive economic system. 
Order,  in  a free-market  system  (i.e. 
complex  adaptive economic system) 
materializes through lower  level  interactive 
and adaptive individual  relationships, where 
unpredictable and spontaneous collective 
order  emerges.  The free-market’s economic 
order  is an  emergent,  dynamic,  bottom-up, 
and self-organizing  process that no one 
controls.  Essentially, order emerges within  a 
complex  adaptive economic system  even 
though it is decentralized and leaderless.
So, what does a  complex  adaptive system 
have to do with CIKR? Consider  a  complex 
adaptive system  a  schematic for  how 
individual economic  actors behave within  an 
open  disequilibrium  system  (i.e., free-market 
system).  That being  said, CIKR,  in many  ways 
i s n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n  t h e p h y s i c a l 
representation  of an economic actor’s 
business decision. Later  in  this article the 
underlying  principle surrounding  an 
economic  actor’s business decision  will be 
explained in greater detail.
RISK AND RISK MANAGEMENT
The current NIPP emphasizes both  risk  and 
risk management. However,  “the cornerstone 
of the NIPP is its risk  management 
framework.” 15  From  a  risk standpoint, DHS 
uses a  formula  where risk  is a  “function  of 
consequence, vulnerability, and threat.” 16 In 
other words, R = (C, V, T).  Additionally, and 
within  its own  lexicon, DHS defines risk 
management  as the “process of identifying, 
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analyzing, assessing,  and communicating risk 
and accepting,  avoiding,  transferring  or 
controlling  it  to an  acceptable level 
considering associated costs and benefits of 
any actions taken.” 17  
Below  is the NIPP idealized graphic for 
approaching CIKR risk  management.  From 
an  applicability  standpoint,  it  seems the risk 
management  framework could be the most 
beneficial  on  the micro level  (i.e. individual 
business/firm). The challenge lies in  applying 
the risk  management framework on  a  macro 
level (i.e.  nationally). CIKR risk management, 
from  both  the micro and macro levels, will  be 
discussed later in the article. 
Figure 1.  CIKR Risk Management
W h a t m a k e s n a t i o n a l C I K R r i s k 
management  complex is that (1) The US 
economy  is an  open  disequilibrium  complex 
adaptive economic system  and (2)  DHS is 
attempting  to comprehend the consequence, 
vulnerability,  and threat (i.e., risk)  across all 
eighteen  CIKR economic sectors assets, 
systems, and functions. Furthermore, DHS is 
then  attempting  to coordinate the nation’s 
collective CIKR risk management  activities 
(i.e.,  economic  behaviors/decisions) among 
the multitudes of CIKR stakeholders. 
That  being said,  the  problem  of DHS 
coordinating  the nation’s CIKR risk 
management, and perhaps with  homeland 
security  in  general, is that the problem  is 
“wicked.” 18  Wicked problems, in a  nutshell, 
are extremely  complex problems that 
intensify  the challenges for  any  planner/
planning  body  to effectively  address.  If a 
planning  solution to a  wicked problem  is said 
to exist, it may not be desirable. 19
In  expressing  how  the current  DHS 
national CIKR risk management  model  might 
function on  a  macro level, Horst Rittel and 
Melvin Webber  provide a  more illustrative 
narrative. In  an  idealized context,  the current 
national CIKR risk management  approach 
could be described as:
An  on-going, cybernetic process of 
governance, incorporating systematic 
procedures for continuously  searching  out 
goals; identifying problems; forecasting 
uncontrollable contextual changes; 
inventing alternative strategies, tactics, and 
time sequenced actions; stimulating 
alternative and plausible action  sets and 
their consequences; evaluating  alternatively 
f o r e c a s t e d o u t c o m e s ; s t a t i s t i c a l l y 
monitoring those conditions of the publics 
and of  systems that are judged to be 
germane; feeding  back information  to the 
simulation and decision channels so that 
e r r o r s  c a n b e c o r r e c t e d - - a l l i n  a 
simultaneously  functioning governing 
process.20
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Essentially,  for  the current national CIKR 
risk management  model to be operationally 
functional,  DHS would need to collect and 
process  the complete,  simultaneous,  and 
uninterrupted flow  of real-time consequence, 
vulnerability,  and threat  (CVT) information 
across the entire  economy’s CIKR assets, 
systems, and functions. In  other  words, DHS 
would need to permanently  have its finger  on 
the economy’s pulse.  Not  doing  so could 
potentially  render  the current  DHS approach 
to coordinating  the nation’s CIKR risk 
management  activities less nimble and less 
responsive. Furthermore,  assuming  DHS 
could collect  and analyze such  a  magnitude of 
data,  DHS would also need the full 
cooperation  from  the entire spectrum  of 
public and private CIKR stakeholders in 
coordinating and synchronizing  the nation’s 
collective CIKR risk management efforts.  One 
approach  may  be for  national CIKR risk 
management  to be coordinated in  an 
asynchronous manner,  as discussed later  in 
this article with  regards to entrepreneurial 
security.21 
Not only  is the current  DHS national CIKR 
risk management  model capital intensive, 
assuming  the economic dependencies/
interdependencies become more complex 
overtime, additional  financial resources will 
likely  be required for  further  coordination 
and planning.  As the “new  normal”  for  the 
homeland security  enterprise gravitates 
toward deteriorating  budgets and financial 
uncertainty,  contemplating  potentially 
financially  sustainable alternatives for 
national CIKR risk management  seems 
prudent. 
ENTREPRENEURIAL SECURITY
“Capitalism without failure is like religion 
without sin. It doesn’t work.”22
-Alan H. Meltzer
In order  to successfully  and sustainably 
c o o r d i n a t e t h e n a t i o n ’ s C I K R r i s k 
management  posture,  both partnerships and 
information  sharing  are  required; in  fact, 
they  are paramount.  However,  the concern 
here is not  with  coordinating  the nation’s 
CIKR risk management activities per  se.  The 
primary, in fact  crucial,  concern  here relates 
to the nation’s CIKR risk  management 
coordinator.
As mentioned earlier,  a  complex  adaptive 
system  is the scientific  construct  used to 
describe the functional  nature of the free-
market  system. In  offering an  alternative 
national CIKR risk management model,  this 
section  provides the economic theory 
underpinning the concept  of entrepreneurial 
s e c u r i t y . T o a c c o m p l i s h  t h i s t a s k , 
entrepreneurial security  uses the economic 
contributions associated with  the Austrian 
school of economics to describe how  national 
CIKR risk  management  might emerge within 
a  free-market. Additionally,  the Austrian 
approach  to economics is used because it  may 
be the most  closely  aligned with  what 
Beinhocker  refers to as complexi ty 
economics.23
Infrastructure,  as stated earlier, is the 
physical representation  of an  economic 
actor’s business decision. That  being said, 
what  might be the impetus behind an 
economic  actor’s business decision? Nobel 
Laureate Milton Friedman  asserts that  the 
primary, indeed only, purpose of business is 
to seek  profit.24  First  and foremost, the 
nation’s CIKR exists because economic  actors 
chose  to take the risk  to build (i.e.,  produce) 
infrastructure to maximize their  profits.25 
Alternatively, separate economic actors 
choose  to use (i.e. consume) infrastructure to 
maximize their  profits. 26  The common 
denominator  for  both  types of economic 
actors is choice and profit.  Nevertheless,  how 
is this article defining  an  entrepreneur  and 
what  role will that  entrepreneur  have in 
national CIKR risk management? 
THE ENTREPRENEUR
The entrepreneur,  as economist Jack High 
suggests,  is one who “shoulders uncertainty, 
coordinates plans,  and introduces new  goods 
and production  processes.” 27  Furthermore, 
“Crucial to all  of these activities is the pursuit 
of monetary  profit.  Profit  provides the 
incentive to exercise the alertness, judgment, 
creativity, and will to formulate  and carry  out 
plans that  capture monetary  profit.” 28 
Entrepreneurs are economic  actors; not  only 
are they producers, they are also consumers. 
PEPPERS, ENTREPRENEURIAL SECURITY: A FREE-MARKET MODEL FOR NATIONAL ECONOMIC SECURITY 4
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME 9, ARTICLE 7 (JUNE 2013) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
In  an  Austrian  context,  Dan Mahoney 
suggests there is a  duality  that may  apply  to 
private property  due to the fact that  both 
consumers and producers are property 
owners.29 As such, consumers influence what 
is produced when  choosing how  to employ 
t h e i r  p r o p e r t y  t o m a k e p u r c h a s e s . 
Alternatively,  producers determine what  is 
consumed by  directing their  property  in  the 
means of production.30 The important  point 
here is that  producers and consumers are 
both  coordinating  their  diverse and self-
interested activities through  an  economic 
transaction (i.e. purchases). 
Again, DHS defines risk  management  as 
the “process of identifying, analyzing, 
assessing, and communicating  risk and 
accepting,  avoiding, transferring or 
controlling  it  to an  acceptable level 
considering associated costs and benefits of 
any  actions taken.” 31  Accepting  the premise 
t h a t  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e s a r e e c o n o m i c 
components created to support  only  those 
economic  transactions which  are  profitable 
(i.e.  human activity), it  seems producers and 
consumers may  be the most  qualified to 
manage their  CIKR risk; especially  if the 
objective is to consider  the costs and benefits 
of risk management activities. 
The skeptic,  however, may  offer  the 
following  rebuttal. Perhaps entrepreneurs 
(i.e.,  those functioning  at  the micro level) can 
manage their individual CIKR (i.e. business) 
risk, but  on  the national  (i.e., macro) level, 
CIKR are intertwined into highly  complex 
and interdependent systems.  Therefore,  if 
each  entrepreneur is only  concerned with  his 
or  her individual self-interest how  does that 
translate into a  nationally  coordinated CIKR 
risk management  model? Moreover,  how  are 
i n d i v i d u a l e n t r e p r e n e u r s g o i n g t o 
comprehend the consequence, vulnerability, 
and threat  (CVT) to the nation’s entire CIKR? 
One potential  answer  is through  the price 
system.
PRICE SYSTEM
To reiterate,  this article seeks to provide a 
national CIKR risk  management model that 
is both  adaptable and financially  sustainable 
in  a  fiscally  austere environment. That said, 
the price system  might  be an  existing  free-
market  mechanism  that  is capable of sharing 
all-hazard CVT  information in  a  manner 
b e n e f i c i a l t o n a t i o n a l C I K R r i s k 
management.32 
Peter  Boettke explains, “Prices summarize 
the terms of exchange on  the market.”  He 
describes the price system  as a mechanism 
that  “…signals to market  participants the 
relevant  information,  helping  them  realize 
mutual  gains from  exchange.” 33  In  a  risk 
management context, price fluctuations 
communicate warning signals that  are 
equitably  sent  across the entire economy. 
Nobel Laureate Friedrich  Hayek claims that 
through  competitive price fluctuation, the 
price system  enables entrepreneurs to adjust 
their  activities vis-à-vis their  fellow  economic 
actors. 34  From  an  Austrian  information-
sharing  standpoint,  prices have the potential 
to transmit  cautionary  signals. These 
cautionary  price signals help facilitate and/or 
compel entrepreneurs to make more 
informed economic decisions.
 For  instance, every  economic actor  need 
not know  whether  global  turmoil  might be 
responsible  for  increased energy  costs to 
adjust energy  consumption activities. For 
adaptation  to occur, the only  thing  that 
matters is that  consumers and producers 
know  the price of energy  has changed.35 For 
example,  price fluctuations could be seen  as 
the economy’s version  of a fever. 36  Where 
prices are free to fluctuate competitively, 
price fluctuations could be seen  as cautionary 
signals,  thereby, indicating  to a  consumer/
producer  that  alternative and/or substitute 
solutions may  be beneficial  – regardless of 
the individual’s knowledge of foreign affairs. 
In  homeland security  jargon, competitive 
prices could be considered unclassified 
“actionable intelligence.”  As they  relate to all-
hazard CVT, price fluctuations would 
influence an economic  actor’s business 
decision. As economic  activities (i.e.  human 
behavior)  shift  with price fluctuations, so too 
will the criticality,  composition,  and 
configuration  of CIKR to support those 
activities. 
Through  a competitive price system, 
individual economic actors are  pressured 
and/or compelled to communicate and 
coordinate with each  other  the necessary  risk 
management  activities for  maximizing  profit. 
As competitive prices communicate the CVT 
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to an  individual economic  actor,  consensual 
economic  transactions coordinate individual 
risk management  activities (i.e.  through  new 
business relationships)  vis-à-vis other 
economic  actors.  However, although 
individuals may  have the ability  to manage 
individual risk, how  does this translate into 
national risk management?  One potential 
answer is through emergence.
EMERGENT SECURITY
Although  the price system  may  facilitate 
communication  and coordination  between 
individual economic actors,  several questions 
remain.  First,  how  will individual  economic 
actors know  which  risk management 
activities are the correct ones? Second, how 
does individual risk  management  evolve into 
national risk management? 
As it  relates to the first question, 
economist Israel Kirzner  provides a  potential 
economic  framework for  discovering 
appropriate risk  management  solutions. 
Kirzner  suggests that profit  opportunities 
emerge through  prior  entrepreneurial  error, 
which  in  turn stimulates subsequent 
entrepreneurial  discovery.37  In  a  risk 
management  context, it is the natural 
alertness of the entrepreneur  that  observes 
the diversity  of economic activities and, 
through  such  observations,  discovers possible 
opportunities and/or  the possible danger of 
disaster.38 
In  many  ways,  CIKR risk  management 
discoveries can  include a  diversity  of 
a c t i v i t i e s . F o r  e x a m p l e , C I K R r i s k 
management  could lead to new  business 
models. Distributed energies,  such  as solar/
wind/geothermal for  example, could be seen 
as alternatives to the dependence on  the 
electric grid.  The point here is that  the most 
adaptable and financially  sustainable CIKR 
risk management solutions will emerge 
through entrepreneurial discovery.
The energy  sector’s electric grid illustrates 
the differences between the current  approach 
to national CIKR risk  management  and an 
entrepreneurial approach. Showcased in  the 
DHS Energy Sector Specific  Plan  (SSP), The 
American  Recovery  and Reinvestment Act of 
2009  allocates $4.5  billion  for "energy 
reliability,  sustainability,  and resilience."39 
Utilizing the Public-Private Partnership 
model,40  DHS would likely  leverage the 
Energy  Sector’s Coordinating  Councils as the 
principal  coordinating  mechanism  to invest 
in  “a nationwide plan  to modernize the 
electric grid,  enhance security  of US energy 
infrastructure,  and ensure reliable electricity 
delivery to meet growing demand."41  
However,  this approach  to managing  the 
risk to the energy  sector  has the potential  to 
distort  the true price of energy, ergo,  the true 
risk to the energy  sector.  As a  result of such 
external  financial  intervention,  moral hazard 
is potentially  introduced and economic actors 
might  not  alter  their  energy  related risk 
management behavior  because the price 
system  failed to communicate any  cautionary 
signals.  Although the policy  may  be well 
meaning, the resulting  energy  sector  risk 
management  model may  be equivalent  to up-
armoring  the Humvee.  In  a CIKR risk 
management  context, we will  accessorize the 
existing energy  model (i.e.,  the electrical  grid) 
and proclaim  we have just increased its 
security performance. 
Within  a complex  adaptive economic 
system,  if the true competitive price (i.e., 
risk)  of energy  is freely  communicated 
through  the price system  – to the entire 
spectrum  of energy  producers and consumers 
– entrepreneurs (i.e., economic actors) would 
have an  increased opportunity  to discover the 
most adaptive and sustainable energy  related 
risk management approaches. 
Uniting  a  freely  fluctuating price system 
with  individual free choice,  successful energy 
sector  related risk  management  activities 
have the potential to be voluntarily 
communicated and coordinated through the 
economic  transactions between  energy 
producers and energy  consumers. The 
absence of an  economic  transaction between 
an  energy  producer  and energy  consumer 
would suggest that a  voluntary  partnership is 
not profitable (i.e.,  too risky). In  many  ways, 
the most  adaptive and sustainable energy 
sector  risk management approaches may  still 
be waiting to be discovered and these 
approaches may  and/or  may  not embrace the 
electrical grid. 
T h e d i a g r a m  b e l o w  i s a  v i s u a l 
representation  of how  economic security 
might  emerge within an  entrepreneurial 
security model.
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Figure 2.  Entrepreneurial Security
The free-market  is a heterogeneous and 
dynamic  complex  adaptive economic system, 
where activities within  the system  are 
spontaneous, adaptive, decentralized, 
leaderless, and self-organizing. As it  relates to 
the second question, in  an  entrepreneurial 
security  model, national  (i.e.,  macro) CIKR 
risk  management  percolates from  the 
bottom-up (i.e.,  micro). Within  the crucible 
of entrepreneurial  friction, the most  adaptive 
and financially  sustainable  national  CIKR 
risk management  solutions have the potential 
to spontaneously emerge. 
The entrepreneurial approach  to national 
CIKR risk  management  is, in  a  sense, 
Darwinian.  The most sustainable,  cost 
effective,  and dynamic national  CIKR risk 
management  solutions have the potential  to 
emerge through  variation, selection,  and 
replication.42 This has been  demonstrated by 
multitudes of individual entrepreneurs 
observing and interacting with each other.  
MEASURING SUCCESS
One of the challenging aspects of national 
CIKR risk  management is how  to measure 
success. For  entrepreneurial security, 
successful  CIKR risk management  will occur 
at  the price intersection  where both  a 
consumer  and producer  conduct  a  voluntary 
and consensual economic transaction.43 In  an 
openly  competitive environment where prices 
are free to fluctuate,  a  voluntary  economic 
transaction  between a  consumer  and a 
producer  would signal  a profitable CIKR risk 
management activity.  For entrepreneurial 
security, profit  will not  only  be  the catalyst 
for  change – it will  also be the arbiter  of 
success.
W i t h i n  a n  a s y m m e t r i c t h r e a t 
environment , mult i tudes of d iverse 
entrepreneurs will  communicate,  adapt  and 
self-organize through  the price system  in 
order  to manage risk and maximize their 
profit. In  a  decentralized and dynamic 
manner, a  sustainable and national CIKR risk 
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management  model will  emerge from  the 
bottom  up. To revisit  Smith’s invisible hand 
from  an entrepreneurial security  standpoint, 
the economic  actor  “intends only  his own 
gain,  and he is in  this,  as in  many  other  cases, 
led by  an  invisible hand to promote an  end 
which  was no part of his intention.” 44  As 
entrepreneurs individually  manage risk  and 
m a x i m i z e p r o f i t  u s i n g  f r e e m a r k e t 
characteristics, they  promote a  more secure 
nation  – an end that  was no part  of their 
intention. 
NATURAL SECURITY
The human  immune system  offers a  corollary 
for  describing  the type of national CIKR risk 
management  being  recommended. In  order 
to bui ld immunity  against  harmful 
pathogens,  a  short-term  sickness may 
sometimes facilitate the long-term  defensive 
solution.  For  example, if antibiotics are the 
default remedy  for  the flu, the defenses of the 
i m m u n e s y s t e m  w i l l d e t e r i o r a t e 
incrementally. Indeed,  a  potential  danger  of 
externally  stimulating  the immune system  to 
avoid short-term  illness is that such 
stimulation may  render  the immune system 
less adaptable and effective  against  injurious 
pathogens in the long-term. 
However,  if the body  is allowed to 
naturally  fight  the flu  in  the short-term, a 
sustainably  stronger  and more resilient 
immune system  will  emerge. The immune 
system,  from  a  “natural security”  standpoint, 
is a  complex adaptive security  system.  In 
terms of coordinating defensive activities, 
biologist Luis P. Villarreal suggests our 
immune systems do not “depend on  a  central 
authority,  such  as our  brain,  to initiate a 
response.” 45 In  fact, “our  immune systems do 
this automatically, against old or  new  threats, 
with no central authority.” 46 
To be clear, this article is not advocating  a 
national CIKR risk  management model that 
only  reacts when there is a  homeland security 
event. Furthermore, law  enforcement  and the 
military, respectively,  will  play  critical 
homeland security  and homeland defense 
roles.  However,  in  an  economic  context, we 
s h o u l d b e s o b e r l y  c a u t i o u s i n 
institutionalizing  national economic security 
policies that may  inadvertently  possess 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s s i m i l a r  t o 
immunosuppression.  
NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES
One might argue that the market,  from  a  risk 
management  standpoint, cannot compensate 
for what  economists call  a  negative 
externality  (such  as a  terrorist  attack).  From 
a  homeland security  standpoint, Peter  Orszag 
suggests: 
The presence of a  negative externality 
means that private markets  will  undertake 
less investment in security  than would be 
socially  desirable: Individuals  or firms 
deciding  how best to protect themselves 
against terrorism  are unlikely  to take the 
external  costs of  an  attack fully  into 
account, and therefore will  generally 
provide an  inefficiently  low level  of  security 
against terrorism  on their  own. Without 
government involvement, private markets 
will  thus typically under-invest in  anti-
terrorism measures.47 
However,  a  negative externality  is still a 
market  variable.  Additionally,  there is 
evidence to suggest that  economic actors take 
into consideration homeland security  related 
concerns.
Research  by  James Hayes and Charles 
Ebinger  indicate that businesses,  in fact, do 
“consider  security  spending  to be part  of the 
‘investment’ that  a  company  must  make to be 
successful  and well-run  firms will make that 
investment.” 48  Additionally,  businesses will 
“take into account the threat  of terrorism  on 
the financial well being  and reputation  of the 
firm  and that  inability  to perceive risk  is not 
to blame for  the failure of firms to spend 
m o n e y  o n  t e r r o r i s m  p r o t e c t i o n . ”49 
Significantly,  Hayes and Ebinger  indicate 
where a  connection between government 
intervention  and security  spending  exists, 
such  a  “relationship suggests that  “crowding 
out”  by  government spending  replaces 
private investment  rather  than  supplements 
it.” 50
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CONCLUSION
Application  of the entrepreneurial security 
model – although it  is based in  economic 
theory  – addresses a  number  of CIKR risk 
management needs.
• Sharing Information: A  competitive 
price system  is a  mechanism  through 
which  a  diversity  of all-hazard risk (i.e., 
CVT) information  is shared across all 
CIKR sectors in  a  universal format  that 
all CIKR stakeholders understand and 
have open access to.
• Creating Partnerships: The price 
system  helps compel CIKR stakeholders 
across all  CIKR sectors to voluntarily 
communicate and coordinate their  risk 
management  activities vis-à-vis each 
other (i.e., seek out their self-interest). 
• Adaptation: In  seeking  out  their 
individual self-interests (i.e.,  profit 
a c t i v i t y ) a n d t h r o u g h  v o l u n t a r y 
interactions, CIKR stakeholders will  have 
the potential to discover the most 
adaptive and financially  sustainable risk 
management solutions.
• Measuring Success: The most 
appropriate CIKR risk  management 
solutions will  be realized when CIKR 
stakeholders (i.e.,  consumers and 
producers) make a  consensual economic 
transaction.
For  national  CIKR risk  management  to be 
enduring within a complex  adaptive 
economic  system  – which  is to say  financially 
sustainable and adaptive over the long  run  – 
two key  elements need to be present: (1) 
prices must  be realized through  dynamic 
free-market  competition,  and (2)  individual 
economic  actors must be free to choose the 
most profitable risk management solutions 
vis-à-vis one another.   As it  relates to national 
CIKR risk  management,  an  entrepreneurial 
security  model  would suggest transitioning 
from  the current public-private partnership 
model  to a  model  that emphasizes and 
strengthens partnerships between  consumers 
and producers.
If government financially  intervenes  in 
national CIKR risk  management  the true risk 
picture could be distorted.  Furthermore,  if 
the economic actor  is also limited in  their 
choices to address their  risk, an open 
disequilibrium  economic  system  could be in 
danger  of inadvertently  gravitating toward a 
closed equilibrium  economic system. As it 
pertains to managing  the risk  of a  complex 
adaptive economic  system,  the influence of 
freedom  of choice and competitive prices are 
areas worthy of further research.
Again, the free market  is a heterogeneous 
and dynamic complex  adaptive economic 
system,  where activities within  the system  are 
spontaneous, adaptive, decentralized, 
leaderless, and self-organizing. In  attempting 
to effectively  manage the risk to the 
components of a  complex adaptive economic 
system,  in  a  manner  that  is both adaptive and 
financially  sustainable, the concept  of 
entrepreneurial security could be beneficial. 
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Letter to the Editor:  Homeland Security Education
Michael W. Collier
“Homeland Security  Education: A  Way  Forward,”  by  William  Pelfrey  and William  Kelley  and 
published in  the February  2013  issue of Homeland Security Affairs  provides some valuable 
insights but only a partial view of the overall situation with homeland security education. 
The methodology  used by  Pelfrey  and Kelley  does not support their  inference of the research  to 
the larger  homeland security  community. Their  data  collection  included a survey  of graduates of 
the Naval Postgraduate School  (NPS)  program  in  National  Security  Affairs,  Homeland Security 
and Defense and Homeland Security, a  survey  of NPS faculty, and a  survey  and panel data 
collected from  homeland security  community  leaders. While the NPS program  is highly 
respected in  academic  circles,  the instruction  is focused on  mid-career  homeland security 
administrators and leaders.   The NPS program’s graduate and faculty  member  enthusiasm  for 
their  program  is commendable,  but they  are mainly  from  the US public  sector  and are likely 
influenced toward seeing  homeland security  education  within  a  public  sector  framework  defined 
primarily  by  their  NPS experience. The article does not mention  education in the US private 
sector, nor  appear  to collect data from  this sector,  where there is a  growing  demand for 
homeland security  specialists to implement  and manage security  programs mandated by  federal, 
state and local  laws and regulations.  The failure to address the US private sector adds bias to the 
article’s findings. The authors do not provide the number  of survey  or  panel members for  the 
data  collection from  homeland security  leaders. The reader  is therefore unable to assess the 
validity  of this data.  In  reviewing  the professional disciplines listed for  their  survey  and panel 
data  obtained from  homeland security  leaders,  it  does not appear  the entire homeland security 
community  is represented. The authors do comment on  some of the limitations of their  data 
collection; however,  based on  the information  they  provide it  appears they  should only  be 
generalizing their findings to their samples and not to the larger homeland security community.  
The article does not address the latest  efforts in  homeland security  curriculum  development,  an 
area closely  related to their  fundamental  questions. A  recent Congressional  Research Report 
highlights the lack of a  consistent  definition  of homeland security  within  the US Department of 
Homeland Security  (DHS) (see CRS R42462, January  2013).  This lack of a  good definition 
hampers efforts to create homeland security  curriculums,  both  at the graduate and 
undergraduate levels,  but  this has not stopped the community  of homeland security  educators 
from  making progress toward establishing curriculum  standards. A  team  of homeland security 
educators and DHS and Department  of Defense officials met  in  Monterey, California,  in  June 
2009.  This meeting,  co-sponsored by  NPS and the Homeland Security  and Defense Education 
Consortium  Association  (HSDECA), developed a  model  homeland security  undergraduate 
curriculum. HSDECA  also published in  November  2009  the latest  draft of specialized 
accreditation  standards for  graduate and undergraduate homeland security  programs.  These 
efforts to establish  homeland security  curriculum  standards reveal a  growing  consensus of both 
the academic and professional communities. 
Pelfrey  and Kelley  dismiss undergraduate education  as being primarily  technical  in  nature,  as if 
undergraduate students are incapable of complex  thought. The authors’ findings identify  the 
most important  learning objectives for  homeland security  leaders as strategic  collaboration, 
critical thinking  and decision-making, foundations of homeland security,  analytical  capabilities, 
leadership,  legal  issues, and strategic planning.  These are all learning  areas covered in  the NPS 
and HSDECA model  undergraduate curriculum  development efforts and in  the latest  draft 
HSDECA  accreditation  standards,  for  both  graduate and undergraduate students. The latest 
theories in  postsecondary  teaching  and learning  do not relegate undergraduates to merely 
learning  technical matters or  facts as was once common in  the United States. For  example,  at 
Eastern  Kentucky  University  (EKU) our  undergraduate education challenges students to become 
critical and creative thinkers throughout  their  degree programs. The EKU undergraduate 
homeland security  program  starts students freshman year  learning critical thinking  techniques 
and by  the time they  graduate they  have mastered all the learning  objectives identified by 
Pelfrey  and Kelley. It  is probably  time to recognize that the most  recent  approaches to 
undergraduate teaching  and learning  ensure graduates have the substantive knowledge and 
professional skills which were in the past mainly developed in graduate programs.  
Demand for  homeland security  specialists is not  fully  represented in  the article.  In a  broader 
sense,  graduate and undergraduate homeland security  programs are producing  security 
managers and disaster  preparedness specialists who are qualified to seek  employment in  either 
the US public or  private sectors. At  EKU,  graduate students are usually  already  employed in  the 
homeland security  field or  find employment  as mid-career  managers or  analysts,  depending  on 
their  previous education  and career  experience.  EKU undergraduate students seek  employment 
at  the entry  level as project or  program  managers,  program  or  intelligence analysts,  and in  a 
variety  of other  security  or  disaster  preparedness positions. Due to the recent US recession  and 
its corresponding  higher  unemployment  rates in  most  occupational fields,  some EKU 
undergraduates find initial employment  as security  guards,  Transportation  Security 
Administration  screeners, Border  Patrol agents,  state and local law  enforcement  officers,  and in 
a  variety  of other  jobs where their  undergraduate degree is not a  necessity.  However,  most  EKU 
undergraduates see these as temporary  positions while they  wait  to either  be promoted into or 
find positions where their degree is needed.
When discussing  the state or  future of homeland security  education,  consideration  of the entire 
homeland security  community  is required,  including  the demand for  graduates from  both  the 
US public and private sectors.
Michael W. Collier, PhD
CDR, USCG (ret.)
Associate Professor of Homeland Security
Eastern Kentucky University
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Letter to the Editor: Homeland Security Education
Response to Michael W. Collier
William V. Pelfrey, Sr. and William D. Kelley, Jr.
Mr.  Collier's criticisms of our  article, “Homeland Security  Education: A  Way  Forward,”  seem  to 
revolve around five issues:
1. Our coverage of homeland security education was partial, not "overall":
2. Our research methods produced no generalizability and ignored the private sector;
3. We ignored the latest  efforts in  curriculum  development  such  as the lack of a definition 
of homeland security  and failing to mention  the model  curriculum  developed by 
HSDECA and perhaps EKU;
4. We were dismissive of undergraduate education; and
5. We understated the demand for security specialists.
Our  objective in  authoring the article to which  Mr. Collier  responds was to extend, not  limit,  the 
debate around homeland security  education.  Thus our  comment  "A  formative,  rather  than 
summative,  assessment  perspective underlies this research." It  would be hubris to think  we held 
the answers to homeland security  education  or  could formulate the curriculum  others should 
accept.  So,  we appreciate and enjoy  the reactions from  Mr.  Collier  and others but we never 
intended for  this to be a  conclusive and comprehensive statement  on  homeland security 
education. 
We had hoped there would be challenges of our  research  by  others presenting  their  own 
research. Our  manifest  objective was to move beyond opinion  and enter  the realm  of evidence. 
Our  evidence was accumulated over  an  eight-year  process of assessing,  not championing, the 
homeland security  curricula  (of which  there were at  least  four  iterations) at  the Naval 
Postgraduate School.  Assessing the knowledge gained by  each  individual course and by  the 
program  as a  whole, as well  as the relevance and value of curriculum  elements and capabilities, 
were at the heart of the assessment process that produced the data.
The critique of our  research  methods is a  useful  discussion,  and almost  always the first critique 
of social science research.  We were careful to state that the response rate of 89.5  percent 
(N=382) allowed us to generalize to the population  of graduates of this program, but perhaps 
that was overlooked. Additionally, endnote 2 stated rather clearly:
The reliance on respondents associated with the graduate program at the Naval  Postgraduate 
School  is  likely  to be a  methodological  concern. The disciplinary  and geographic diversity make 
these graduates a  particularly relevant population and the fact that they were exposed to the same 
curriculum improves inter-rater  reliability. Additionally, the high  importance ratings of  items they 
were not exposed to in the curriculum increases the criticality  of  those assessments and neutralizes 
the argument of favorable bias. Absent data to the contrary, these results  should serve as the basis 
for hypothesis testing in other populations.
So, the data  at  the predicate of our  findings were the eighteen  iterative assessments of relevance 
and value, by  graduates of the NPS program, but the elements included more than  the elements 
of the courses forming  that  curriculum. Indeed, the elements not  included in  the courses were 
more valuable than  the cognates of most of the courses.  The faculty  surveys and the surveys 
from  homeland security  leaders (N= 35) across multiple disciplines yield results consistent  with 
and validating  the data  from  the graduate surveys. Taken  as a  totality, we found the results 
compelling.  We find it  encouraging  that Mr. Collier, HSDECA, and EKU seem  to validate our 
findings by insisting that the same competencies be part of curricula.  
The private sector  is important  to homeland security. The fifty-one disciplines mentioned in  the 
article included the private sector, as did the elements of the surveys,  from  both  the Office  for 
Domestic  Preparedness  Prevention Guidelines  and the Office  for Domestic Preparedness 
Training Strategy.  Again, we are confident that  still  does not  address the issue of private sector 
involvement  in  homeland security  in  any  summative fashion. Strategic  Collaboration  and 
Critical Thinking are certainly  not exclusively  bounded by  the public  sector  and we believe that 
by  high  ratings of importance of elements including  terms such as "private sector" and 
"homeland security  community" (see page 7),  respondents desired to go beyond the boundaries 
of the public sector for some aspects of homeland security preparedness.
We sought  research  related to curriculum  development in  homeland security  and were surprised 
by  few  efforts to gather evidence to guide curriculum  decisions. Kiltz, as well as Rollins and 
Rowan,  provided evidence that helps guide the debate. Articles describing the research methods 
used to gather  the data forming  the predicate for  the "model" curricula  to which  Mr. Collier 
refers would be welcome additions to the body  of knowledge so like-minded researchers can 
compare the robust nature of the research  and findings. We hope the debate and dialog 
surrounding  homeland security  education produces the kind of paradigm  revolution  Kuhn 
described and, as we stated "The way  forward suggests a  dependence on  evidence rather than 
opinion,  and reality  rather  than  belief." We have not  seen  such  evidence sufficient to merit 
standards of accreditation  and moving into such  credentialing  in  an  amorphous environment 
where,  as Mr. Collier  states,  there is lack of consensus on  even  a  definition  of homeland security, 
or  convincing evidence countering  that  which  we have produced as to the curricular  elements. 
However,  we are not  suggesting  that  lack  is a  drawback  because we are reminded that  Hurricane 
Katrina  broadened the perspective of homeland security  for  many  and, had a  concrete definition 
been  formulated prior  to 2005, it  would likely  have been  challenged.  The variance in  the focus of 
homeland security  by  professionals causes us to believe it  premature for  academe to formulate a 
definition  at  this point  or  to establish standards for  curricula  in  the midst of such  uncertainty. 
Uncertainty should, as with other fields of study, be addressed with evidence.
Regarding  demand for  those with  undergraduate degrees in  homeland security, we would be 
interested in  the results of impact analyses.  The graduate program  in homeland security  at the 
Naval Postgraduate School measures knowledge gained at  the end of courses as well as the end 
of the program  using  a  retrospective pretest  posttest.  Critical thinking  assessments are also 
performed for  each course and across all courses.  As the data from  multiple universities 
coalesce,  curriculum  planners will  be able  to better  assess the efficacy  of the courses and 
curriculum. So the data from EKU will be a good addition to the body of knowledge.
Finally,  we hold undergraduate education in  high  esteem.  Both  of us have taught at  the 
undergraduate level. We find the research  points to differences in  undergraduate education  and 
graduate education, with  graduate education most appropriate for  advanced study  in  a 
professional or  academic field.  We also mentioned the aspirational  statement about  the Bologna 
Process being  adopted to identify  "with  some particularity  - the roles and objectives of 
undergraduate and graduate  education,  using  homeland security  education  as the example since 
it is in the germinal stages of development."  
William V. Pelfrey Sr. 
William D. Kelley Jr.
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The Two Faces of DHS:
Balancing the Department’s Responsibilities
Jerome H. Kahan
ABSTRACT
In forming the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS),  many of the  twenty-two 
entities  transferred to the new  Department 
brought with them a smorgasbord of non-
homeland security responsibilities,  such as 
processing legal immigration and enforcing 
immigration laws, intercepting illegal cross-
border trafficking in drugs and arms, 
enforcing our customs  regulations,  and 
keeping our waterways  safe. How  DHS has 
operated with its  “split personality”  has not 
become a prominent issue.  There remains a 
growing risk,  however, that efforts  to 
manage non-homeland security activities 
might compromise the department’s main 
job of protecting against terrorism and 
responding to terrorist attacks and natural 
disasters as  well as  accidents  with national 
implications. It is  not too late for DHS to 
focus squarely on this issue. 
INTRODUCTION
Is it  possible to envision  a  new  Cabinet 
department urgently  created in the post-9/11 
context  to enhance our  homeland security 
also being  given  additional non-homeland 
security  responsibilities? Whether  or not  this 
seems to make sense,  many  of the agencies 
transferred in  2002  to the new  Department 
of Homeland Security  (DHS)  because of their 
homeland security  responsibilities also 
brought  with  them  a  smorgasbord of non-
homeland security obligations. 
How  DHS handles its homeland security 
and non-homeland security  responsibilities 
has not become a  prominent  issue during  the 
past  decade—at least  in  the public  domain. 
Yet  this issue has been living what might  be 
characterized as an “underground life”—
buried in  the annual DHS budget.  Here we 
find detailed tables showing  how  each  overall 
budget  is allocated to homeland security 
functions versus non-homeland security 
activities, with  breakouts for  some twenty 
different  DHS organizational units. No 
rationale is given for  why  and how  these 
allocations are made. 1
The nation is facing an era  where both 
terrorist  threats and natural  disasters are 
becoming  more dynamic  and dangerous. 
Apart  from  contributing  to bureaucratic  and 
budgetary  confusion,  there remains a 
growing  risk that  efforts to manage non-
h o m e l a n d s e c u r i t y  a c t i v i t i e s m i g h t 
compromise the Department’s main  tasks of 
protecting  the nation  against  terrorism, 
possibly  involving  attacks with  weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD),  ensuring  effective 
responses to terrorist  attacks that  do occur, 
and preparing  the nation  to deal with  natural 
disasters and accidents of nat ional 
consequences.
T h i s e s s a y  e x a m i n e s t h e d u a l 
responsibilities of DHS and what  this duality 
means for  the department’s ability  to meet  its 
legislated mandate.  Complicating this issue is 
the fact that  no authorized definition has 
been  reached on  the meaning of the term 
“homeland security”  that distinguishes 
between  homeland security  and non-
homeland security responsibilities. 2
THE CREATION
The Homeland Security  Act of 2002  (the Act) 
established DHS on November  25, 2002. This 
constituted the most diverse merger  of 
federal functions and responsibilities the 
nation  has ever  experienced, incorporating 
twenty-two government  entities into a  single 
organization.3  Congress would have control 
of DHS—its budgets, personnel,  and 
missions. 4
In addition to absorbing  the agencies 
transferred to the new  department,  DHS also 
established new  headquarters units for 
management,  science and technology, 
i n t e l l i g e n c e a n d a n a l y s i s ,  c r i t i c a l 
infrastructure protection,  policy,  operations, 
and other  functions. Many  critical agencies or 
o f f i c e s w i t h  h o m e l a n d s e c u r i t y 
responsibilities were not  moved to the new 
department and have to this day  remained 
outside its official jurisdiction. 5
The process by  which  entities were  chosen 
to be transferred to DHS was complicated 
and not  fully  understood in  the outside 
world.  There was intense pressure to take 
urgent and dramatic  action  after  9/11. 
Political  and bureaucratic factors,  as well as 
substantive considerations,  came into play. 
As put by one expert,
Legislators first decided which programs 
should not be transferred to the newly 
created DHS… on a political  basis rather 
than a  sound cost benefit  analysis. …It 
appears that the only  real  question  asked 
then was ‘in’ or ‘out.’  As it happened, large 
homeland security  items were left out of 
DHS, while some small  items not related to 
homeland security  were incorporated into 
DHS, perhaps because this made the 
programs less likely targets for future cuts.6  
As a  result  of these and other  factors hard 
to fully  discover,  the department  inherited an 
odd array  of responsibilities spread across its 
major  headquarters organizations and 
operating components. 
LEGISLATED RESPONSBILITIES 
The primary  mission  of the Department, as 
expressed in  the Homeland Security  Act, 
SECTION 101 (b) is to
(A) Prevent terrorist  attacks within  the 
United States;
(B) Reduce the vulnerability  of the United 
States to terrorism;
(C) Minimize the damage, and assist  in  the 
recovery, from  terrorist  attacks that do 
occur within the United States;  and
(D) Carry  out  all functions of entities 
transferred to the department,  including 
by  acting as a  focal point regarding 
natural and manmade crises and 
emergency planning. 7
Because the Act was a direct result  of the 
9/11  terrorist  attacks, threats to the 
homeland are centered on  terrorism  (parts A, 
B, C).  While fighting  terrorism  is priority 
n u m b e r  o n e , D H S i s a l s o g i v e n 
responsibilities for “natural  and manmade 
crises and emergency  planning”  (part  D). 8 It 
took  Hurricane Katrina in  2oo5  to remind the 
nation  of the high  consequence dangers of 
such  non-terrorist  instigated threats to the 
lives and economic well being of the nation.
A  little known  part of Section  101  of the 
Act (part E) presents a  surprising caveat, 
requiring  the department  to ensure that in 
carrying out its non-homeland security 
functions,  there should be no lessening  of 
DHS ability  to execute its primary  homeland 
security  obligations, except through  an 
explicit  action  of Congress.  This represents a 
legal  alert  by  Congress for DHS to protect its 
i n h e r i t e d n o n - h o m e l a n d s e c u r i t y 
responsibilities from  infringing  on  the main 
homeland security  jobs for  which  is was 
created. 
HOMELAND SECURITY MISSIONS
Annual budget requests offer  the opportunity 
for  DHS,  at the secretary  level,  to present  the 
strategic  underpinnings of its budget—not 
only  how  the funds are to be spent,  but  why. 
From  FY2004  forward,  DHS has sent  its 
annual budget  request  to Congress in  the 
form  of a Budget-in-Brief (BIB) transmitted 
by  the secretary  of Homeland Security.  9  In 
their  basic design, these annual documents 
seek to assure the American  people and 
Congress that  the department’s primary 
mission  is the protection  of the nation, 
mainly  against  terrorist  threats and also in 
mitigating  the consequences of major  natural 
disasters and manmade accidents. In  so 
doing,  these BIB have relied on the following 
missions to prioritize annual budgets. 10 
Mission 1: Prevent  terrorist  attacks by 
disrupting planning activities and 
intercepting attacks before they  can 
cause damage.  While motivations need to 
be understood and changed, the near  term 
focus is to thwart  dangerous goods as well as 
dangerous people from  having the means and 
methods to execute  terrorist  attacks. 11  
Priority  is given  to halting  the transportation, 
movement,  or  use of chemical, biological, 
radiological, and nuclear  materials and 
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capabilities; and reducing  vulnerability  of 
critical infrastructure and key  assets, 
essential leadership,  and major  events. This 
mission  also includes such  non-homeland 
security  tasks as intercepting  drugs and other 
forms of illegal smuggling  of drugs, arms, and 
human beings. 
Mission 2: Securing and managing our 
borders. Secure the nation’s air, land, and 
sea  borders against movements in  and out  of 
the country  by  terrorists and terrorist-related 
materials.  This mission  also seeks to guard 
against all forms of illegal cross-border 
activity, while enforcing customs regulations 
and facilitating lawful travel and trade. 
M i s s i o n 3 : E n f o r c i n g a n d 
administering our  immigration  laws. 
Effective and smart enforcement of US 
immigration laws, with  emphasis on  stopping 
indiv iduals wi th  potent ia l terror is t 
indications or  connections from  crossing our 
borders, while streamlining  and facilitating 
the legal  immigration  process.  This also 
includes identifying  and removing  criminal 
aliens who pose a  threat  to public safety  and 
targeting  employers who knowingly  and 
repeatedly  break  the law, as well as enforcing 
visa regulations such  as students overstaying 
or not complying with their eligibility criteria.  
Mission 4: Safeguarding and securing 
cyberspace. Lead the federal effort to 
secure civilian  government computer  systems 
and works with  industry  and state,  local, 
tribal and territorial governments to secure 
critical infrastructure and information 
systems of significance to the nation. This 
mission  analyzes and reduces cyber  threats 
and vulnerabilities; distributes threat 
warnings; and coordinates response to cyber 
incidents affecting  computers,  networks, and 
cyber systems.
Mission  5: Ensuring resilience to 
disasters. Coordinate the comprehensive 
federal  response in  the event  of a  terrorist 
attack,  natural  disaster,  or  other  large-scale 
emergency  with  national significance.  FEMA 
leads this effort, working  with  federal,  state, 
local,  community, and private sector  partners 
to ensure a swift and effective recovery effort. 
Mission 6: Providing Support to the 
Homeland Security  Enterprise. DHS 
budget  documents also discuss an additional 
group of of missions. These include providing 
essential support  to national and economic 
security  with  emphasis on  non-homeland 
security  issues such  as support to national 
and economic  security,  including  collection  of 
customs revenue,  maintaining safety  and 
security  of the marine transportation  system, 
preventing  exploitation  of children, providing 
law  enforcement  training, and coordinating 
Federal  response to global intellectual 
property theft. 12
A  recent  report  to Congress notes that 
“Not  all of the missions of DHS are officially 
“homeland security” missions”  and goes on to 
say that
Some components have historical missions 
that do not directly  relate to conventional 
homeland security definitions, such as the 
Coast Guard’s environmental and boater 
safety  missions, and Congress  has in the 
past debated whether  FEMA and its 
disaster  relief and recovery  missions belong 
as a  part of  the Department. Some aspects 
of crime and justice could arguably be 
included in  a broad definition of homelands 
security. Issues such as  the role of  the 
military in law enforcement, monitoring 
and policing transfers of  money, human 
trafficking, explosives and weapons laws, 
and aspects of foreign  policy, trade, and 
economics have implications for homeland 
security policy.13
MISSION PRIORITIES 
The new  agency  was expected to focus on its 
main  set of responsibilities—dealing  with 
terrorist  threats and responding  to major 
natural disasters—with  the funds provided by 
Congress, while  ensuring that  the inherited 
non-homeland security  obligations were met. 
To support this two-policy,  DHS budget 
documents would be expected to pay  special 
attention  to the breakout of funds for 
homeland security  and non-homeland 
security missions. 
The FY  2004  BIB, while far  less detailed 
than  all the subsequent formal budget 
requests,  does presents a  prominent  pie chart 
with  an  associated generalized discussion  of 
how  this requested budget is allocated 
between  homeland and non-homeland 
security  responsibilities, without defining 
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these two areas.  A  prominent  pie chart  in  this 
document shows that  two-thirds  of this all-
important first  official DHS budget  was 
allocated for  homeland security, leaving a 
whopping  one-third to support its “other 
responsibilities.” 14
All  of the subsequent BIB contain  tables 
showing  the detailed allocation  of homeland 
security  versus non-homeland security 
budget  items—on an  overall basis and also for 
each  of the department’s organizational 
units. 15 Yet, in summarizing,  explaining, and 
justifying  each  budget, no references is made 
to issues surrounding  the dual  nature of the 
Department’s responsibilities. None of the 
post  FY2004  BIB even  acknowledge, let alone 
discuss,  the information in the resource 
tables showing  allocation of funds for the two 
different sets of DHS responsibilities.  A 
review  of other DHS documents, speeches, 
and testimonies did  not find discussions of 
the department’s dual set of responsibilities 
and how  these are managed—nor  have such 
issues been  seriously  addressed within 
academic circles. 16
BUDGETS MAKE THE 
DIFFERENCE
The DHS budget process—how  dollars are 
actually  allocated—follows an  undefined and 
in  some ways questionable separation of 
funds for  homeland security  and non-
homeland security  functions as presented in 
the BIB tables developed for  each  annual 
proposed budget. However, what is not 
shown is the key  link between budgets and 
missions—that  is,  how  each  annual  budget 
supports the six  missions discussed earlier, 
which  are expressed in  a  manner  that does 
not separate homeland security  sub-missions 
from non-homeland security obligations. 
Besides causing confusion  over  the 
department’s primary  and secondary 
responsibilities, relying  on  mixed missions 
makes budget  allocations to these two 
different areas of responsibilities difficult  to 
develop and defend,  especially  with  no 
analytic rational given on how  to balance 
homeland security  functions and non-
homeland security activities.
At the same time, we can  point  to the old 
adage that  “money  makes the world go 
‘round,”  suggesting  that  the way  in  which 
annual BIB funding  allocations break out 
homeland versus non-homeland security 
funds provide de facto “definitions”  of these 
two different sets of responsibilities. 17
Not surprisingly,  examining the homeland 
security/non-homeland security  tables across 
the sweep of departmental BIB,  a  reader 
might  either  agree with  or  question  the basis 
for  placing  an  organizational unit’s budget in 
the homeland security  bin,  the non-homeland 
security  bin,  or  divided between  the two.  For 
example,
• Most readers would agree that  the 
c o m p l e t e b u d g e t s f o r  T S A 
(Transportation Security  Agency) and 
DNDO (Domestic Nuclear  Detection 
Office) ought to support homeland 
security  and that the budgets of USCG 
(United States Coast  Guard) and CBP 
(Customs and Border  Protection  Patrol) 
should be allocated to both functions.
• Many  readers would question  why  the 
budget  for  FEMA  (Federal Emergency 
Management Agency) allocates twice as 
much  funding  to non-homeland security 
than  to homeland security  functions, 
when it  has lead responsibilities for 
homeland security  preparedness and 
response in  the face of natural disasters 
and accidents of national significance.
• Finally,  others would ask  why  USCIS 
(United States Customs and Immigration 
Service) has its entire budget  allocated to 
non-homeland security  when  the process 
for  legal  immigration  does in  fact help 
keep dangerous people out of the country. 
At  the same time,  finding  feasible 
alternate solutions is not easy.  While 
developing separate sets of missions may  be 
desirable, this would not  be easy  to 
implement.  As a  practical matter,  it  may  not 
be hard to keep USIS  separated with  the full 
time responsibility  for  the non-homeland 
security  task of immigration  administration. 
However,  it  would be tricky  to separate ICE, 
CBP, USSS, and FEMA into the two different 
areas when  they  have major homeland 
security  responsibilities but also some non-
homeland security jobs. 
Furthermore,  it  would be very  tough  to 
separate out  the USCG’s virtually  equal 
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treatment of homeland and non-homeland 
security  responsibilities with  heavy  reliance 
on  intrinsic dual capability  systems and 
personnel. Finally, under  the Act,  Congress 
would need to be  consulted about  changes in 
DHS missions.
An important  analysis by  DHS touched on 
the question  of homeland versus non-
homeland security  responsibilities and 
offered the following observation: 
DHS performs a number of [...non-
homeland security] services and functions 
that are complementary to its homeland 
security  mission responsibilities… typically 
performed with  hybrid capabilities–assets 
and resources capable of performing 
multiple missions. These complementary 
activities are critical  to fulfilling other 
national  interests and are often intertwined 
with  and mutually supporting  of  homeland 
security activities.18 
This statement is true, but only  to a point, 
as in  the case of dual use systems offering 
cost-effective solutions to the USCG, CBP, 
and other  units with  both  homeland security 
and non-homeland security  responsibilities. 
However,  it  does not address the key 
problems raised by  the fact  that many  non-
DHS activit ies are competit ive, not 
complementary, with  the Department’s major 
homeland security  responsibilities and take 
time and resources away  from  managing 
these security issues. 
Finally,  in addition  to the non-homeland 
security  obligations already  assigned to DHS, 
a  host of further  “concerns”  have been 
suggested as falling  within  the domain  of 
homeland security.  Examples of these include 
environmental degradation; growing  federal 
fiscal  debt; inferior  math,  science, and 
engineering  education; decaying physical 
infrastructure; dependence on  foreign 
energy; foreign  ownership of US debt; an 
aging  population; obesity; inadequate health 
care; drug-resistant  disease; and “human 
security”  (e.g.,  access to clean  food and water, 
freedom  from  economic exploitation, 
protection  from  arbitrary  violence by  the 
police,  gangs,  or  domestic  partners,  etc.). 19 
S u c h  e v o l v i n g  e x p a n s i o n s o f D H S 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s w o u l d w a r r a n t  a n 
amendment  to the Act.  However,  this cannot 
be ruled out  if the initial impetus to create a 
Department of Homeland Security  fades and 
attention  turns to its present  set of non-
homeland security  responsibilities plus what 
seems to be a  virtually  unlimited list of other 
concerns.
THE REAL RISK
It is at  least  fair  to ask  the question  of 
whether the non-homeland security 
responsibilities of DHS—now  or  in  the future
—may  be taking  up budget  allocations and 
leadership attention  at the expense of 
conducting  the homeland security  missions 
the department was created to address. 
From  the origins of DHS to the present, 
homeland security  and non-homeland 
security  responsibilities became mixed and 
mingled.  This has generated confusion  and 
complexities in  developing  and justifying the 
capability  outputs of DHS organizational 
units and in understanding  and justifying  the 
annual DHS budget.  It  has also created the 
impression  that homeland and non-
homeland security  responsibilities are of 
equal importance, which is not  the intent  of 
the Act that created the department.
This situation  can lead to a  growing risk 
that attention  to non-homeland security 
responsibilities, which  is not  the fundamental 
rationale for  creating DHS, might  endanger 
provision of critical  funds needed in  the 
future to support  homeland security 
responsib i l i t ies ,  which i s what  the 
department is supposed to do.
In  moving  ahead, it  is important not  to 
lose sight of the main  reason why  managing 
the dual responsibilities of DHS, with 
homeland security  tasks intermingled with 
non-homeland secur i ty  ob l igat ions , 
represents a  significant  challenge deserving 
serious attention.
 It is not  simply  the fact  per se that 
disparate missions compete for policy 
attention  and resources.  This is far  less of a 
problem  than  the growing risk  that  such 
mixing can  diffuse mission  responsibilities. 
Traditional homeland security  missions 
loosing  funding  and priority  as non-
homeland security  activities are given 
relatively  more funding  and senior  official 
attention and energy.
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Whatever  clever  and to some extent 
credible ways are found to link aspects of 
immigration  administration  and various 
approaches for  managing  cross-border 
criminal  activities to homeland security,  DHS 
needs to keep its eye on  the ball and ensure 
that  terrorist threats, natural  disasters,  and 
accidents of major  national significance are 
given top priority by the department. 20  
The issue of homeland security  versus 
non-homeland security  responsibilities for 
DHS has not yet  become a prominent  issue in 
the department,  the homeland security 
enterprise (HSE),  the Congress,  or  the 
academic  community. Although  a  breaking 
point  may  not have been  reached,  however, 
this question  cannot remain  unattended. 
Recent  trends sugggest  this year and the next 
may  represent  a  turning  point  in  the 
homeland security/non-homeland security 
balance.21 
The possibility  exists that future ratios of 
homeland security  to non-homeland security 
annual DHS budgets might  move outside the 
range within  which  they  have fallen  for the 
past  decade—either  more than  three quarters 
of the budget for homeland security  or  more 
than  one third for  non-homeland security. 
For  many,  the latter  is the real  issue, with 
particular  concern  in  a  period of tight or 
reduced DHS budgets that  non-homeland 
security  responsibilities might  somehow  take 
attention  and resources away  from  DHS’s 
homeland security  responsibilities in  the 
future.
WHAT TO DO?
Most  significant  is the absence of discussions 
in  the Quadrennial Homeland Security 
Report (QHSR) that break out  the homeland 
security  versus non-homeland security 
responsibilities of DHS. Not addressing  this 
issue in such  a  seminal document can have 
the effect of making  the problem  more 
complex by  treating the department’s 
inherited missions as,  seemingly,  all  of equal 
importance and all connected to homeland 
security.22 
However,  there is a  good chance that  this 
problem  will  become both  more complex  and 
more important  within  the next  few  years. 
Concerns over  budget  constraints might 
exacerbate tensions between (1)  addressing 
new  patterns of terrorist  behavior and 
exhibiting more concern  over  major  natural 
disasters and (2) the need for  more funding 
to support  potential  changes to immigration 
laws and greater public  interest  in  stopping 
drugs and all forms of dangerous cross-
border trafficking over land, sea, and air. 
 We need to address this issue now  and 
formulate a  strategy  going  forward that 
enables DHS to execute its primary 
responsibility  for  homeland security  missions 
while carrying out  its non-homeland security 
activities as a  secondary  set  of obligations. 
This issue might well gain attention  as 
anticipated budget cuts across federal 
agencies go into effect, even  as the frequency 
and intensity  of natural  disasters affecting  the 
nation  continue to increase and the risk  of 
WMD-related terrorist  strikes on  the 
homeland grows. 
Next year,  the second QHSR is scheduled 
to be produced.  This interagency  effort, 
coordinated by  DHS and taking into 
consideration  stakeholder  interests at all 
public and private levels,  offers an 
opportunity  for  the Executive Branch  and 
Congress to revisit  how  DHS was formed and 
what  organizational changes might  be 
necessary  to make the nation’s homeland 
security  effort  more effective.  Rather  than 
creating  our  present structure under  the 
pressure induced by  9/11  and shaped by 
many  political  factors, it  is now  time to learn 
from over a decade of experience
Whether  or  not  circumstances force this 
issue to the front  burner, dealing with this 
issue is far overdue. We now  have the 
opportunity  to formulate a  strategy  going 
forward that  enables DHS to effectively 
execute its primary  responsibilities, while 
proper ly  carry ing  out  i t s inher i ted 
obligations.  Suggested areas where actions 
need to be taken are offered below.
• DHS leadership needs to make it clear 
what is means  by “homeland security.” Is 
it  the basis upon  which  annual DHS 
budgets are allocated into these two 
broad areas of responsibility? If so, how 
to explain  certain anomalies? Any  effort 
to develop an  agreed meaning must 
recognize the need for  flexibility  to 
change with  circumstances. The purpose 
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is to prevent  these from  expanding  in  the 
future and risking  a  reduction  of 
resources and attention  given  to DHS’s 
primary  concerns of terrorism  and major 
natural hazards.23  To gain  approval 
across the whole HSE, this effort could be 
part of preparations for  the next QHSR 
via an interagency effort led by DHS.
• The DHS annual budget needs  to provide 
an analytically based rationale for why 
and how  separate homeland and non-
homeland budget allocations  are made. 
The annual DHS Fiscal  Year  budget 
requests contain  proposed funding for 
homeland security  functions and non-
homeland security  activities, overall and 
by  each major  organizational  unit.  These 
figures can  be translated into a  ratio of 
the budget  allocated for  homeland 
security  over  that  for  non-homeland 
security.
• DHS should explore  organizational 
adjustments  or updates. Consistent  with 
its charter  to implement  inherited non-
homeland security  missions,  a  more 
coherent  decision-making  process is 
needed, assigning  oversight  of the non-
homeland security  responsibilities within 
DHS headquarters.  Since the Department 
is obligated to fulfill  many  non-homeland 
security  duties based on  existing and 
transferred authorities, what  is needed is 
either  a  better  balance or  to shift  some if 
not all non-homeland responsibilities to 
other  departments, enabling DHS to 
focus on  the larger  dangers posed by  true 
homeland security  threats and hazards. 
This shift  would be geared to ensure that 
the department maintains a  proper 
balance among  its units in  allocating 
resources to homeland security  as its 
primary  job, while funding to the non-
homeland security  responsibilities of 
DHS to the extent possible. 
• DHS and Congress  need to  cooperate in 
resolving this  issue.  Aside from 
approving  possible organizational 
changes in  DHS in  the coming  era  of 
budget  austerity,  Congress needs to 
ensure that budget reductions do not 
disproportionately  fall on  either  side of 
the DHS dual responsibilities.  If there is a 
need to place more resources on  the 
homeland security  side to enable certain 
units to more effectively  execute the 
department’s primary  job, Congress 
would need to be consulted on this issue 
of whether  this is at the expense of non-
homeland security funding. 
In  sum, it  is not too late for  DHS to focus 
squarely  on  the issue of how  it  ought  to 
manage the odd responsibilities it  was given 
at  its creation,  beginning  by  forming  separate 
sets of missions and then  ensuring  that its 
organizational units can  supply  the 
capabilities needed for  these missions to be 
effectively  executed.  No longer  can  this 
remain “the elephant  in  the  living room,”  or 
whatever  other form  of metaphor  best 
describes how  this issue has managed to be 
largely ignored for over ten years. 24 
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intervention. 
15 Consistent with the way annual DHS budgets are assembled, there are nineteen budget accounts, eighteen of which 
fund specified headquarters’ units or operating components. For the purpose of analysis, we broaden the scope of the 
management and operations account to take care of a large number of direct report subunits as well as the Office of 
the Secretary.  See the latest DHS organization chart, which has “pop up” text in each of the boxes: http://
www.dhs.gov/organization.
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16 Within time and resource constraints, a representative set of documents, statements, speeches, and other sources 
were consulted to support the credibility of this admittedly sweeping assertion. Types of sources consulted include (1) 
official DHS documents, speeches, statements, etc.; (2) Congressional support entities such as CRS, GAO, and CBO; 
(3) well known think tanks; (4) university research centers; and (5) relevant journals. 
17 Quotation is from a song in the musical play "Cabaret" from the 1960s.
18 Bottom Up Review, Department of Homeland Security (Washington DC,  xi. 
19 See “Meta Hazards” discussion in Christopher Bellavita, “Changing Homeland Security: What is Homeland 
Security?” Homeland Security Affairs 4, no. 2 (June 2008), http://www.hsaj.org/?article=4.2.1# and “Changing 
Homeland Security: In 2010, Was Homeland Security Useful?” Homeland Security Affairs 7, Article 1 (February 
2011), http://www.hsaj.org/?article=7.1.1. See also Stephen Sachs, “The Changing Definition of Security,” (Oxford, 
England, Merton College, International Relations Term Paper, 2003). 
20 A study published while the proposed legislation to form DHS was being reviewed by Congress can, in retrospect, 
be described as clairvoyant in its anticipation of problems that could arise if the new Department of Homeland 
Security was also given an array of non-homeland security tasks. One of its main recommendations was to ensure 
that DHS’s  non-homeland security functions “neither overwhelm the new department nor get lost in the 
organizational shuffle […and  recommend that Congress and the administration]  keep as many non-homeland 
security missions as possible out of the Department as it is finally put together and legislated into existence.” 
Assessing the Department of Homeland Security (Brookings Institution, 2002), 9.
21  For example, in March 2013, the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee held major 
hearings, “The Department of Homeland Security at 10 Year – A Management Review.”
22  Department of Homeland Security, Quadrennial  Homeland Security Review (Washington, DC: Department of 
Homeland Security, 2010).   
23 Kahan, “What’s in a Name?”13.
24 "Elephant in the Living Room" is an English metaphorical idiom for “an obvious truth that no one wants to 
discuss.” Cambridge Academic Content Dictionary (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 298. It vividly conveys the 
message that an elephant in a living room (or any room in a house) would be impossible to overlook. So those who 
pretend the elephant is not there have metaphorically speaking chosen to avoid dealing with a big issue. 
The Plan, Type, Source, Report Cycle: 
A Unifying Concept for National Guard Preparedness
David W. Smith
ABSTRACT
Unity of effort in homeland response 
operations has proven over the  last decade 
to  be an elusive target. National Guard 
contributions to  homeland response are no 
exception.  Much effort has gone into  creation 
of a dual status  commander,  and rightfully 
so.  But, much low  hanging fruit remains  in 
the form  of improvements  to National Guard 
preparedness. A plan, type, source, report 
cycle supports a  National Guard concept for 
preparedness that enables  unity of effort in 
homeland response operations.  The plan, 
type,  source,  report concept successfully 
satisfies  a rigorous set of selection criteria 
and deserves evaluation as  an overarching 
National Guard concept that can be 
supported by the fifty-four commanders  in 
chief of the National Guard of the various 
states.  
INTRODUCTION
The 376-year  history  of the National  Guard 
consistently  ref lects the dedication, 
endurance and innovation  necessary  to 
remain  a  relevant  force throughout our 
nation’s history.  The National Guard began 
the new  millennium  as a  strategic  reserve 
force and transformed into an  operational 
force standing  shoulder-to-shoulder  in  Air 
Force and Army  formations throughout  the 
world.  On  the home front, National Guard 
response to disasters and even  catastrophic 
events has been  record setting, and led to the 
creation of operational headquarters in each 
state that lead military  response within  those 
states’ borders.  But  it’s not  a  focus on  the past 
that keeps us relevant.  So I ask, are 
Americans getting the utmost from  this 
national treasure we call  the Guard?  In  the 
pages that  follow,  I propose a  plan, type, 
source,  report  cycle,  which  will form  the core 
of a National Guard preparedness concept.  
ESTIMATE OF STRATEGIC 
SITUATION
ENDS  
The National  Guard operates at the 
intersection  of homeland security  and 
national defense. Federal and state dual 
sovereignty  is manifest  in  the military 
instrument  of national power  by  the US 
Constitution’s creation  of a  centralized Army 
and Navy  at the federal level  and a 
decentralized military  arm  given each state: 
the National Guard.  The constitution  of each 
state places the National  Guard under 
command of the governor  of that  state. 
Subsequent  federal  legislation  charges the 
National Guard of the several states with 
defense of the nation, as a  reserve of the 
Army  or  Air Force, subject to presidential 
“call up”  or  mobilization.1 This signature dual 
mission  defines the National Guard.  In  this 
way, our founding fathers ensured the 
mission  of securing the homeland would be 
shared between  fifty-four  commanders in 
chief (CINC), the governors of the fifty  states 
and three territories, and the president.  
MEANS 
Events of the past dozen  years have not 
changed the National Guard dual  mission; 
rather  the requirements and expectations 
were thrust to new  heights.  The attacks on 
September  11th, Hurricane Katrina,  and a 
decade at  war  sparked a  transformation  of 
the National Guard from  a  strategic reserve 
force, capable of providing  forces,  to an 
operational  force,  providing  ready  forces and 
the capability  to employ  forces in  the 
homeland in  support of the governors. 
Lieutenant General (Retired) Steven Blum, 
the chief of the National Guard Bureau 
(NGB) in  2003, recognized this expanding 
dual miss ion  and proposed a jo int 
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headquarters and other  operat ional 
capabilities in  each  state,  territory, and the 
District  of Columbia  (referred to as “the 
states”).  The US Congress later  codified the 
formation  of a  Joint  Force Headquarters 
(JFHQ) in each state. 2 
The Council of Governors was formed in 
2010  by  Executive  Order  13528 and the 
National Defense Authorization  Act of 2008. 
It is comprised of ten  governors who work on 
behal f o f a l l  governors to improve 
coordination  of federal  military  forces and 
National Guard forces responding to a 
disaster  situation. The Council  provides the 
states,  the Department  of Defense (DoD), 
NGB and the Department  of Homeland 
Security  (DHS) a  collaborative vehicle to 
improve unity  of effort. 3 Unity  of effort is a 
national  strategic objective that supports 
securing  the homeland. Establishing a  dual 
status commander  (DSC) as the “usual  and 
c u s t o m a r y  c o m m a n d a n d c o n t r o l 
arrangement”  for  planned and no-notice 
events was an  early  accomplishment  of the 
Council; the role and responsibilities of the 
DSC are more fully  explained in  the Council’s 
“Joint  Action  Plan  for Developing  Unity  of 
Effort.” 4  The DSC addresses a unity  of effort 
challenge identified in  several  reviews and 
audits of homeland response operations 
where improved integration  of federal  and 
state operations was recommended.  The DSC 
a n d t h e n e w  N a t i o n a l G u a r d j o i n t 
capabilities, in  addition  to the half million 
airmen and soldiers who form  Air  National 
Guard and Army  National  Guard units, 
provides the governors with  expanded means 
for conducting operations in the state.    
PREPAREDNESS AND THE NATIONAL 
GUARD
The DSC is only  the first  of the five-part Joint 
Action Plan  for  Developing Unity  of Effort 
that  was unanimously  approved by  the 
Council. Also included in  this plan  are Shared 
Situational  Awareness; Joint  Reception, 
Staging, Onward Movement and Integration 
(JRSOI); Mission  Assignments (MA)/Pre-
Scripted Mission  Assignments (PSMA); and 
Planning.  Shared Situational Awareness 
includes “the sharing of location  and 
availability  of state and Federal military  units 
potentially  able to provide military  support  to 
civil  authorities.”  In  addition,  “Governments 
use PSMAs to assist  in  planning and to 
reduce the time it  takes to deploy  response 
resources.” 5 When  taken  along with  planning, 
this charge represents a  significant  National 
Guard investment in preparedness.  
National preparedness is defined in  the 
September  2011  National Preparedness Goal 
(NPG), as the actions taken  to plan,  organize, 
equip, train,  and exercise to build and sustain 
the capabilities necessary  to prevent,  protect 
against,  mitigate the effects of, respond to, 
and recover  from  those threats that  pose the 
greatest  risk  to the security  of the nation.6 
The National Preparedness System  (NPS) 
supports the NPG and defines capability  as 
the means to accomplish  a  mission, function, 
or  objective based on the performance of 
related tasks,  under  specified conditions,  to 
target  levels of performance.7  The NPS 
includes six  components: identifying  and 
assessing risks, estimating  the level of 
capabilities required, building and sustaining 
t h o s e c a p a b i l i t i e s ,  d e v e l o p i n g  a n d 
implementing  plans, val idat ing and 
monitoring  progress, and reviewing  and 
updating  efforts.8 In  addition  to the NPS,  the 
National Response Framework (NRF) and 
the National  Incident  Management System 
(NIMS) guide all  partners in  response 
operations.  The National Guard brings a 
tremendous amount  of potential  capability  in 
support  of “a  secure and resilient  nation” and 
is implicitly included in the NPG.  
Historically, DoD policy  held that 
response capability  was resident  in, or 
“derivative”  of, warfighting  capability. As a 
result,  DoD resources could not  be  expended 
in  support  of preparedness, only  warfighting 
readiness. DoD assets prepare for  domestic 
operations after  a lead federal agency 
generates a  requirement following an 
incident.  Readiness is cyclical  and timed to 
peak  in  support  of the DoD combatant 
commander  (CCDR). If preparedness equals 
readiness, then  it  is a  zero sum  game for 
National Guard units; they  can  either fight  or 
support  domestic contingencies. But, since 
many  required domest ic  operat ions 
capabilities are “subsets”  of the unit’s full 
warfighting capability,  units that are  “amber” 
or  “red” and do not meet  the standard for 
warfighting (at  a  given  time) may  possess 
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significant  levels of preparedness.  This 
unreported preparedness provides a  key 
source of support for  homeland response 
operat ions whi le minimiz ing d irect 
competition  with  the warfight – significantly 
enhancing National Guard dual  use.9 
Governors,  as commanders in  chief of the 
National Guard forces of their  state, are not 
bound by  the DoD policy, but  the vast 
majority  of the resourcing supporting  those 
forces comes from  DoD and is governed by 
the policy. This reactive strategy  is a  poor fit 
for  the military’s first  responders,  the 
National Guard.10    
WAYS 
In a  2005  article, then Maj.  Gen. and 
Adjutant  General  of Washington  Timothy  J. 
Lowenberg wrote: 
The United States enters the 21st Century 
with  unresolved questions about what our 
national  defense and homeland security 
strategies should be.  The life safety  of  our 
citizens and the future of  our nation  hang 
in  the balance. Now, as at the founding of 
our nation, the states and the central 
federal  government must work in harmony 
to assure our collective safety  and security. 
Governors, as State Commanders in  Chief, 
must take a  central role in  shaping our 
national  policy  on use of military  force. 
The Adjutants  General  stand ready  to assist 
in this historic endeavor.11 
The role  of the governors in  homeland 
security  strategy  is essential to developing 
unity of effort in the homeland.  
THEATER STRATEGY 
Theater Strategy  is defined in Joint 
Publication 1-02 as “concepts and courses of 
action directed toward securing  the objectives 
of national  and multinational [could be read 
“multi-state”]  policies and strategies through 
the synchronized and integrated employment 
of military  forces and other instruments of 
national power.” 12  The Joint  Action  Plan 
offers guidance on developing unity  of effort 
towards securing the homeland, a  national 
strategic  objective.  National Guard means to 
support  governors in  securing  the homeland 
are developing. National Guard ends (dual 
mission) have expanded. Now,  the “ways” 
remain  to be transformed.  The National 
Guard must move beyond a reactive, default 
strategy  to a way  that  enables governors to 
take the lead in  employing  the military 
instrument  of national power in  response to 
disasters and to secure the homeland when 
authorized.  
RESOURCING STRATEGY
A  successful concept for  preparedness 
depends on  efficiently  adapting  and growing 
capabilities to meet  evolving  missions and 
requirements. Leveraging the National  Guard 
dual mission  and appropriately  resourcing  it 
implies the ability  to measure cost  and 
benefit  and development of a  process to link 
the two.  Christine Wormuth  describes the 
impact of such  a  disconnect  on  the 
d e v e l o p m e n t  o f h o m e l a n d s e c u r i t y 
capabilities:
The lack of a  formal  validation process to 
connect requirements identification  to 
budgeting has  resulted in a sort  of  lowest 
common denominator approach  to 
developing capabilities for  homeland 
security. Only those capabilities on  which 
all  stakeholders agree inside a particular 
federal  department, or which  can  generate 
sufficient support in  Congress, are actually 
funded.13  
A  rationale to systematically  measure 
National Guard contributions to homeland 
response operations is needed. Competing 
resourcing  alternatives for  preparedness 
must  be quantitatively  compared and 
analyzed based on  measures of cost  and 
benefit.  If resourcing  decisions are made only 
on  the basis of qualitative versus quantitative 
analysis,  then  capability  that  is maintained 
on  “stand by”  yet  was not  “called up”  is easily 
overlooked (and under resourced).  
RISK 
Finally,  no strategic  estimate is complete 
without addressing risk, defined as a 
mismatch among  the ends, ways, and 
means. 14  A  mismatch  between demanding 
ends,  a  sizable  capability  (means),  and ways 
built  on reactive policies yields underutilized 
National Guard capacity,  unnecessary 
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competition  between  the two components of 
the dual mission, and greater  loss of life and 
property  due to slowed response times. 
Against  the risk  presented by  uncertainty,  the 
best insurance is mutual support  and enabled 
Crisis Action  Planning (CAP).  A  robust 
preparedness common  operating  picture is a 
p o w e rf u l t o o l f o r  p l a nne rs m a k i ng 
adjustments after an incident occurs.  
The organizational risk to the National 
Guard is an  erosion  of relevance due to 
gradual loss or  degradation  of its dual 
mission, with  resulting  loss of synergy, and 
loss of value leading  to reductions in  force 
structure (means).  The operational capability 
building  within  each  state’s JFHQ over  the 
last ten  years is also at risk. The ultimate 
value of operational capability  is the 
employment  of military  forces (as in 
homeland response operations),  not  solely 
the generation  and readiness of Air Force and 
Army  units (the old State Area  Command 
mission).  
OBJECTIVE  
Develop a  concept  that best employs all 
National Guard means to accomplish  the dual 
mission  of the National Guard by  leveraging 
preparedness to integrate National  Guard 
capability  into state and federal homeland 
response operations and synchronize the 
requirements of the governors and the 
president  into one mutually  supported 
theater strategy for the homeland.  
SELECTION CRITERIA  
A  number  of criteria  must be satisfied by  a 
National  Guard Preparedness concept to 
warrant selection  and evaluation  against 
other concepts or  courses of action. The 
concept  must  comply  with  and “nest  within” 
federal  guidance and leverage the autonomy 
and authority  of the states.  Such  a  concept 
must  enable the fifty-four  JFHQ to 
synchronize their  dual  mission  in  order  to 
realize the lead military  response role 
envisioned by  Congress in  The National 
Guard Empowerment Acts. It  must provide 
structure and “common  language”  in  support 
of interoperability, yet foster  innovation, 
collaboration, and creative problem  solving. 
This concept must  facilitate a  preparedness 
common  operating  picture (COP) that 
supports response operations and CAP. The 
successful  concept  must  set  the conditions for 
unity  of effort  between  federal and state, civil 
and military, and state-to-state, and include 
the use of the Emergency  Management 
Assistance Compact (EMAC). It must  support 
a  process of continuous improvement  focused 
by  the laser  of metrics.  Ultimately,  it  must  be 
“built for speed,”  enabling rapid domestic 
deployment and employment.  And,  the 
concept  must  enable the National  Guard to 
maintain  the unprecedented support  to the 
combatant commanders demonstrated over 
the past decade.  
STRATEGIC CONCEPT
The answer  is a  plan, type, source,  report 
cycle  forming the core of a  National Guard 
preparedness concept. Strategic  concept  is 
defined in DoD Joint Publication 1-02 as: 
[The] course of  action accepted as the 
result of  the estimate of  the strategic 
situation. It is a  statement of what is to be 
done in broad terms sufficiently flexible to 
permit its use in framing the military, 
diplomatic, economic, informational, and 
other measures which stem from it.15
Certainly  national guidance and strategy 
for  securing  the homeland is in  place,  but  a 
stubborn  disconnect continues to challenge 
unity  of effort.  That  gap lies at  the theater 
level and is the target  of this National Guard 
preparedness concept requiring a  collective 
agreement  of the fifty-four commanders in 
chief.  
The concept  begins with  the adjutants 
general  and their  Joint  Force Headquarters 
supporting  their  governor’s contingency 
planning  efforts to define the National Guard 
capabilities required for  each  contingency. 
The governor’s lead planner  or  representative 
then  nominates these capabilities for  “typing” 
per  the National Incident  Management 
System  (NIMS). All typed National Guard 
capability  definitions are shared in  a 
common,  accessible system  with  all other 
state and National Guard planners. The typed 
National Guard capabilities are measurable 
units of National  Guard preparedness and 
become interoperable  building  blocks for 
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interlocking  supported and supporting plans 
at  all levels. The adjutant  general and JFHQ 
source all  missions, state contingency  plans, 
and federal requirements, ensuring  all are 
covered.  This includes recommending  state 
authorities coordinate and preplan  EMAC 
and Request  for  Assistance (RFA)  sources. 
National Guard Commanders report the 
preparedness status of any  capability  they  are 
sourced to provide in  a  common,  secure 
system.  Training and exercises support all 
segments of the cycle with  lessons learned 
from  exercises and actual  operations 
providing feedback to increase National 
Guard preparedness.  
PLAN
Planning  is the foundation  of preparedness. 
Each  jurisdiction  starts with  planning  in 
order  to satisfy  its unique responsibilities.  All 
jurisdictions generally  share in  common  a 
few  components: they  receive guidance from 
appropriate authorities,  collaborate with  as 
many  partners as possible,  create plans 
( i n c l u d i n g  s e c u r i n g  a p p r o v a l f r o m 
authorities),  conduct exercises testing those 
plans, and evaluate  and assess their  results in 
order  to improve.  The challenge,  especially 
of a  catastrophic event,  becomes the 
“interlocking”  of all these plans created by  the 
affected and supporting  jurisdictions 
horizontally  and vertically  to save the most 
lives and property  and most  quickly  restore 
government services and public confidence.
“All disasters are local  disasters”  and 
planning  during  a  disaster  begins with  the 
Incident Command (IC) or  Unified Command 
(UC)  Incident  Action  Plan  (IAP).  According 
to NIMS, the IAP is created by  the IC/UC 
during  the response and covers the next 
twelve to twenty-four  hours of operations.16 
Local jurisdictions’ planning  efforts, 
therefore ,  focus on an est imate  or 
anticipation  of the IAP for  a given  event 
(from  one to hundreds of IAP in  a  given 
response). The anticipation  of IAP during 
response forms the basis of planning 
accomplished by  all jurisdictions during the 
p r e p a r e d n e s s p h a s e , e v e n  t h o u g h 
preparedness precedes response.  
Figure 1.  Planning Portion of Preparedness Cycle
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The complexities of planning  for a 
catastrophic  event  make this a  daunting  task. 
During  Hurricane Katrina,  hundreds of local 
jurisdictions were directly  affected and 
thousands more supported the response 
effort.  It is often noted that  a  “common 
language”  is essential  to facilitate this 
complex  planning  process. Fortunately, 
NIMS provides a  common language used in 
IAP base plans.  It  is the common  “typing”  of 
the various assets or  capabilities used by  the 
IC/UC in  response operations. Resource 
typing  is categorizing, by  capability, the 
resources requested, deployed and used in 
incidents.  Measurable standards identifying 
resource capabilities and performance levels 
serve as the basis for  categories.   Resource 
users at  all  levels use these standards to 
identify  and inventory  resources. 17 Universal, 
well-defined, quantifiable capabilities act  as 
interoperable building blocks upon  which 
plans can be built and interlocked. 
Plans created by  local  jurisdictions inform 
planners laterally  at neighboring  jurisdictions 
who may  plan to provide mutual support. The 
use of typed capabilities adds speed and 
certainty  to the  process of finding and filling 
the gaps in  the supported jurisdiction’s 
response plan. All  partners reading  the plan 
have a  clear  understanding  of what  is needed. 
State level  planners are informed by  the plans 
of local jurisdictions (both  affected and 
supported)  and they  too benefit  from  the use 
of typed capabilities – allowing  state 
capabilities to identify  and fill gaps at  the 
local  level completely  with  little waste. 
Likewise, shared understanding  of the typed 
capability  enhances state-to-state mutual 
support  by  EMAC. Finally,  federal  regional 
planners are informed and empowered to 
contribute quickly, accurately,  and efficiently 
with federal capabilities.  
It is at the state level  that  the state 
National Guard and the JFHQ plug into this 
planning process. As the supporting 
headquarters,  JFHQ planners carefully 
rece ive and understand the s ta te ’ s 
requirement  for  National Guard capabilities 
to support each  plan. They  then  work closely 
with  state planners to clearly  define these 
National Guard capabilities in terms common 
to the supported civilian  jurisdiction. In  this 
way  they  interlock planning  efforts with  the 
supported jurisdiction(s) and begin  to 
generate the interoperable building  blocks 
that  form  the base of this complex  planning 
task.  Each  jurisdiction,  and each  JFHQ, is 
provided maximum  flexibility  – to use an 
existing typed capability  or  customize one in 
partnership with civil authorities. The 
capability  must be  well  defined in  order  to 
deliver  interoperability  for  civilian and 
military  partners.  All  partners,  vertically  and 
horizontally, know  what the capability 
consists of,  what it  can  do, and even  have an 
estimate of the cost to employ it.  
JFHQ contingency  plans based on  well-
defined National Guard capabilities along 
with  sponsorship of the supported civil 
authority moves the cycle from plan to type.
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Figure 1.  Typing Portion of Preparedness Cycle
TYPE
The planning  process generates National 
Guard capabilities vetted by  the appropriate 
civil  authorities.  These capabilities are clearly 
defined in  the plan  by  JFHQ and civilian 
emergency  planners. This definition includes, 
but  is not  limited to, function, task/
condition/standard,  personnel, equipment, 
training,  response time,  and estimated cost  to 
employ.   At this point  the capability  is unique 
to this plan  and this set of partners.  In  order 
to facilitate interoperability, the capability 
must  be typed in  terms common  to all 
partners. The civilian  authority  that approves 
the plan then sponsors the capabilities for 
inclusion  in  a national “clearinghouse”  or 
registry  for  response capabilities.  Once 
included in  this national  registry, the 
capability  becomes the interoperable building 
block that  allows the plan  to be interlocked 
wi th  support ing  p lans o f a l l o ther 
jurisdictions from local through federal.  
Flexibility  is afforded each  and every 
jurisdiction  to “tailor”  exactly  the capability 
needed and still have it  universally 
understood by  all  partners and jurisdictions. 
Planners may  also choose a  capability  that 
has previously  been  typed in  the national 
registry. And, they  may  choose an  existing 
typed capability  and modify  it  in  their  plan. 
New  National Guard capability  can  be 
defined at any  time or  point  in  the cycle,  or 
during  response operations,  in  order  to 
support the needs of the IC/UC. The 
appropriate civil authority  and JFHQ can 
send this for typing  after  the fact.  What exists 
in  the national  registry  of typed capabilities 
are common start  points,  or known  way 
points, from  which  responders can  shift  as 
necessary  during homeland response 
operations in  order  to create capability  for 
any unanticipated requirement.  
The well-defined and typed National 
Guard capability  provides the “basis”  for 
preparedness, a  measurable unit.  In addition 
to meeting  the standard for  typing, a 
capability  definition  must  provide the detail 
necessary  to support the EMAC and the unit 
providing  the capability. EMAC requires 
number  of personnel, equipment,  response 
time, an  estimated cost, etc. Simply  defining 
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task,  condition  and standard lacks sufficient 
detail to estimate cost, a  critical variable in 
selecting  a  capability  for  EMAC. Also, the 
National Guard unit  commander  sourced to 
provide the capability  in  the next  segment of 
the cycle requires sufficient detail to prepare 
that  capability  and a measure to evaluate and 
assess the capability  in  order to report 
preparedness during  the report  segment of 
the cyc le .  Rarely  wi l l this level  of 
preparedness mirror  levels of readiness 
required of the unit  by  its warfighting 
mission.    
T y p e d c a p a b i l i t i e s i d e n t i f i e d i n 
contingency  plans, along  with  Army  Force 
Generation  (ARFORGEN)/Air Expeditionary 
Force (AEF) warfighting  requirements, move 
the cycle to source.  
Figure 2.  Source Portion of Preparedness Cycle
SOURCE
The state’s JFHQ is uniquely  positioned to 
support  synchronization  and sourcing of the 
dual mission  – warfighting  requirements 
through  ARFORGEN/AEF and domestic 
contingencies.  The JFHQ determines the best 
sourcing solution  among  its Air  and Army 
units,  ensuring  that both  missions are 
supported and any  shortfalls or  “gaps”  are 
covered by  EMAC or  RFA, once approved by 
the appropriate state civil authority.  
Each  capability  is sourced against  the 
lowest level  of command that contains all the 
parts required to form  the capability.  For 
example, a  company  may  provide two 
capabilities or  a battalion may  provide a 
separate single  capability  from  portions of 
two of its companies. This predictability 
empowers the sourced unit  to focus efforts on 
just the personnel,  equipment, and training 
required to generate the required capability. 
Waiting,  wondering,  and wasted effort  are 
reduced. The sourced unit  must  understand, 
develop,  and maintain the capability,  as well 
as,  mobilize and deploy  it  and provide 
f e e d b a c k  o n  t h e p ro c e s s .  Th e u n i t 
commander  also has a  responsibility  for 
reporting  the status of the capability.  (More 
details on  reporting  are included in  the next 
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segment  of the cycle.) Sourcing also 
establishes a  physical location  of the 
capability,  a  key  factor in  determining 
response time.  
A  unit sourced with  a  capability  along  with 
the commander’s assessment  of that 
capability’s preparedness level move the cycle 
to report.  
Figure 3.  Report Portion of Preparedness Cycle
REPORT 
Responsibility  for  and authority  to report 
readiness in  military  units resides with  the 
unit  commander.   Preparedness reporting 
respects this proven, time-tested process by 
leveraging  the unit  commander to report 
preparedness status.  The commander’s 
assessment relies on a holistic evaluation  of 
the ability  to project  the capability  into the 
near  future.  The report provides detail 
indicating what  deficiencies,  if  any, exist  and 
what  measures are required to correct them. 
P r e p a r e d n e s s r e p o r t i n g  i s b y  u n i t 
identification  code (Army) or  unit  type code 
(Air) with  reference to the plan  the capability 
is sourced against. Because the capability  is 
typed,  the details of the composition, 
response time,  and estimated cost are readily 
referenced in  the system.  The unit’s location 
and contact  information  is included, further 
increasing  the value as a  common  operating 
picture (COP) tool.  
The DoD, through the NGB, is the logical 
“proponent”  of the preparedness reporting 
system  and maintains this repository  of 
preparedness data, ensuring  ready  access for 
all  with  appropriate clearance and need to 
know.  The states must  have lightning  fast 
access to this data  through  their  JFHQ, just 
as defense coordinating officers and defense 
coordinating  elements support  Federal 
Emergency  Management Agency  regional 
planners and operations centers. The system 
must  leverage technology  securely  to meet 
this requirement.  The preparedness COP 
created supplies visibility  both horizontally 
and vertically  to find and plug  gaps,  support 
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EMAC,  and even CAP.  All  military  homeland 
response planners and operators have access 
to this interoperable system.  Decision  makers 
are supported with  a  system  that  contains all 
prepared capability  with  location,  response 
time, contact info, and even  estimated cost. 
The preparedness reporting  system  or  COP 
becomes a  tool for  the operators executing 
h o m e l a n d r e s p o n s e o p e r a t i o n s .  A s 
capabilities are activated they  can  be checked 
out in  the preparedness reporting  system  and 
entered into a  t racking  system  for 
deployment. 
 
Figure 4.  National Guard Preparedness Cycle
CLOSING THE LOOP
Conditions are set  for  homeland response 
operations with  the establishment of the 
report  portion  of the cycle, but the cycle is not 
complete.  Lessons learned and reviews 
generated by  exercises advance the cycle  back 
to plan  in  order  to review  and update existing 
plans or  generate a  new  plan,  typed 
capability, sourcing, or  reporting  status as 
needed. Likewise,  training  and exercises 
support  each segment  of the cycle as well. 
The exercises themselves follow  the Joint 
Exercise Life Cycle found in  the Joint 
Training System. The JFHQ simultaneously 
coordinates with  state authorities to ensure 
compliance with  the Homeland Security 
Exercise  and Evaluation  Program. In  addition 
to exercises, an actual event, new  guidance, 
changes in  threats or  technologies, or  other 
planning  inputs may  also initiate a  review  or 
new  requirement  that  moves the cycle back to 
plan.  
CONCLUSION 
The table below  summarizes the selection 
criteria  as applied to the plan, type,  source, 
report cycle.  
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Table 1: Selection Criteria in the Plan, Type, Source, Report Cycle
CRITERIA DISCUSSION ASSESSMENT
“Nested” in federal guidance 





o Unity of effort (UoE)







o A “how to” manual to support engagement 
across jurisdictions
o Synch’s tiers and jurisdictions
o Infinite, determined by the JFHQ
and State EM creativity
o Sets conditions for UoE (see below)
o Sets units of measure for 
Preparedness reporting
• Reduces an elephant sized planning task to 
bite sized proportions with interoperable 













Leverage autonomy/authority of the 
states/territories
Based on the dual sovereignty between State and 
Federal.  Does not infringe on authority or creativity  
of the State.
Enable synchronization of NG Dual 
Mission
Empower JFHQs to use/report capability in ALL 
units, no under-utilized capacity.
Enhanced Interoperability Interoperable system/process with metrics 
understood by civil and military.
Foster innovation, collaboration, and 
creative problem solving
ALL are rewarded for innovation without
limits or top-down standardization.  Colla-
boration is enabled by COP, shared plans, 
and interoperable building blocks.
ü  
Common Operating Picture Shared contingency plans, capability status, 
location in common, secure system.
ü  
Supports process of continuous 
improvement
Quantifies Preparedness.  If we can’t 
measure  it, how do we know if we are
Improving it?
ü  
Enable rapid Domestic Response Requires getting “left of the bang”, landfall, quake 
epicenter, etc… Unity of 
Effort begins well prior to an event during
Preparedness.  
ü  
Maintain “Warfighter” support for 
“away game”
DoD deployments and contingencies get
top priority, and capability resident in ALL
other units is identified, defined and measured 
against a domestic contingency plan.  
ü  
Unity of Effort- “One of the Great 
Challenges of our time”
Unified action requires a unifying 
Strategy maximizing National Guard Preparedness.  
 
“Achieving  unity  of effort in  homeland 
response is a  complex  challenge,  among  the 
greatest  of our  age… It  requires us to develop 
new  ways of thinking  about  and managing 
homeland response capabilities,  before 
disaster  strikes.” 18 Preparedness and a  plan, 
type,  source, report  cycle do not  guarantee 
success,  however. Response operations have 
the ultimate vote, but  this concept  sets the 
conditions that enable successful response.  It 
is a proactive strategy  that  is at  work 
24/7/365  to improve National Guard 
contributions to homeland response. Typing 
of capabilities provides a  measurable unit  of 
preparedness. Sourcing  a  typed capability 
against a  National Guard unit  provides an 
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authority  to report  the status of the 
capability,  the commander.  Homeland 
response capabilities resident  in  “red”  and 
“amber”  warfighting  units are not  obscured 
by  a  singular  reliance on  readiness.  All the 
ingredients are present  for  a shared reporting 
system  able to support  a  preparedness COP 
in  near  real  time.  This collaborative system 
facilitates shared learning  among  planners 
and enables us to quantitatively  sum  National 
Guard contributions to homeland response. 
In  the fog  of a “no-notice”  event,  all  partners, 
at  all jurisdictions,  have visibility  (through 
shared plans and reporting  in  a  preparedness 
COP) of the intent  of any  entity  that  is 
“incommunicado.”  One broken  link in  the 
chain  doesn’t  paralyze all  other  partners from 
beginning  to build the bridge around it  that 
stabilizes the situation.  
The principle of dual sovereignty  in  our 
Constitution intends the military  power  of 
the National Guard to be decentralized. The 
situation  creates a significant  challenge to 
unity  of effort  in  homeland response, but 
yields a  unique advantage in  the form  of 
many  varied sources of solutions to complex 
response problems.  A  common, collaborative 
system  for  preparedness data,  shared by 
planners,  facilitates shared learning  and sets 
the conditions for adaptive learning  as 
planners and operators design, experiment, 
and collaborate. Taken along  with  the typing 
clearinghouse,  it  provides a  quick, low  cost 
and effective way  to compare plans and 
capabilities across the fifty-four JFHQ. 
We must come to terms with  the 
dissonances found in  each state. Instead of 
ignoring or  diminishing each state’s 
individuality, we must embrace it. This will 
require a mastery of fundamental 
principles…and a  mechanism  by which  we 
can accelerate the pace of development.19  
The plan,  type,  source, report cycle 
satisfies a  rigorous set  of selection  criteria 
and deserves evaluation  by  the adjutants 
general  of the several  states and the chief, 
National Guard Bureau,  as a National  Guard 
Preparedness concept capable of fully 
supporting the “Joint  Action Plan for 
Developing Unity of Effort.”  
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Ami J. Abou-bakr, Managing Disasters through 
Public-Private Partnerships
(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013)
Reviewed by Austen D. Givens
A  massive tornado tore a seventeen-mile path 
through  Moore,  Oklahoma  on  May  20, 2013, 
tragically  killing  twenty-four people and 
injuring over  three hundred. 1  Response 
efforts began  immediately, and partnerships 
between  government  entities and businesses 
played a  significant  role in  those efforts. For 
example,  the Ford Motor Company  donated 
$400,000  to local  charities, including the 
American  Red Cross,  which  worked closely 
with  first  responders to help survivors.2  The 
Home Depot  gathered three hundred 
employees in Dallas,  Texas, including 
plumbers and general  contractors,  and then 
bussed them  to Moore to assist  in recovery 
operations.3  With  numerous cell  phone 
towers destroyed in  the Moore area, the 
wireless phone company  Sprint provided cell 
phones to local  first  responders and set  up 
mobile cell phone towers on  trucks to boost 
service coverage.4  These examples of public-
private sector cooperation  and collaboration 
after  the Moore tornado are part  of a  broader 
trend in  which  businesses and government 
agencies work together  before, during, and 
after  disasters. Ami J.  Abou-bakr’s Managing 
D i s a s t e r s t h r o u g h P u b l i c - P r i v a t e 
P a r t n e r s h i p s i s e a s i l y  t h e m o s t 
comprehensive scholarly  work on  this topic 
to date.
Abou-bakr’s book contributes to an 
emerging  literature on  public-private 
partnerships in emergency  management 
today, which she labels “disaster-oriented 
PPPs.” 5  In  Managing Disasters, Abou-bakr 
argues persuasively  that the current federal-
level framework for  disaster-oriented PPPs is 
not sustainable. The framework’s deficiencies 
may  grow  into bigger  problems without  a 
f u n d a m e n t a l r e - t h i n k i n g  o f t h e s e 
partnerships’ purposes.  Better  defining 
disaster-oriented PPPs, in  her  view, will 
provide a  valuable first step toward making 
these partnerships more sustainable.
Abou-bakr  first  traces the development  of 
disaster-oriented PPPs from  the late 1990s 
through  2005.  Beginning with the Clinton 
administration,  she systematically  reviews 
the major milestones in  the federal 
government’s evolving  view  of public-private 
partnerships in  US national security.  The first 
chapter  of Managing Disasters  covers the 
enormous number  of post-9/11  changes in 
government,  including the huge federal  re-
organization  that  led to the US Department 
of Homeland Security’s creation  in  2002. 
Readers will find her detailed accounts of 
Verizon’s role in  re-opening  the New  York 
S t o c k  E x c h a n g e a n d W a l - M a r t ’ s 
contributions to Hurricane Katrina  relief 
refreshing  and engaging. They  add new 
insights from  interviews with  key  Verizon  and 
Wal-Mart  officials,  and her  narrative style 
helpfully  mixes these new  insights with 
sharp, clear analyses.
In  Chapter  2  Abou-bakr  establishes an 
analytical framework  for  disaster-oriented 
PPPs today. This framework, which  she 
developed based upon more than  two dozen 
interviews with  senior  public  and private 
sector  leaders in  emergency  management, 
consists of seven  critical  factors: crisis, 
leadership, organizational  structure, 
information  sharing,  shared benefits, trust, 
and adaptability  or  sustainability. Her 
analytical  framework  takes its place alongside 
a  number  of other  frameworks developed to 
assess public sector partnerships with  non-
public sector  entities. 6  Through  the balance 
of Chapter  2  she uses this framework  to 
evaluate the current  status of federal 
disaster-oriented PPPs, weaving  in  multiple 
case studies to illustrate the broad impact 
that  disaster-oriented PPPs have on 
emergency  management  today. These cases 
make for  fascinating  reading, and include 
descriptions of FedEx’s role after  the 9/11 
terrorist  attacks,  the shipping company 
Maersk’s efforts to combat piracy  off the 
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coast  of Africa, and the Walt Disney 
Company’s use of character  actors in shelters 
for  Hurricane Katrina  survivors (pp.  50-51, 
60, 70).
Using  the analytical framework developed 
in  Chapter  2,  Chapters 3  and 4  explore two 
examples of historical  frameworks for public-
private partnerships that  could be used as 
models to improve today’s federal disaster-
oriented PPPs. From  the late eighteenth 
century  through  the early  twentieth  century 
there were three separate attempts to create a 
national banking system  in  the United States 
(p. 93). The Federal  Reserve,  which  Abou-
bakr  examines in  Chapter  3,  came about 
largely  as a  reaction  to the panic of 1907—a 
national economic  crisis that  underscored the 
need for  a  central  banking  system  (pp. 
94-95).  Yet  the Fed’s creation  was hardly  an 
isolated reaction to a  single crisis; it  was,  as 
she puts it, “[t]he culmination of decades of 
disjointed banking  regulation  and a  changing 
national economy,”  coupled with  the panic  of 
1907, that  ultimately  brought  forth  the 
Federal  Reserve system  as we know  it  today. 
While Congress did not  pass legislation 
forming the Fed until 1913—a  full six  years 
after  the panic—the notion  of “crisis as a 
catalyst for  change”  is clear  here, and the 
parallels with  the huge federal government 
structural  reforms after 9/11  are self-evident 
(p. 96). The Fed, in  Abou-bakr’s analysis, 
represents a  strategic partnership between 
the federal government  and the private 
sector, because its goals are ultimately 
focused on  longer-term  economic health. 
Although  the Fed can  and does intervene to 
bolster  the  US economy, its longer-term  focus 
means that  it ultimately  works to prevent 
economic  crises from  happening  in  the  first 
place (p. 117).
Chapter 4  presents the War  Industries 
Board (WIB) as an  example of a  responsive, 
rather  than  strategic,  partnership between 
government  and businesses.  From  March  to 
November 1918  the WIB existed for  a  single 
purpose: to lend private-sector  know-how  to 
US government  preparedness for  World War 
I (pp.  130-32). It  was in this context that the 
WIB mobilized American industry  to support 
the war  effort,  helping to produce and deliver 
basic  supplies and munitions to U.S. military 
personnel (pp. 136-38). Although  the WIB 
existed for  less than a year, it  played a 
valuable part  in  organizing  the private 
s e c t o r ’ s r e s o u r c e s t o m e e t f e d e r a l 
government  needs.  The singular  purpose of 
the WIB stands in  sharp contrast  to the Fed, 
for  the WIB was created solely  to mobilize the 
United States in  wartime,  and the WIB was 
dissolved when  the war  ended (p.  158). The 
Fed,  meanwhile, continues to play  an 
enormous role in  steering  the US economy 
today.
In  Chapter  5  Abou-bakr  compares and 
contrasts the Fed and the WIB against  the 
backdrop of today’s disaster-oriented PPPs. 
There is an  “identity  crisis,”  she argues, in 
which  modern  federal  disaster-oriented PPPs 
share traits of both  strategic partnerships 
(i.e.,  the Fed)  and responsive partnerships 
(i.e.,  the WIB) (pp. 188-89).  This identity 
crisis hampers the effectiveness of disaster-
oriented PPPs. Without a  clear  and shared 
sense of what  disaster-oriented PPPs are 
supposed to achieve,  the organizational 
structure of disaster-oriented PPPs remains 
ill-defined (p.  191). Although  federal disaster-
oriented PPPs should address strategic,  long-
term  disaster  response needs,  at  present, 
these PPPs are actually  more responsive in 
nature.  Abou-bakr  maintains that  it will likely 
take a  catastrophe bigger  than  9/11  or 
Hurricane Katrina  to ultimately  reconcile this 
tension  between  strategic and responsive 
disaster-oriented PPPs (p.  193).  Such  a 
catastrophe would rivet  the nation’s 
attention, generating  the political will 
necessary  to tackle and resolve many  of the 
messy  organizational problems that  plague 
disaster-oriented PPPs.
Managing Disasters  skillfully  explores the 
current status of federal disaster-oriented 
PPPs and exposes two of the central  problems 
with disaster-oriented PPPs: the lack  of 
consensus on what  these partnerships are 
supposed to be, and what they  are supposed 
to achieve.  Managing Disasters  also suffers 
from  several  shortcomings.  First,  it  does not 
offer  detailed prescriptions to heal federal 
disaster-oriented PPPs of their  identity  crisis. 
Instead,  as Abou-bakr  notes,  “I do not 
purport  to provide ‘the solution’ but  I hope to 
provide a  foundational first  step in  the 
development of a  comprehensive and viable 
way  forward for  disaster-oriented PPPs” (p. 
197).  Yet  Managing Disasters  clearly  sets the 
stage for  at  least a  preliminary  discussion of 
GIVENS, REVIEW OF MANAGING DISASTERS  2
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME 9, ARTICLE  12 (JULY 2013) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
“the solution.”  What would an  act of Congress 
that  re-orients responsive disaster-oriented 
PPPs look  like? What government  regulatory 
mechanisms may  be used to move disaster-
oriented PPPs from  a responsive posture to a 
strategic  outlook? A  second issue is that 
Managing Disasters  focuses overwhelmingly 
on  federal disaster-oriented PPPs,  and not 
state or  local  disaster-oriented PPPs. This 
federal  focus is understandable,  as federal 
disaster-oriented PPPs are generally  more 
developed than  state or  local  disaster-
oriented PPPs.  But even  a limited exploration 
of state and local disaster-oriented PPPs 
would add greater depth  to this book. A  third 
shortcoming  is that  the book  returns again 
and again  to 9/11  and Hurricane Katrina to 
illustrate the ways that  federal disaster-
oriented PPPs function. A  more expansive 
e x a m i n a t i o n  o f o t h e r  l a r g e - s c a l e 
emergencies,  and the roles that disaster-
oriented PPPs played in  those other  large-
scale emergencies,  would provide a  more 
robust  sense of how  these disaster-oriented 
PPPs work  in  the context of other types of 
crises.
The world’s growing interconnectedness 
means that even  smaller-scale disasters will 
tend to impact greater  numbers of people as 
time goes on. This “cascade effect,”  in  which  a 
crisis in  one part  of the world can  quickly 
affect  systems in  other  parts of the world,  will 
r e q u i r e e x c e l l e n t  c o o p e r a t i o n a n d 
collaboration  amongst  many  diverse actors. 
Disaster-oriented PPPs hold great promise as 
a  tool  to facilitate this cooperation  and 
collaboration. Managing Disasters  through 
Public-Private Partnerships  delivers the 
most compelling  analysis yet  of how  disaster-
oriented PPPs can  help us to deal  with 
increasingly  complex  crises,  and how  to begin 
to make these partnerships more effective in 
the future.
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Enabling Public Safety Priority Use of Commercial Wireless 
Networks
Ryan Hallahan and Jon M. Peha
ABSTRACT
By providing public safety users  with 
roaming access  to  commercial broadband 
networks on a priority basis, it’s  possible to 
increase the capacity, coverage, and 
reliability beyond what’s  possible with 
dedicated public safety  networks  alone.  This 
article quantifies  the advantages  with 
respect to  capacity, showing that by 
establishing multiple arrangements  with 
commercial carriers  in every locality,  public 
safety can access  an amount of capacity that 
has been projected for very serious 
e m e r g e n c i e s w i t h o u t s e r i o u s l y 
compromising quality of service for 
commercial customers.  However, this  article 
also demonstrates  some of the issues  that 
must be addressed when crafting roaming 
agreements  between public  safety and 
commercial carriers. LTE technology 
provides  a wide range of capabilities to 
support priority and roaming,  but these 
must be used in accordance  with policies  and 
governance structures that have yet to 
emerge.  It must be decided whether priority 
and resource allocation decisions  are made 
in an automated way or with  human 
intervention,  and if the latter,  the locus  of 
control. Moreover, agreements  must find 
ways  to accommodate significant technical 
differences  in commercial networks, even 
though they all comply with a common 
(LTE) standard,  and to support changes in 
technology and needs  over the coming years. 
This will require a single  entity with  the 
expertise and authority to bridge public 
safety stakeholders, commercial carriers, 
and technical standards bodies.
INTRODUCTION
Wireless broadband networks present  a 
unique opportunity  to revolutionize the way 
public safety  responds to emergencies, 
bringing  a  number  of new  and important 
applications to first  responders who 
previously  had to rely  on only  narrowband 
voice. 1 In order  to bring this functionality  to 
first  responders,  public safety  agencies 
around the world may  deploy  wireless 
broadband networks. 2  At the same time, 
commercial operators will  continue to deploy 
and operate their  own broadband systems. At 
least  in the United States, leading  commercial 
operators, 3  and the most prominent public 
safety  network  which  is now  known  as 
FirstNet,4  are all  moving towards the same 
underlying technology: Long  Term  Evolution 
(LTE). 5  This has created an  extraordinary 
opportunity  for  public safety  agencies to 
make use of the services offered by  these 
commercial networks in  a  way  that 
complements the capabilities of public safety 
networks; public  safety  users could roam 
onto commercial networks seamlessly,  and 
receive priority  access when  they  do. For 
example,  had this been possible on 
S e p t e m b e r 1 1 ,  2 0 0 1  w h e n  t h e 
communications system  used by  firefighters 
in  the World Trade Center  stopped working,6 
firefighters could simply  have roamed onto a 
commercial network and received the order 
to evacuate the building.  In reality, many  of 
the 128  firefighters still  inside when  the 
second tower collapsed probably  never  heard 
that  evacuation  order,  and lost  their  lives as a 
result.  
Roaming  onto commercial networks for 
important communications would be a  major 
shift  in  both  policy  and technology  from  the 
traditional  approach  to public safety 
communications, in  which all  mission-critical 
communications are carried over  networks 
that  are the exclusive domain  of public  safety 
agencies. It  would also be a controversial 
shift.  Many  in  public safety  believe  they  can 
only  rely  on systems built for  their  agency 
alone, and not  on systems that  others control 
and that  were designed for  a  consumer 
market. 
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Priority  roaming for  public safety  began 
receiving  increased attention  in the United 
States in  2010  when  the US National 
Broadband Plan  (NBP)  recommended that 
public safety  be able to roam  with  priority 
onto commercial networks (FCC 2010a).7 As 
should be expected from  a  high-level 240-
word recommendation,  most of the details of 
this policy  were left to be worked out  at  a 
later  date.  The idea  of priority  roaming  drew 
intense debate,  as public safety  advocates 
questioned whether  priority  roaming  could 
meet  public safety  needs, especially  for 
mission-critical communications that  require 
a  higher  degree of reliability  than consumers 
typically  demand,  and consumer  advocates 
wondered about  the impact  on  commercial 
users.  Commercial  carriers have explored 
how  to provide roaming  services to public 
safety, as shown  by  the Motorola-Verizon 
alliance,8  although Motorola and Verizon 
only  offered to support  non-mission-critical 
communications, which  would make the 
approach  far  less useful  to public  safety. 
Ultimately, the future level of interest  from 
industry  will  depend on  the financial  terms, 
technical  requirements of prioritization and 
the costs imposed on commercial  networks. 
Thus, this paper  quantifies some of the 
benefits of roaming  to public  safety,  as well as 
the impact it would have on  the commercial 
sector.  
When Congress funded the nationwide 
public safety  network, they  maintained the 
Federal Communications Commission’s 
authority  to require priority  roaming, 
although  within  limits.9  Among  them, 
requirements could not  be imposed on 
commercial carriers that  used technologies 
that  are  incompatible with  those used by 
public safety,  commercial  carriers must  be 
reasonably  compensated, and priority 
mechanisms cannot be preemptive.  Whether 
the FCC uses its authority  and how  has yet  to 
be determined, and may be contentious.  
FirstNet  has also the authority  to negotiate 
voluntary  priority  roaming  agreements with 
one or  many  commercial networks.  In 
addition to the long-term  benefits of such 
agreements described in  this article, priority 
roaming agreements can  also be put in  place 
quickly  at  relatively  low  initial  cost, which 
could help FirstNet  succeed despite  tight 
constraints on  both time and budget in  its 
initial phases.10
FirstNet, the FCC, the commercial cellular 
providers and tens of thousands of state and 
local  public safety  agencies will have to make 
important decisions about  priority  roaming, 
beginning  with  whether  to adopt  it.  This 
article will  inform  those decisions by 
shedding  light on  whether and how  LTE 
technology  can  meet  public safety  needs 
when  emergency  responders roam  onto 
commercial networks,  the potential  benefits 
to public  safety,  and the potential  risks to 
commercial carriers and their  customers.  The 
article will therefore address a  number  of 
questions. For example,  what  priority 
mechanisms exist in  LTE technology  and how 
can  they  be mapped to public safety  needs? 
Would priority  roaming  meet the capacity 
needs of public safety, even  in  major 
disasters,  and would doing  so be harmful to 
consumers who also need to communicate? 
This article also studies the issues and 
tradeoffs presented by  specific  technical  and 
operational design  decisions where these 
have implications for  future policy  and 
governance decisions.  These raise additional 
questions.  For  example,  what  technical issues 
need to be addressed in roaming agreements, 
and is there significant  benefit  of establishing 
multiple agreements per  region?  Technical 
decisions of design  and operations are also 
intertwined with  decisions of organizational 
planning  and governance. Should procedures 
be established that  place a person  in  charge 
of resource allocation during certain  kinds of 
emergencies,  which  would require careful 
negotiations given  the large number  of local, 
state, and federal organizations involved, or 
should those decisions be automated based 
on agreements made before the actual 
emergency?
Providing  public safety  users roaming 
access to commercial  wireless networks can 
yield a  number  of benefits including: (1) 
increased aggregate capacity  and possibly 
increased cell site diversity,  (2) increased 
coverage,  and (3) increased resiliency.  To 
reiterate the benefits of priority  roaming 
more specifically,  where both  commercial 
wireless service and public safety  wireless 
service are available, public safety  will  have 
access to increased aggregate capacity  from 
both  sources. 11 This is a  significant  benefit, 
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which  this paper quantifies in  the next 
section.  Moreover, even  greater  aggregate 
capacity  is available where commercial  and 
public safety  cell  sites are not  co-located, 
because devices can  connect  to the closest 
tower  (or  more precisely, the source of the 
strongest signal) regardless of which  network 
it is associated with.  Reducing  distance 
between  tower and mobile device can  enable 
a  much higher  data  rate per  MHz of 
spectrum. Second, where commercial 
wireless service is available but  public safety 
service is not, public safety  gains the ability  to 
operate by  roaming,  effectively  increasing 
geographic  coverage.  Third, where 
commercial wireless service is available in 
addition to public  safety  service,  public  safety 
will have access to more resilient and 
dependable communications,  because 
communications is possible whenever  at  least 
one of the networks is functioning. 12 Public 
safety  can  realize some of these benefits 
whether or  not  they  receive priority  access. 
However,  with  priority,  public safety  users 
can  rely  on  commercial  networks to a  much 
greater degree.  
There has been  other  work done on 
prioritizing public  safety  traffic on  LTE-based 
networks, 13 but  these efforts have focused on 
developing use cases and user requirements, 
detailing  the implementation  of specific  LTE 
mechanisms and demonstrating  these 
mechanisms on a dedicated public safety 
network.  And more recently,  the FCC’s 
Technical  Advisory  Board for  First Responder 
Interoperability  presented their  “minimum 
technical  requirements for  interoperability” 
to FirstNet.  That  report touched on  LTE 
priority  mechanisms, but  the focus of was on 
e n s u r i n g  a  n a t i o n w i d e l e v e l o f 
interoperability  for  the public safety 
broadband network. 14 This article, unlike the 
others, focuses on  the broader policy 
challenges of prioritizing public  safety  traffic 
o n  c o m m e r c i a l n e t w o r k s , a n d t h e 
implications technical  design  decisions have 
for  agreements between  public  safety  and 
commercial operators.  
We assume throughout  this work  that 
public safety  operates its own  network, and 
supplements that  network’s capabilities with 
commercial services. Consider Figure 1, 
which  shows the cellular  towers belonging to 
public safety, which presumably  operate in 
one spectrum  band, and the towers of a 
commercial carrier,  which  operate in  another 
spectrum  band.  The region is divided up into 
a  set  of “cells”  or  areas,  each  of which  is 
served by  a  different  commercial cell tower. 
The region  is also divided into a  different set 
of cells,  each  of which  is served by  a different 
public  safety  tower.  Public safety  and 
commercial carriers may  share some physical 
towers, each  with  their  own equipment on  the 
tower  operating in  their  own  spectrum.  (An 
alternative outside the scope of this paper  is 
to operate a  single network with  shared 
capacity,  which  can  take a  variety  of forms.15) 
Both  public safety  and commercial towers 
will be connected by  connections known as 
“backhaul”  back to high-speed centers of 
their  respective, which  are known as “packet 
core networks.”  (The internal  workings of 
packet  core networks are described in  greater 
detail in  the appendix) Within  this region, 
there will be areas where the public safety 
and commercial coverage overlaps; in  these 
areas a  device capable of priority  roaming 
could connect to either network.  
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Figure 1.  High-level illustration of a public safety network that is deployed in the same region as a 
commercial cellular network.
Section 2  quantifies some of the benefits 
of allowing public safety  users to roam  onto 
commercial networks.  Section  3  discusses the 
prioritization  capabilities that might be 
desirable to public safety. Section  4  presents 
the mechanisms available in  the LTE 
standard, and shows that these can  be used to 
meet a  wide range of public safety’s needs, 
including protecting  critical communications 
when  roaming. Sections 5  and 6,  respectively, 
analyze technical and operational  design 
decisions that  must be made,  and identify 
i m p o r t a n t  p o l i c y  a n d g o v e r n a n c e 
implications.  Finally, section 7  presents 
conclusions. 
Many  of the observations are rooted in  the 
specifics of LTE technology. The appendix 
provides an  overview  of LTE, and highlights 
the important mechanisms and concepts in 
the LTE standard that  enable preferential 
treatment of some users and applications.  
BENEFITS OF ROAMING AND 
IMPACT ON COMMERCIAL 
SECTOR
As discussed in  the introduction, one of the 
primary  benefits to public  safety  of priority 
roaming is the ability  to supplement  the 
dedicated capacity  on  public safety  networks 
with  the capacity  available on  existing 
commercial networks.  The more commercial 
networks public  safety  users have access to, 
the more capacity  that  will  be available  to 
those users,  and the less of an  effect  public 
safety  roaming  traff ic wil l have on 
commercial subscribers. Thus, to maximize 
capacity,  as well as coverage and resiliency, 
there is incentive for  public  safety  agencies to 
craft  roaming  agreements with  as many 
commercial carriers as possible, although 
these  benefits might be weighed against 
administrative overhead and transaction 
costs. This section  quantifies the extent  to 
which  roaming agreements can give public 
safety  the capacity  it  needs by  estimating 
utilization  levels after  serious disasters as the 
number of roaming  agreements and the 
corresponding  amount of spectrum  available 
through  roaming is varied. Of course,  it  also 
matters what  constitutes a  serious disaster, 
so this too is varied.  From  the carriers’ 
perspective, it is also important  to consider 
how  roaming  would affect  the ability  of 
consumers to communicate during  disasters, 
so this is quantified as well. 
To demonstrate how  the amount  of 
roaming capacity  depends on  the number  of 
roaming agreements, Figure 2  shows the 
amount  of commercial  capacity  per cell sector 
that  is available to public safety  in  both  the 
uplink and downlink as a function  of the 
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amount of spectrum  available for  public 
safety  to roam  onto. The amount of spectrum 
available to public safety  depends on the 
number of roaming  agreements with 
commercial carriers,  and on  the technology 
and handset design.  That  is,  in  LTE there is a 
predefined set  of spectrum  bands (i.e.,  band 
classes) in which  the technology  standard can 
be used,  and as the number of band classes 
supported by  a  single device increases, the 
complexity  of the device (and thus its cost) 
increases as well.   For  this analysis, the x-axis 
in  Figure 2  extends to 60 MHz,  which  is 
about the amount  of spectrum  that  is 
available in  the three 700MHz band classes 
(i.e.,  LTE bands 13, 14,  17). 16 (The 700MHz 
band is of particular  interest in  the U.S,  in 
part. because that  is where public safety’s 
broadband allocation is located.)
Furthermore, Figure 2  includes two 
scenarios.  There is a  base case scenario in 
which  4.8  Mbps is required in  the downlink 
and 1.5  Mbps in  the uplink to support 
response to a localized emergency. As 
discussed in  Hallahan  and Peha, 17  the base 
case scenario is based on a  hypothetical 
emergency  in  which  there  is a chemical and 
biological terrorist  attack  in  downtown 
Washington D.C.  that  causes a  substantial 
number  of casualties. This scenario, which 
was developed by  the Spectrum  Coalition  for 
Public  Safety,18  was designed to illustrate a 
localized ‘worst-case’ capacity  scenario in 
which  thousands of first  responders 
participate in  an  emergency  response that is 
concentrated in  a  small area, served by  a 
limited number  of cell sites. To consider  even 
larger  and presumably  less likely  disasters, 
we include a second scenario that  requires 
four times as much capacity as the base case.
Figure 2  (as well as Figure 3  discussed 
below)  was generated using  a  model 
described in  Hallahan  and Peha,19  which 
calculates capacity  requirements and costs 
with  a  variety  of scenarios and assumptions. 
The capacity  in  a given  region  is proportional 
to the density  of cell sites.  In  Figure 2  and 
Figure 3,  it  is assumed that the density  of cell 
sites in  each  commercial carrier’s network  is 
equal to the  density  of cell  sites in  the public 
safety  network. This is a  reasonable first-
order  approximation  given  that  the number 
of cell sites in  each  major  carrier’s network is 
roughly  equal to the number  of cell  sites 
recommended by  the NBP for  a nationwide 
public safety  network (i.e.,  all four  major 
networks have about  40,000 to 50,000 cell 
sites nationwide, 20  while the NBP calls for 
about  44,000  cell  sites in  a  nationwide public 
safety  network.21 It is assumed that  cell  sites 
are  co- located, so devices have no 
opportunity  to choose the carrier  with  the 
closest  tower, which  can  greatly  increase 
spectral efficiency  and total capacity  beyond 
what  is shown here. Also, it  is assumed in  this 
analysis that  the cell sites in  both  the public 
safety  and commercial  networks are divided 
into sectors in  the same way  (e.g.,  three 
sectors/cell).  Additionally,  it  is assumed that 
the commercial spectrum  is divided equally 
between  the uplink  and the downlink and 
that  the spectral efficiency  is the same on 
both  the commercial and public  safety 
networks (i.e.,  0.5  bps/Hz uplink; 1.5  bps/Hz 
downlink),  which  is reasonable given that 
both  sets of infrastructure must support  the 
same LTE technology  to facilitate the 
roaming envisioned in this paper.  
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Figure 1.  Roaming capacity available for public safety traffic on commercial networks that have roaming 
agreements with public safety 
As shown  in  Figure 2  as the amount of 
spectrum  on which  public safety  can roam 
increases,  the magnitude of emergency  that 
can  be supported while roaming  increases, 
such  that  roaming  alone can  provide 
sufficient capacity  to support  an  extremely 
large emergency  response. Even  if public 
safety  can  roam  onto just  10 MHz of 
commercial spectrum, there would be enough 
capacity  to support  the response to the 
terrorist  attack in  Washington  DC studied 
here without  using a  dedicated public  safety 
network. If,  instead,  public  safety  can roam 
onto 24  MHz of spectrum  (e.g.,  all of band 
class 17),  there would be enough  roaming 
capacity  to support an emergency  four  times 
as great as the base case DC-based scenario. 
Finally,  if public safety  can  roam  onto all of 
the 700MHz band classes (i.e.,  LTE bands 13, 
14,  17),  this 60 MHz of spectrum  would 
provide over 60  Mbps of supplemental 
capacity  per  sector  (45+ Mbps downlink; 15+ 
Mbps uplink), which  is far  beyond the 
capacity  per  sector  expected on  the dedicated 
public safety  network envisioned in  the 
National Broadband Plan.22
To assess the impact  of public safety 
roaming on  commercial  subscribers, Figure 3 
shows the utilization of a  commercial cell 
sector  as a  function  of the total amount  of 
spectrum  used by  commercial carriers that 
have agreements with  public safety.  Note that 
this includes both spectrum  that public safety 
can  roam  onto and spectrum  they  cannot 
roam  onto,  because when  a commercial 
operator  makes spectrum  at 700MHz 
available for  roaming, its commercial 
subscribers can  be shifted to other  spectrum 
bands outside of 700MHz as needed, even  if 
public safety  users can’t. Assumptions for 
Figure 3  are the same as for  Figure 2  The x-
axis in  Figure 3  extends to 320  MHz, which, 
as of 2010, was roughly  the amount  of 
spectrum  licensed in  the United States below 
2.5  GHz that  could be used for  mobile 
broadband.23
Of the commercial spectrum  available 
below  2.5GHz, the two largest nationwide 
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commercial carriers in  the United States (i.e., 
the tier-1carriers)  currently  average roughly 
100 MHz in the major  markets and the next 
two carriers (i.e.,  the tier-2  carriers) average 
about  50 MHz in  these markets.24  Not all of 
the available spectrum  has been  put to use 
yet,  and not all of the spectrum  in use is used 
for  mobile broadband.  (Some is used for 
voice traffic.)   To provide some context, 
Figure 3  includes labels on  the x-axis showing 
the impact of agreements with  tier-1  and 
tier-2  carriers,  assuming tier-1  carriers have 
60 MHz of spectrum  available for  mobile 
broadband and the tier-2  carriers have 30 
MHz.25 
Figure 1.  Average commercial network utilization due to public safety roaming during a localized 
emergency response
Figure 3  demonstrates that  the impact of 
public  safety  roaming  on  commercial 
subscribers is small,  and decreases further 
when  the commercial  networks on which 
public safety  can  roam  have more total 
spectrum.  For  example, if public safety  only 
has a  roaming  agreement with  one tier-1 
carrier,  only  about 10  percent  of that  carrier’s 
capacity  will be utilized by  public safety 
during  the response to the serious localized 
emergency  scenario studied here. Thus,  the 
quality  of service observed by  commercial 
subscribers will  not  be greatly  affected. With 
two tier-1  carriers, utilization due to public 
safety  falls to about  5  percent during  the 
same emergency.  Clearly ,  the more 
agreements public  safety  negotiates, the less 
commercial users will  be affected. Moreover, 
f r o m  a  g i v e n  c o m m e r c i a l c a r r i e r ’ s 
perspective, the impact of public  safety’s 
roaming depends more on  the number  of 
carriers with  which  public safety  forms 
roaming agreements than  on  how  much  of 
that  carrier’s spectrum  public safety  users can 
roam directly onto.
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Table 1.  Key Factors that may be used to differentiate resource requests on a wireless broadband 
network, the possible levels of granularity, and specific examples for each distinction
 
  Distinction Granularity Examples
Commercial
User Identity Type of Subscription
Business vs. Standard




time app Voice vs. Web browsing
Type of real-time 
application Voice vs. Video




Level of Government Local vs. State vs. Federal
Type of Agency Fire vs. Police vs. EMS
Rank of User Officer vs. Chief
Device Type
Mobility of device Portable vs. Car-mounted vs. Fixed 
User-issued device type Handheld vs. Laptop
Fixed device type Fixed sensor vs. Fixed Video Camera
Service Type
Real-time vs. Non-real-
time app Voice vs. Web browsing
Type of real-time 
application Voice vs. Video
Importance of application Emergency Voice vs. Routine Voice
Location
of Usage
Within a Jurisdiction Commercial Building vs. Residential  
Building vs. Highway
Within Jurisdiction vs. 
Outside Jurisdiction
Local Responder vs. Neighboring 
Jurisdiction Responder
Time of Usage Time of Day




Type of Event 4-Alarm Fire vs. Hurricane vs. 
Terrorist Attack
Network Used
Roaming on other Public 
Safety Network
Network for Region A vs. Network 
for Region B
Roaming on Commercial 
Networks Carrier A vs. Carrier B
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PRIORITIZATION DECISIONS IN A 
BROADBAND NETWORK 
This section  identifies some of the main 
factors involved in  differentiating resource 
requests in  a broadband priority  access 
system  that meets public safety  needs. Table 1 
l ists several l ikely  distinctions that 
commercial  and public safety  broadband 
network operators may  make to differentiate 
resource requests,  along with  some of the 
possible levels of granularity,  and specific 
examples for  each  distinction.  Some 
dist inctions are stat ic , and easy  to 
accommodate.  For example,  voice traffic may 
always be given  priority  over  web browsing, 
or  a dispatcher may  always be given  priority 
over  other  users. Other  distinctions are 
highly  dynamic. For  example, the same 
firefighter  running the same applications may 
be given higher  priority  when  responding  to 
an  emergency  than  when running  errands,  or 
higher  priority  when  100  feet  from  a  known 
fire than  when  50  miles from  the closest 
known fire. 
While Table 1  provides examples of 
possible factors used to distinguish  resource 
requests,  determining exactly  what traffic 
should be prioritized over  other  traffic will 
require extensive input from  public safety 
s t a k e h o l d e r s w o r k i n g  c l o s e l y  w i t h 
technologists.  The complexity  of these 
decisions is often  understated, and there is 
not yet one organization  or  group with  both 
the knowledge and authority to address them. 
A  similar process is needed to determine 
which  traffic  remains on the dedicated public 
safety  network,  and which  traffic should 
roam.  This decision  should take into account 
the fact  that  public  safety  and commercial 
networks typically  differ  in  the types of 
applications they  support, the outdoor signal 
reliability,  the level  of in-building  coverage, 
cell-edge data-rates,  and latency/call-setup 
times. 26 For  example,  given  the better  signal 
reliability  and indoor  coverage that  we expect 
for  public safety  networks, it  may  be better  to 
use these networks for  critical  voice 
communications,  whereas video may  be 
better  supported in commercial  networks due 
to their  high  data  rates at edge of cell.  (Or  if 
cells are not  co-located, unicast video streams 
might  be carried on  the system  with  the 
closest tower.)
LTE MECHANISMS USEFUL TO 
PUBLIC SAFETY
Some in  the public safety  community  have 
expressed concern about  whether  they  can 
count  on  priority  mechanisms.  This concern 
comes in  part  from  experience with  the 
Wireless Priority  Service (WPS),27  through 
which  public safety  users currently  get 
priority  access when making cellular 
telephone calls.  Relatively  speaking,  WPS is a 
blunt instrument.   As discussed in  greater 
detail in  Hallahan  and Peha, 28 there are six 
levels of priority  in  the WPS system: the 
lowest is that of the general public,  with five 
levels above that  reserved for  authorized 
emergency  personnel. Higher priority  calls 
are served first  when  calls are queued,29 but 
high-priority  users may  still  have to wait for 
lower-priority  calls to complete when  all 
voice channels are occupied (i.e.,  there’s no 
preemption).30  However, quality  of service 
(QoS)  is more complicated in  a packet-
switched network, and LTE provides a rich 
multifaceted set  of mechanisms that can be 
used in  a  variety  of ways to meet  public 
safety’s needs on a commercial  network.   This 
section  will briefly  introduce some of these 
mechanisms.   For  more details, see the 
appendix.
The coarsest form  of priority  in  LTE is 
Radio  Admission Control, which  utilizes a 
mechanism  called Access  Class  Barring to 
prevent entire classes of devices from 
connecting  to one or  more cells in the cellular 
network.31 This allows a  network  operator to 
decide whether  or  not  a given cell tower will 
connect to user  classes such as commercial 
customers, police and other  security  services, 
public  utilities,  and firefighters and 
emergency medical services.  
Once devices are allowed to connect,  the 
network uses a  variety  of methods to allocate 
resources where they  are most needed.  First, 
to give one set  of traffic better treatment than 
another,  it  must  be possible to tell them 
apart.  As the previous section  shows,  there 
are many  different  criteria  that could matter 
when  determining  which  traffic  should get 
preferential treatment.  LTE has mechanisms 
to support  this.  In  LTE,  it  is possible to 
differentiate one user’s traffic from  another 
(e.g.,  a  public safety  user  from  a  commercial 
user)  and one application’s traffic  from 
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another (e.g.,  a  video stream  from  a  web 
browsing session) based on  the bearer 
channel (as described in  the appendix).  A 
bearer  channel  is a  form  of virtual  channel 
between  endpoints. A  single device may  be 
exchanging  traffic  over  multiple bearers at 
any  given  time. A  Traffic  Flow  Template is 
used to sort  packets into the appropriate 
channels in  both  the upstream  and 
downstream  directions using  fields such  as 
source,  destination, and port  number  (which 
is usually  an  indicator  of application  type). 
Bearer  channels are therefore useful 
instruments to separate traffic  associated 
with  applications that have different  QoS 
requirements (e.g.,  real-time voice traffic  vs. 
email) and traffic to or  from  users for  which 
QoS during an  emergency  may  be more or 
less important. All packets in  the same bearer 
channel have similar  quality  of service 
objectives, and should receive similar 
treatment, while network  algorithms can  give 
packets from  one bearer preferential 
treatment over packets from another bearer.  
In LTE, preferential treatment  during 
periods of congestion  can  take many  forms. 
It is possible to block,  drop (i.e., preempt),  or 
reduce the QoS of the communications of one 
user or  application  that is considered less 
important. At the same time,  it is possible to 
ensure more important packet  streams are 
p r i o r i t i z e d o v e r  o t h e r s s u c h  t h a t 
predetermined QoS characteristics are met, 
that  established sessions are guaranteed a 
minimum  bit  rate, and that  individual users 
do not  use more than  a  preset amount of 
network resources.  
Allocation and Retention Priority (ARP) 
mechanisms work at  the granularity  of 
bearers, as opposed to individual packets. 
Three ARP parameters are associated with 
every  bearer: a  scalar  reflecting  the 
importance of the stream,  and two flags that 
indicate the preemption  capability  and 
vulnerability  of the bearer.  (See the 
appendix.) Through ARP, lower  priority 
requests for resources can  be blocked if 
enough  resources are being  used for higher 
priority  sessions, and lower  priority 
communication  sessions can even  be 
preempted by  higher priority  sessions. 
Session  dropping  and/or  blocking can  be 
used to give preference to one user  over 
another,  or  for  a  given  user, give preference 
to one application  over  another.  For  example, 
during  a  severe disaster,  bearers with  lower 
ARP priority  level values and preemption 
vulnerability  may  simply  be dropped to free 
up capacity  for  higher  priority  bearers. 
Alternatively,  an  operator  could map the 
voice component  and the video component  of 
the same video telephony  session  to separate 
bearers with  different ARP parameters.32 
During  times of congestion,  the video 
component could then  be dropped without 
affecting  the bearer  carrying  voice, allowing 
voice communications to continue during 
times of severe congestion.
Additional mechanisms operate on  a 
packet-by-packet  basis to protect  the QoS of 
those bearers that  are admitted/allowed to 
continue,  and these may  also provide 
preferential treatment  to some traffic.  For 
example,  there are two different  classes of 
bearer:  guaranteed bit rate  (GBR) and non-
guaranteed bit  rate (non-GBR). For  GBR 
bearers, the network  will ensure that 
sufficient resources are available to meet or 
exceed this rate, even if this means blocking 
new  bearers (of lower  ARP). Conversely,  the 
network may  impose a  maximum  data rate 
on  a  bearer,  or  collectively  on  all bearers from 
a  given device,  by  establishing a  maximum 
bit rate (MBR) for  GBR bearers or an 
aggregate  maximum bit rate (AMBR) for 
non-GBR bearers.  This prevents a  given user 
or  a  given  application from  generating too 
much  traffic,  thereby  endangering  the QoS of 
other data streams.
At even  finer  granularity, the QoS Class 
Identifier (QCI) mechanism  ensures that  the 
treatment a  packet  receives at  each  node in 
the network is tied to specific  QoS objectives 
(e.g.,  packet delay  budget and packet error 
loss rate) and is subject to varying  levels of 
prioritization  accordingly.  Using  QCI values, 
the desired QoS characteristics of each  bearer 
are understood by  the network without  the 
need to specify  individual QoS characteristics 
(e.g.,  a  packet delay  budget) for  each  bearer. 
For  example,  one QCI value indicates a  QoS 
that  would be well  suited for  interactive voice 
communications,  and another  QCI value 
would fit video streaming.
Finally,  in  LTE it is possible  to receive 
preferential treatment even  when  roaming 
onto a  new  network. However,  the question 
to be debated is whether the home network 
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or  the visited network should decide how 
traffic to and from  the roaming  device will  be 
handled.  As discussed further  in  the 
appendix,  LTE supports both  possibilities. 
For  example,  in  a  home-routed configuration, 
all  traffic from  the roaming  device is routed 
through  that  device’s home network, and it is 
the Policy and Charging Rules  Function 
(PCRF) module in  the home network (i.e.,  H-
PCRF) that makes the QoS policy  decisions. 
On the other  hand,  with  local breakout,  there 
is no requirement  to route traffic  through  the 
home network,  and it  is the visited network’s 
PCRF (i.e.,  V-PCRF) that makes the QoS 
policy decisions.
Thus, it is technically  possible under  the 
LTE standard to provide several priority-
related capabilities that are likely  to be 
important to public  safety  users.  These 
capabilities mean that  during  times of 
congestion, a  LTE-based priority  system 
could meet  the QoS requirements of the 
individual users or  applications that  public 
safety  deems most  important,  whether  or  not 
public  safety  is roaming on  commercial 
networks or  using their  own  dedicated 
systems. However, crafting the agreements 
and designing  the rules that  would govern 
such  a  system  raises a  number of challenges, 
as will be discussed in the next two sections.
TECHNICAL DESIGN DECISIONS: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR AGREEMENTS
Public  safety  use of commercial  networks will 
require entirely  new  forms of agreements 
between  public safety  agencies and 
commercial carriers.  Among other  things, 
these agreements must  reflect  technical 
design issues.
Some people in  policy  circles believe that 
simply  by  specifying a  standard,  which  in  this 
case would presumably  be LTE,  al l 
interoperability  and quality  of service issues 
associated with  priority  roaming  will be 
settled. This is not  the case.  It is all too 
common that  two systems that  both  comply 
with  a  given  standard do not  work  together, 
or  at  least  not  at  a  quality  of service that users 
expect or demand.  
In  the case of the LTE standard,  not all 
network elements are  required for  an LTE 
deployment,  and not all the features of LTE 
a r e s u p p o r t e d b y  e v e r y  n e t w o r k 
configuration. Agreements should be 
structured such  that  they  ensure public 
safety’s needs are met  even when  vendors 
and/or  operators may  make different 
decisions in their  implementations of an  LTE 
network, perhaps by  making  the agreements 
independent  of those vendor/operator 
specific  decisions (e.g., by  specifying 
performance requirements and letting 
vendors and operators decide how  to meet 
them)  or  by  including vendor-specific 
breakout pieces in agreement guidelines.   
As discussed in  the previous section,  two 
networks that  both comply  with  the LTE 
standard can have different  ways of handling 
roaming.  For  example,  if public  safety 
representatives conclude that  they  require 
direct control  over  the QoS that  their  users 
experience when  roaming  onto commercial 
networks,  then  the home network(s) operated 
by  public  safety  must  include a  PCRF and the 
commercial network must support ‘home-
routed’ traffic  for  roaming public  safety  users. 
Both  of these are optional implementations 
within  the LTE standard, 33  thus requiring 
coordination  and agreement between 
commercial  and public safety  network 
operators to ensure the desired functionality 
is properly supported.
The previous section  also shows the 
importance of the values assigned to QCI and 
ARP parameters. However,  there is no 
guarantee the defined values will match  the 
needs of all  important  public  safety 
applications. 34  Worse yet, there is no 
guarantee the QoS experienced on  one 
commercial network with  a  given set  of QCI 
and ARP values will be the same as the QoS 
on another  network.  For example,  one 
commercial carrier  may  give its best  business 
customers ARP values even  higher  than 
public safety’s,  while another  carrier  doesn’t, 
so public safety  blocking  probabilities in  the 
first  network  would be worse even with  the 
same ARP values. Alternatively,  two different 
carriers may  simply  adopt  a  different 
scheduling algorithm,  which  is the algorithm 
that  determines which queued packet  should 
be transmitted next. 35 LTE standardizes the 
QoS parameters that serve as inputs to a 
scheduling algorithm,  but the algorithms 
themselves are not  standardized, and 
different vendors could easily  take different 
approaches. 36  
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Some degree of commonality  across 
agreements based on  meaningful guidelines 
will likely  reduce the need for  thousands of 
different agreements to be negotiated 
separately,  while still  allowing  for  divergence 
between  agreements.  One challenge with 
creating  commonality  is that  there are many 
commercial carriers across the country  and 
even  more public  safety  agencies. (In the 
United States, there are more than  50,000 
local,  state,  and federal  agencies. 37) Thus, 
identifying  (or  creating) a  single entity  to be 
responsible for  soliciting  input  from  all 
interested agencies and establishing 
appropriate guidelines for  agreements will 
reduce the burden on  individual  agencies 
while ensuring  a  more consistent roaming 
experience for  first responders in  all 
localities. There is an  inevitable tradeoff in 
such  guidelines. The more specific  the 
agreement,  the  more likely  the agreement  can 
ensure the needs of public  safety  will be met. 
However,  overly  specific agreements can have 
a  stifling  effect  on  innovation over  time and 
diversity  of product  and service offerings 
across providers. Thus, the goal  is to identify 
the minimum  level  of specificity  that  can 
meet public  safety’s needs,  while enabling 
innovation and evolution to occur.
Finally,  note that  agreements must  be 
constructed based on  current  technologies 
and standards,  but  the needs of both 
commercial and public  safety  users are likely 
to change in  the years ahead.  For  example, 
the LTE standard currently  recognizes 15 
values of ARP priority  and 9  QCI values.38 It 
is possible that a  new  and important  public 
safety  application  will  emerge that  is not  well 
served by  the currently  defined values.  If 
public safety’s needs evolve in  the same way 
as commercial  needs, then standards bodies 
like 3GPP will  probably  meet  public safety 
needs without  any  prompting. However,  it  is 
also possible that public safety’s needs could 
diverge from  those of commercial  users.  This 
raises two important  issues for  policy  and 
governance.  First, some entity  with  the ability 
to solicit  input from  public safety  agencies 
and the authority  to speak for  those agencies 
should actively  participate in  the standards 
process.  Second, it  must be possible to update 
the guidelines on  agreements between  public 
safety  and commercial carriers to reflect 
changes in the standard (including changes 
that  may  be optional).  For  example, imagine 
that  after  years of effort,  3GPP defines a new 
QCI value that  perfectly  fits an  important 
public safety  application. Some commercial 
carriers may  have little incentive to upgrade 
their  networks to support  this new  QCI. 
When such  a  network  observes a  QCI value it 
doesn’t understand, it  may  simply  interpret 
this as a  QCI value that  it does understand,39 
potentially  giving  public safety  users an 
inconsistent QoS  experience as they  roam. 
(As discussed by  Hallahan  and Peha, 
recognizing  a  new  QCI may  require  nothing 
more than software updates of the affected 
infrastructure,  whereas other new  features 
could conceivably  require more disruptive or 
costly changes. 40)
OPERATIONAL DESIGN DECISION: 
ENABLING HUMAN INTERVENTION
Perhaps the most  important decision that 
must  be made about  the operation of a 
national  wireless broadband network for 
public safety  concerns the role of human 
operators to allocate resources and set 
priorities.  Whatever  the decision,  it will 
significantly  affect  network  technology, 
p r i o r i t y  r o a m i n g  a g r e e m e n t s ,  a n d 
governance.  Yet,  this issue has often been 
missing  from  the debate.  Some in  the policy 
realm  may  see it  as a  technical issue,  but on 
an  issue like this there is no way  to separate 
design  of technology  and design  of 
organizations and how  they  operate,  which 
demands a  sociotechnical perspective.41  As 
Bostrom  and Heinen said,  “a  work system  is 
made up of two jointly  independent but 
correlative interacting  systems – the social 
and the technical.”42  This section will discuss 
the pros and cons of a  fully  automated system 
versus a system  in  which  human  operators 
make real-time decisions about  priority  and 
resource allocation, and it  will show  the 
capabilities of LTE technology.
In an  automated priority  system, the 
priority  parameters (such  as the QCI and 
ARP values in  LTE)  are assigned according  to 
policies and decision rules that  are  based only 
on  factors that  the system  either (1) knows a 
priori or  (2) can  detect  without any  human 
intervention. These include static factors 
(e.g.,  user  identity,  as stored in  a  subscriber 
profile) and dynamic but  detectable factors 
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(e.g.,  device location as determined through 
GPS). These factors are then used in  a 
predefined decision  rule (e.g., if roaming, 
then ARP level = 1; else ARP level = 2). 
A  purely  automated priority  system  can 
prioritize  resource requests appropriately  in  a 
great many  circumstances,  but not all. 
Factors like the intention  of a  first  responder 
or  their  perceived level of danger  cannot  be 
detected by  a  network and therefore cannot 
be used for  resource allocation.  For example, 
an  automated system  could base priority 
decisions on  the fact that  a police officer  is 
making  a  voice call from  his patrol  vehicle on 
a  highway  outside of his normal jurisdiction; 
it  just cannot  tell  whether  he is pursuing  a 
known fugitive  or  driving back to the police 
s ta t ion .  To handle these cases , an 
intervention-enabled system  could be 
designed such  that  decisions depend, at least 
in part, on factors that require human 
intervention. In  the example above, the police 
officer  or  a  dispatcher  could explicitly 
indicate that this particular  session is of 
elevated importance.  
While  allowing  human intervention  may 
yield better  resource allocation in some 
situations,  human intervention also brings 
s o m e c o m p l i c a t i o n s f o r p o l i c y  a n d 
governance that  must  be addressed.  It 
requires that  humans be available with both 
the authority  and expertise to make decisions 
that  affect  the network, and do so within 
appropriate time constraints. Moreover, 
there can  be first  responders from  many 
different  public  agencies simultaneously 
responding to emergencies, each  with  its own 
incident  commander,  and its own  urgent 
needs. Even  without roaming, it must  be 
determined who is allowed to intervene in 
ways that affect resource allocation, and how.  
With  the addition  of priority  roaming, 
solutions must  be found that are effective for 
all  first responders that  are roaming onto 
commercial networks,  while also treating 
commercial traffic appropriately. Moreover, 
someone must  define procedures by  which 
those with  situational  knowledge (whether 
they  are incident  commanders, dispatchers, 
or  individual first  responders)  communicate 
that  knowledge in  real time back to the 
networks,  and ideally  those methods would 
be common  across the many  public  safety 
agencies and commercial networks.  It  is also 
possible that the additional  technical  and 
operational complexity will also affect cost.
To assess the trade-offs,  decision  makers 
should understand the needs of the public 
safety  community,  the functionality  provided 
by  automated priority  systems, and the 
additional  functionality  provided by 
intervention-enabled systems and then 
balance these against  the additional 
c o m p l e x i t y  a n d c h a l l e n g e s h u m a n 
intervention  presents before deciding  on 
which  method to employ. This section  will 
present a  few  potential  operational 
a r r a n g e m e n t s f o r  e n a b l i n g  h u m a n 
intervention  as well  as a  few  examples of 
possible technical implementations.
The good news for  policymakers is that 
LTE makes possible a  wide range of options 
for  enabling human  intervention  in  priority 
decisions,  so technology  need not be an 
impediment.  To demonstrate  this,  three 
possible options will  be presented as 
examples,  each of which  has its advantages 
and disadvantages. One option is to give a 
centralized public safety  entity  full control to 
make QoS decisions for public safety  users 
even  while those users are roaming  (which 
means these decisions would affect 
commercial users as well). Another option  is 
to allow  commercial operators to hold final 
control  over  the QoS decisions that affect 
their  network, while public  safety  only 
provides input to the commercial operator.  A 
third option  is to leave the decision  up to 
individual public safety  users,  and allow  them 
to affect  the QoS they  receive in  response to 
their  current  situation.  To demonstrate 
technical  feasibility,  the following  are some 
examples of how  to implement  these options; 
other approaches are also possible.   (See the 
appendix  for  more information  on  the 
technology.)  
CENTRALIZED CONTROL BY PUBLIC 
SAFETY
The first  option  could be supported by 
implementing  the (optional)  PCRF function 
in  the public safety  network and “home-
routing”  traffic back  through  that  network, 
even  when public  safety  users are roaming on 
commercial networks.  The QoS level these 
users receive would then  be controlled by  the 
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PCRF in  public safety’s home network  (H-
PCRF).  Therefore, if a  public  safety 
representative maintains control  over the H-
PCRF (or  multiple  H-PCRF’s if there are 
multiple regional public safety  networks), 
then  public  safety  could potentially  intervene 
and update the policies to reflect  current 
situations even  for  users who are roaming  on 
commercial  networks, with  no action 
required by  the commercial operator.   This 
level of control is most  like what public safety 
agencies with typical LMR systems are 
accustomed to.  It  has the advantage of giving 
a  public safety  representative maximal 
control  over  resources,  although it  is not clear 
who that  representative should be,  especially 
in  scenarios when  multiple public  safety 
agencies simultaneously  respond to serious 
emergencies.  However,  commercial networks 
may  be reluctant to allow  public safety  to 
make decisions that  affect the QoS observed 
by  commercial  subscribers. As shown 
previously, their  concerns should be lessened 
tremendously  if public safety  makes 
agreements with  multiple commercial 
providers in  every  region  and spreads the 
roaming load across multiple providers. This 
may or may not occur in practice.
COMMERCIAL OPERATOR CONTROL
Alternatively,  the commercial  operator  could 
maintain  control  over  QoS when  public safety 
users are  roaming  by  employing  ‘local 
breakout,’ and placing control for  QoS in  the 
PCRF of the visited network (V-PCRF). The 
operator  may  receive public  safety  input  in  a 
variety  of ways, but the operator  would have 
responsibility  for  the network  element that 
controls priority.  This arrangement is 
consistent  with how  commercial  operators 
tend to view  their  customers, none of whom 
would normally  be allowed to directly  control 
QoS. I t  better  protects commercia l 
customers, but  it  gives public  safety  less 
ability  to put  communications resources 
where they are most needed.
INDIVIDUAL CONTROL
Finally,  LTE also supports the use of 
terminal-initiated QoS control. As discussed 
further  in  the appendix,  with  this approach,  a 
terminal  can signal  the network  and request 
that  a  dedicated bearer  with  the desired level 
of QoS be established. 43 For  example, a  first 
responder  might  press an  emergency  button 
on  the handset,  which  would cause the 
handset  to request  a  different level  of QoS as 
reflected in  ARP and QCI parameters.  Thus, 
control  is passed on  to the first responders in 
the field,  who can  make decisions based on 
their  instantaneous situational needs.  These 
first  responders are best able to assess their 
own  needs,  but  increasing their  own  priority 
has the effect of reducing the resources 
available to others, and they  cannot easily 
assess the needs of others in their cell.
CONCLUSIONS
In  many  ways,  firefighters,  police,  and 
paramedics are at the front line of homeland 
security  emergencies, and they  have long 
b e e n  f o r c e d t o m a k e d u e w i t h 
c o m m u n i c a t i o n s s y s t e m s t h a t  a r e 
unnecessarily  prone to failure, limited in 
functionality,  and overpriced. Wireless 
broadband functionality  could revolutionize 
t h e w a y  p u b l i c s a f e t y  r e s p o n d s t o 
emergencies by  bringing capabilities to first 
responders they  have never had before. Also 
providing users of these new  public  safety 
systems with roaming  access to commercial 
networks,  on  a  priority  basis, can  provide far 
greater  aggregate capacity,  geographic 
coverage,  and service reliability  than  would 
be available from  dedicated public safety 
networks alone. Policies and arrangements 
should be adopted that take advantage of 
these benefits.
In  the United States, which is in  the 
process of creating  the first nationwide public 
safety  network under  the auspices of 
FirstNet, priority  roaming should be one of 
the core elements of an  initial  roll-out 
strategy.  FirstNet  must  show  results 
nationwide very  quickly  and on  a  limited 
budget,  and they  can begin  offering  services 
over  commercial networks right away  even  in 
areas where they  have will  ultimately  offer 
services over their own infrastructure. 44
While  some may  be looking for  a  single 
roaming partner  per region, the more 
agreements public safety  negotiates with 
commercial carriers,  the more capacity  they 
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will have available during  emergencies and 
the less commercial users will be affected by 
public safety’s traffic.  If public safety  is able 
to roam  onto just  10  MHz of commercial 
spectrum,  they  would have enough  roaming 
capacity  (even  without the capacity  provided 
by  the dedicated public safety  infrastructure) 
to support a  hypothetical emergency 
response to a  major  chemical and biological 
terrorist  attack on  Washington  D.C.   If public 
safety  is able  to roam  onto all  of the 700MHz 
band classes (i.e., LTE bands 13,  14, 17),  they 
would have over  60 Mbps of roaming 
capacity  per  cell sector  (45+ Mbps downlink; 
15+ Mbps uplink): enough  to support an 
emergency  ten  times greater  than  the DC-
based scenario studied. Moreover,  concerns 
about  the impact on  consumers are vastly 
overstated. If public  safety  only  has a 
roaming  agreement  with  one t ier-1 
commercial carrier,  only  about 10  percent of 
that  carrier’s capacity  will  be utilized by 
public safety  users during  the disaster 
scenario studied,  which is unlikely  to cause 
significant  congestion  for  commercial 
subscribers. Clearly, more agreements with 
commercial carriers would mean  even  less 
impact  on average for  each  of the commercial 
subscribers affected.  
To make this kind of priority  access 
possible, LTE provides a wide range of 
priority-related capabilities that are likely  to 
be important  to public  safety.  Thus,  even 
during  periods of congestion, an  LTE-based 
system  with  well-crafted rules could meet  the 
QoS requirements that public  safety  deems 
most important, both for  users on  dedicated 
public safety  networks and those that  are 
roaming on commercial networks. However, 
challenging issues must be addressed when 
crafting  service level agreements for  roaming 
between  public  safety  and commercial 
carriers. These include determining which 
optional elements of the LTE standard should 
be adopted and how, and defining  a  common 
understanding  of the quality  of service that 
public safety  can  expect  despite what  could 
be significant  divergence in  important 
technical  design decisions that  are outside 
the scope of the standard.  
To meet  these challenges, there should be 
a  single entity  responsible for  understanding 
the needs of the many  public  safety  agencies, 
and creating a  consistent  set  of guidelines for 
how  agreements can be constructed, thereby 
providing increased commonality  while still 
meeting  regional needs by  allowing  some 
degree of divergence. In  the United States, 
this might  be the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology  (NIST), which  was 
given  funding  and responsibility  to “conduct 
research  and assist with  the development  of 
standards, technologies and applications to 
a d v a n c e w i r e l e s s p u b l i c s a f e t y 
communications”  in  the Middle Class Tax 
Relief and Job Creation Act  of 2012,45  but 
other agencies could also try  to play  this role. 
The goal  should be to identify  the minimum 
level of specificity  that  can  meet  public  safety 
needs,  while  enabling innovation  and 
evolution.  Moreover, to accommodate the 
inevitable changes in  technology, and 
changes in  public safety  needs, this same 
entity  should play  an  active role in  relevant 
standards bodies such  as 3GPP to represent 
the needs of public safety. This entity  should 
have expertise  in  the technical issues, an 
understanding  of public safety  needs,  the 
responsibility  to continually  solicit feedback 
from  the public safety  community,  and the 
authority  to act on  their  behalf. In  the United 
States, there are a number  of candidates to 
perform  this function,  including  NIST, 
FirstNet, and the Department  of Homeland 
Security; one should be chosen.
Another  important issue is the extent to 
which  priorities and resource allocation 
should be controlled through  human 
intervention. In  addition to changing  the 
shape o f roaming agreements wi th 
commercial carriers,  this will significantly 
affect  the technology,  policy, and governance 
structures that public  safety  needs.  We have 
shown that LTE supports a  wide range of 
arrangements,  including placing  high  levels 
of control on resource allocation  in  the hands 
of a  central  public safety  authority,  each 
commercial operator,  individual emergency 
responders, or  some combination  thereof. 
There are complex  non-technical factors to 
consider.  
There is clearly  more work to do.  While 
this article has shown  that much  of what 
public safety  needs is present  in the standard, 
this only  helps if devices are produced using 
these capabilities.  For  public safety  to use 
priority  roaming,  they  need mobile devices 
that  operate in  both  the public  safety 
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spectrum  band and (at  least  one of) the 
spectrum  bands licensed to commercial 
carriers. In  addition, any  of the possible 
features of LTE described in this article that 
are found to be essential to public  safety  must 
actually  be implemented in  the devices in 
question. Further  technical analysis may  be 
needed to determine precisely  how  to do 
design  devices of this kind at minimum  cost. 
Moreover, either  public  policies or  business 
agreements will  be needed that make sure the 
devices are produced, and at  sufficient scale 
to drive down  costs.  There is not  yet 
agreement on how best to achieve this.
The most  important  issues – beyond the 
scope of this article  – may  be more 
organizational  than  technical.  In  a  large-scale 
emergency, it  is not  unusual  for  first 
responders from  many  public  safety  agencies 
to respond,  and with  priority  roaming 
multiple commercial carriers may  also be 
involved. Nevertheless, there will be times 
when  limited resources must  be allocated to 
the most  important  needs.  The existence of 
technology  that allows for  intelligent 
prioritization  only  increases the need for 
governance structures that  allow  for  effective 
and rapid decision-making  even  when  it  is 
not obvious which  person  or  organization is 
in charge.
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APPENDIX:  Overview of LTE Concepts AND Mechanisms
This section  serves as an  introduction  to the relevant  LTE concepts and mechanisms that  are 
discussed in  the main  body  of this paper.   This section  will first  present an  overview  of the LTE 
standard in  section,  then  discuss the fundamental  QoS concepts in  section,  and finally  discuss 
the available QoS policy control mechanisms in section.
OVERVIEW OF LTE
LTE,  or Long  Term  Evolution, refers to the Release 8 iteration  of the 3rd Generation 
Partnership Project’s (3GPP) mobile  network  technology. 46 There are two main components of a 
LTE network: the radio access network (E-UTRAN) and the packet core network (EPC). Both  of 
these components were designed to ensure that  LTE is a  packet-switched,  all-IP standard in 
contrast  to previous voice-centric,  circuit-switched architectures. 47 The E-UTRAN has two main 
elements: the User  Equipment  (UE) and the E-UTRAN base station  (eNodeB or  eNB).  The UE is 
a  generic term  for  the handsets and other  devices that  subscribers use to communicate with  the 
eNodeB’s over  the network’s allocated spectrum.  The eNodeB handles all  radio access related 
functions and each  eNodeB communicates with  the packet  core. Service providers can  have their 
own  separate core networks,  but  share eNodeB’s, since each  eNodeB can  be connected to 
multiple cores. Each  packet  core or  EPC will typically  include the following network elements: a 
Serving  Gateway  (S-GW), a  PDN Gateway  (PDN-GW), a  Policy  and Charging  Rules Function 
(PCRF), and a  Mobile Management Entity  (MME), each  of which  is discussed in  greater  detail in 
(Johnson 2010).48 Figure 4  is a  generic  representation of an  LTE network  architecture, which 
shows the general relationship between  the main  elements of an  LTE network,  based on 
diagrams in. 49
Figure 1.  The main elements of an LTE network and their general relationship to each other
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FUNDAMENTAL QOS CONCEPTS IN LTE
The LTE standard provides a  robust  set  of technical  mechanisms that enable different users and 
services to receive preferential treatment (both  in  terms of priority  access and preemption 
capability) across the E-UTRAN and EPC. The fundamental  concepts that are central to priority 
access are discussed in  this section.  The EPS bearer  is a  logical channel for  data  flows that 
require the same QoS treatment  and is discussed in  the Overview  section; the parameters that 
differentiate bearers based on their QoS requirements are discussed in the subsequent section.
OVERVIEW OF EPS BEARERS: DEFAULT VS. DEDICATED & GBR VS. NON-GBR
At a high  level,  a  bearer  is the term  used to describe a  ‘virtual’ channel established between  the 
endpoints of the network (i.e., from  the UE to the PDN-GW). A  bearer  is ‘virtual’ in  the sense 
that  all  traffic from  the user  device is carried across the  same physical channel (the radio 
channel) back  to the network,  but  many  virtual channels can  be created to distinguish  between 
how  different  traffic should be treated over the same physical channel. There are two types of 
EPS bearer  in  LTE: default  and dedicated.  Every  UE has at  least one default  bearer  that is 
established when  the UE first  attaches to the network and remains available for  the duration  of 
the connection.  A  UE can  have anywhere from  zero to several dedicated bearers established at 
any given time and each is set up and taken down on an as-needed basis.
Dedicated bearers are used when the QoS requirements for  some traffic  is different than the 
QoS provisions provided by  the default bearer.  Furthermore,  all traffic  requiring  the same QoS-
level treatment  will be carried on  the same bearer  (e.g.,  if a  device  is making  a  voice call and 
streaming video at the same time, and both  applications require the same level of QoS,  the 
traffic from  both  will be mapped to the same bearer). In  LTE, packets are filtered into the 
appropriate bearer  using  a  Traffic  Flow  Template (TFT).  At a  high level, the TFT  is just a  list of 
source/destination IP addresses and TCP/UDP port  combinations that identify  which  IP packets 
(based on their header information) should be assigned to which bearer.50
Thus, the bearer  forms the fundamental unit  for  discussing the QoS mechanisms available  in 
an  LTE network.   Furthermore, there are two possible types of dedicated bearer: guaranteed bit 
rate (GBR) bearers and non-guaranteed bit  rate (non-GBR) bearers.  For a  GBR bearer,  the 
system  guarantees a  minimum  bit rate will  be provided to that bearer  once it  is established. This 
means that GBR bearers sending  at a  bit  rate less than or equal to their  GBR can  assume that 
packet  drops as a  result of congestion  will not occur.  For  a  GBR bearer,  a  maximum  bit  rate 
(MBR) may also be specified which caps the maximum bit rate that bearer will receive.51
The network guarantees no minimum  bit  rate for  non-GBR bearers.Thus, there are no 
guarantees as to the amount of traffic a  non-GBR bearer  can  support  at  any  given  time, which 
could potentially  result  in  packet  loss during times of congestion. In addition,  non-GBR bearers 
for  the same device may  be capped in  the aggregate bandwidth they  receive by  using the 
aggregate  maximum  bit  rate  (AMBR) parameter.  The AMBR can  be specified at  either  the APN 
level (APN-AMBR) or  the UE level (UE-AMBR).52  For  example,  the UE-AMBR can be used to 
cap the aggregate bit rate that is allocated to all non-GBR bearers used by a given UE.  
The decision  of which  type of bearer  should be used (GBR vs. non-GBR) depends upon  the 
service that  is carried by  that  bearer.  As discussed by  Olsson et al.,53 GBR bearers are typically 
used for  services where it  is better  to block  them  initially  rather than  degrade the service after it 
has already  started. For  example,  it  may  be desirable to block  a  real-time voice call before it 
begins during  times of congestion,  rather  than  admit the service and then  have the voice be 
unintelligible since the guaranteed bit  rate cannot be maintained. (Note that many  real-time 
services can  actually  adapt  to the available bit  rate to some degree, but  there is still  a  minimum 
bit rate below  which  they  cannot  operate properly.) On the other  hand, non-GBR bearers are 
typically  used for  applications such  as web browsing  and email, as these applications do not 
require a  guaranteed bit  rate. However,  simply  because an  application  does not  require a  GBR 
does not  make it  less important  than applications that  require a  GBR; the relative importance of 
applications can depend on  a  number  of additional factors.  As discussed by  Olsson  et al.,54 the 
HALLAHAN & PEHA, PRIORITY ROAMING  18
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME 9, ARTICLE 13 (AUGUST 2013) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
choice of which  bearer  to use for  each  service is up to the operator  and their  configuration. 
Table 2  summarizes the types of bearers available and the bit rate and QoS treatment 
parameters (discussed in the next section) available to each.55
Table 1.  The bit rate and QoS treatment parameters available to each of type bearer
 Bit Rate Parameter
Type of Bearer
GBR Non-GBR
GBR: Guaranteed Bit Rate X
MBR: Maximum Bit Rate X
APN-AMBR: APN Aggregate Maximum Bit Rate X
UE-AMBR: UE Aggregate Maximum Bit Rate X
QoS Parameter
QCI: Quality Class Identifier X X
ARP: Allocation and Retention Priority X X
OVERVIEW OF BEARER-LEVEL QOS PARAMETERS
To support QoS requirements, the EPS bearer  includes several parameters that  dictate the 
preferential treatment  a bearer  may  receive.  Each  bearer, including  both  GBR and non-GBR 
bearers, is associated with  the following  bearer  level QoS parameters: the QoS Class Identifier 
(QCI)  and the Allocation and Retention Priority  (ARP).  The QCI parameter  dictates the packet-
level preferential treatment a  bearer receives,  while the ARP parameter  dictates the preferential 
treatment individual bearer  receives when  they  are being established.  These parameters may  be 
specified independently  of the other, allowing for  many  different QCI+ARP combinations for 
each bearer.
When bearers are being  established (or  modified) on  the network and resources are limited, 
the network  may  need to make decisions regarding which  bearer  requests should be accepted 
and which  should be rejected (this usually  occurs when available radio capacity  is limited and 
typically  involves GBR bearers).  The primary  role of the ARP parameter  is to facilitate  this 
decision  making  process.56  To do so, the ARP parameter  contains three components: a  single 
scalar  value and two separate flag values.  The scalar  value contains information  about the 
priority  level of a  bearer,  while the two flags refer  to the preemption  capability  and preemption 
vulnerability of the bearer. 
The ARP priority  level is used to ensure that  the request of the bearer with  the higher priority 
level is given preference over  lower  priority  bearers.  During  periods where resources are limited, 
the network may  choose to drop bearers of low  priority  to free up required resources. The pre-
emption capability  flag  defines whether  or  not  a  given  bearer  is allowed to preempt  (i.e.,  force 
the system  to drop) other  bearers of lower priority  level.  On the other hand, the preemption 
vulnerability  flag defines whether  or  not  a  given  bearer is susceptible to preemption (i.e.,  being 
dropped) even by bearers with a higher ARP priority level. 
Once bearers are  established using  the access control mechanisms provided by  the ARP 
parameter,  the nodes in  the network still need to know  how  to treat the packets for  each  bearer. 
During  times of congestion, bearers (who have been established) will  compete for  limited 
resources. This means that at  individual nodes (e.g., eNodeB), the limited resources need to be 
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allocated to individual packets from  many  different  bearers.  The QCI parameter  tells the  nodes 
how to prioritize those resources among the packets (the ARP value has no effect on this).
The QCI parameter  is specified by  a  simple scalar  value. There is one-to-one mapping  of 
standardized QCI values to standardized QoS characteristics.  Table 3  summarizes the QCI that 
have already  been  standardized including: their  priority  level,  packet  delay  budget, packet error 
loss rate,  and examples of services that  will typically  be mapped to each  QCI. 57 Thus, the QCI 
parameter  is used by  the eNodeB to determine the packet  forwarding  treatment  of each  bearer 
(e.g.,  scheduling  weights and queue management  thresholds).  This treatment is pre-configured 
by  the operator  owning  the access node (e.g.,  eNodeB),  such  that the QoS requirements 
associated with a given QCI are met.58







Loss Rate Example Services
GBR
1 2 100 ms 10^-2 Conversational Voice
2 4 150 ms 10^-3 Conversational Video (Live Streaming)
3 3 50 ms 10^-3 Real Time Gaming
4 5 300 ms 10^-6 N o n - C o n v e r s a t i o n a l  V i d e o (Buffered Streaming)
Non-GBR
5 1 100 ms 10^-6 IMS Signalling
6 6 300 ms 10^-6
Video (Buffered Streaming)
TCP-based (e.g., www, e-mail, 
chat, ftp, p2p file sharing, etc.)
7 7 100 ms 10^-3 Voice, Video (Live Streaming), Interactive Gaming
8 8 300 ms 10^-6
Video (Buffered Streaming)
TCP-based (e.g., www, e-mail, 
chat, ftp, p2p file sharing, etc.)
9 9 300 ms 10^-6 QCI typically  used for  the default bearer of a UE/PDN
OVERVIEW OF POLICY CONTROL AND ROAMING
The LTE standard also provides several features for  controlling and initiating the QoS 
mechanisms discussed previously. This section  first  discusses the policy  and charging control 
framework in  LTE and the network elements required to support  this framework, then 
compares network-initiated QoS control  to terminal-initiated QoS control, and finally,  discusses 
how QoS policies can be controlled when users roam on to other networks.  
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OVERVIEW OF POLICIES AND CHARGING CONTROL (PCC)
Policy  and Charging  Control  (PCC) is the concept in LTE that  enables flow-based policy  control 
(e.g.,  QoS management) and charging control.59  The main  component of this concept is the 
Policy  and Charging  Rules Function  (PCRF),  which  is an  optional element in the LTE 
architecture that is responsible for  providing policy  control decision  and charging  control 
functionalities that  are  enforced by  the Policy  and Charging Enforcement Function  (PCEF). 
(Where a  policy  is just  a  set  of rules that determines how  a  specific  IP flow  is treated and the 
QoS it  receives.)  The Application Function  (AF) interacts with application  level signaling  and 
extracts session information  that  it  provides to the PCRF,  while the Subscription  Profile 
Repository  (SPR) contains subscription and policy  information for  individual  users.  Figure 5, 
based on  diagrams in  Olsson,  et  al.,60  illustrates the relationship between  these network 
elements. 
Figure 1.   The main elements of the LTE PCC framework and their general relationship to each other
QOS CONTROL – NETWORK-INITIATED VS. TERMINAL-INITIATED
As discussed in  greater  detail by  Olsson  et  al.,61 there are two different methods available to 
establish  a  dedicated bearer  for  a  given  level of QoS in  a LTE network: network-initiated QoS 
control  and terminal-initiated QoS control. In  network-initiated QoS control, the network 
signals the UE to establish  a  dedicated bearer  with  a  given level of QoS.  Ultimately,  it  is the 
PCRF that makes this decision,  although  it  may  consult  the AF and/or  SPR in  the process. The 
exact details of this process depend on  a  number  of factors and are not central  to this article. 
The key  is that  with  network-initiated QoS control,  it is the responsibility  of the network  to 
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detect  and infer  what  QoS resources are needed by  the user  or  application, without  explicitly 
being told.
In  terminal-initiated QoS control,  it  is the terminal that signals the network  and requests that 
a  dedicated bearer  with  the desired level of QoS be established.62 This means that the terminal 
must  be aware of the  specifics of how  QoS is handled in  the access network, which  is not  the case 
with  network-initiated QoS control (where terminals can  be access QoS-agnostic).  Additionally, 
in  a  terminal-initiated QoS scheme, the terminal must  be able to interface with  the network  to 
convey  the QoS request (e.g.,  using  an  Application  Programming Interface [API]).63  However, 
terminal-initiated QoS control  means that a  PCRF is not needed to send QoS information  to the 
network (although  a  PCRF can  still  be used,  if desired, to authorize QoS requests made by 
terminals). 64
ROAMING: HOME-ROUTED VS. LOCAL-BREAKOUT
There are two main  roaming  scenarios that  are supported by  the PCC framework in  LTE: “home-
routed”  and “local-breakout.”  In  home-routed roaming,  the user  in  the visited network  (i.e., the 
user who is roaming) is connected to the PDN through  a  PDN-GW that  resides in  the home 
network. Thus, all traffic for  that user is routed from  the visited network  (where the roaming 
user is connected to the visited E-UTRAN) back through  the home network before it exits to 
external  packet networks (e.g., the internet).  In  local-breakout  roaming, the user  in  the visited 
network is connected to the PDN through  a PDN-GW in the visited network.  Thus,  all  traffic for 
that user is routed through the visited network only and never enters the home network. 
The PCC architecture was designed to enable  the PCRF in  the home network (H-PCRF) to 
communicate with  the  PCRF in  the visited network (V-PCRF) and, when allowed by  the visited 
network, control and authorize all  resources for  roaming  users in the visited network.65  The 
exact QoS  control  the H-PCRF has over  its roaming  users depends upon  which  PCC network 
elements are connected and how  they  are configured on  both  networks. In  some cases, the V-
PCRF may  be allowed to either accept  or  reject  (but not change) policy  decisions made by  the H-
PCRF thereby  allowing the visited operator  some degree of control over  the resource usage in  its 
radio access network (i.e., E-UTRAN).66    
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Supply Chain Resilience: 
Diversity + Self-organization = Adaptation
Philip J. Palin
ABSTRACT
In the  last three decades a collection of linear 
supply chains has become a complex adaptive 
network of demand creating supply. The 
benefits  are  obvious. The risks tend to be 
insidious. With the 2012 National Strategy for 
Global Supply Chain Security and the  2013 
Implementation Update  on the  strategy, a 
public-private  process has been engaged for 
considering risks  and cultivating resilience. 
Complex adaptive systems are not well suited 
to traditional security mindsets. In the  natural 
environment resi l ience emerges from 
d i v e r s i t y , s e l f - o r g a n i z a t i o n , a n d 
innovation. Are these characterist ics 
appropriate  to the  supply chain? Can these 
characteristics be systematically cultivated by 
private  and public decision-makers who 
influence  the supply chain?  This essay points 
to prior examples of dealing with complex 
adaptive  systems to suggest an affirmative 
conclusion.
S u p p l y  h a s b e e n u n c h a i n e d . 
Improvements in  transportation – 
highways, fast high capacity  planes, 
intermodal trains, trucks,  and ships – 
combined with  a  revolution in  computing 
and communications have transformed a 
dense lattice of overlapping  chains of 
supply  into a  shared network  for  delivery-
on-demand.
Only  thirty  years ago a  major  retailer 
often  owned most  of the links in  a chain 
that  connected producer  to consumer.  No 
more. Almost  everyone specializes in  a 
horizontal  or  oblique or  nodal niche.  Each 
niche forms around functional expertise 
and comparative advantage. This global 
commons makes possible more goods at 
lower  cost  and with  better assurance of 
quality  than  ever  before. In  the last 
generation  we have experienced a  rate of 
change and improvement in  moving  goods 
n o t e q u a l e d s i n c e s t e a m - p o w e r 
transformed maritime shipping and made 
possible railroads. 
On June 26,  1974, at  a Marsh 
supermarket in  Ohio, a  pack of Wrigley’s 
Juicy  Fruit  chewing  gum  became the first 
retail product sold using a scanner  and 
Universal  Product  Code.  The use of the 
UPC and other “bar  codes” allows the 
supply  chain  to be digitally  monitored, 
mapped, and managed as never  before. 
Logistics has become one aspect of a 
constantly  shifting  supply  and demand 
stream.
 Increasingly  these processes – and the 
rich  information  and management 
resources they  make possible – ensure 
effective, timely,  and comparatively 
fr ict ion-free transact ions between 
companies and nations.  The ability  to 
share digital information in very close to 
real-time has transformed the  modern 
supply chain from  supply-push to 
demand-pull.
Farmers,  miners,  and fishermen  still 
matter.  Processors,  truckers,  wholesalers, 
and retailers still  play  crucial parts.  Ports, 
railways, and highways are still  required. 
Physical stuff of all sorts still has to move 
from  point  A  to B (and usually  on  to points 
C, D,  and Z). But at  least in  the United 
States, Europe, and Pacific  Rim,  the digital 
signals that  are sent  along  largely 
determine when  and where product 
arrives.
When  the strategic  capacity  for 
generating  demand-pull information 
persists, the supply  chain  is very  resilient. 
But disruption or corruption of this 
information stream also presents 
unprecedented challenges to  supply, 
especially in crisis situations.  In  the 
a f t e r m a t h  o f t h e M a r c h  1 1 , 2 0 1 1 
earthquake-and-tsunami in  Japan  demand 
signals went dark  across the hardest hit 
areas of Northeast Japan.  At  the same 
time, demand spiked in  Tokyo and other 
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areas far  from  the impact  zone. The supply 
chain responded adroitly  to hoarding 
behavior  by  those whose demand could be 
communicated with  a  quick electronic 
scan.  But this same behavior  reduced the 
capability  of Japanese producers and 
distributors to respond to the critical needs 
of those who had been rendered digitally 
mute.1   
 Resulting in considerable United States comparative advantage
Source: Council of Supply Chain Management Professionals (2011)
Figure 1.  Logistics as a Competitive Advantage
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As late as 1980  the cost  of logistics as a 
proportion of GDP was more than double 
what  it is today.2  Over  the last  three 
decades logistics  has  become something 
very different than ever before.
For  most of human  history  anticipating 
demand has been  a  guess. In  a  few  cases, 
historical data  might be used to project 
demand and some using  it  were better  – or 
luckier  – guessers than others.   But  mostly 
demand was met  (or  not) by  producing  and 
distributing  what could be supplied at a 
price the producer  hoped the market  would 
pay.  A  nineteenth  century  economic 
doctrine,  as stated by  John  Maynard 
Keynes, was “Supply  creates its own 
demand.” 3  Certainly  true until  the 1980s 
was supply  creates its own  distribution  – in 
search of demand.
For  most  of human history  inventory 
has equaled wealth.  In the 1950s the 
president of Toyota declared that inventory 
is waste. Taiichi Ohno said, “The more 
inventory  a  company  has, the less likely 
they  will have what they  need.” 4 Toyota  was 
a  pioneer  in  what  came to be called Just-
In-Time manufacturing. To be effective, 
Just-In-Time (JIT)  depends on a  deep 
understanding  of demand.  Making and 
delivering  where and when  demand is 
expressed eliminates “waste”  and increases 
profits.  By  focusing on  customer needs and 
wants business can  transition  from  “selling 
supply” to “serving demand.”  
The competitive success of Toyota and 
other Japanese firms in  the 1970s and ‘80s 
c o n v e r t e d m a n y  U S a n d o t h e r 
manufacturers to similar  philosophies and 
practices. In  1983,  Zero Inventories  by 
Robert  Hall  articulated the ultimate goal 
and a workable process for  achieving the 
goal. It  was a  process aided and abetted by 
the increasing ability  of computer 
databases to store and analyze customer 
data.
In  1972  Walmart  had fifty-one stores.  By 
1980  it  had grown  to 276  stores.  In  1983 
Walmart replaced all of its cash  registers 
with  computerized point-of-sale systems. 
In 1987  Walmart  installed the largest 
privately  owned satellite system  in  the 
United States to facilitate the increasing 
amount  of demand and sales data being 
generated. In  1990  Walmart overtook  Sears 
to become the nation’s largest retailer. In 
1993, with  nearly  2,000 stores,  Walmart 
achieved its first billion  dollar  sales week. 
Today  Walmart  has nearly  10,000 stores 
and generates annual  sales of over  $422 
billion. In  terms of operating  revenue it  is 
the world’s largest private enterprise.
There are many  explanations for 
Walmart’s phenomenal success, but 
according  to a  study  by  the University  of 
San  Francisco “Walmart  owes its transition 
from  regional retailer  to global  powerhouse 
largely  to changes in  and effective 
management  of its supply  chain.”  The same 
study reports:
Technology plays a  key  role in Walmart’s 
supply chain, serving as the foundation 
of their supply  chain. Walmart has the 
l a r g e s t i n f o r m a t i o n  t e c h n o l o g y 
infrastructure of any  private company  in 
the world. Its state-of-the-art technology 
and network design  allow Walmart to 
accurately forecast demand, track and 
predict inventory  levels, create highly 
efficient transportation  routes, and 
manage customer relationships and 
service response logistics.5
According  to JIT guru  Richard 
Schonberger, this technological capability 
is a  very  tangible expression  of an  even 
more important  comparative advantage. 
Schonberger  writes,  “Wal-Mart  is the 
world’s grand champion  of lean supply 
chains. While advanced IT gets most of the 
credit,  collaboration  is the foundation. 
Wal-Mart’s 2,000-odd suppliers near  the 
retailer’s Bentonville,  Ark.,  headquarters 
maintain  multifunctional teams on  site.” 6 
Streamlining  and upgrading sources of 
supply  has been  fundamental to driving 
down costs across a  wide array  of supply 
c h a i n s .  T h i s w a s a t  t h e c o r e o f 
restructuring  the American  supply  chain  in 
the last  two decades of the twentieth 
century. An example from the early 1980s:
Unisys, of New Jersey, cut its supplier 
base from 750 to 106 and reduced the 
number of  trucking companies from  120 
to 8. As a result, purchase costs have 
dropped by 40 percent, freight costs have 
been reduced from $.32 per pound to 
$.09 per pound, and transit times from 
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the Far East have been cut by two-
thirds.7
Success stories like this,  and increased 
competition  by  early-moving  innovators, 
transformed many  product  categories from 
supply-push  to demand-pull.  In  2000, the 
Department of Defense opened the Global 
Positioning  System  (GPS)  to public  use. 
This transformed the potential  of trucks,  in 
particular,  to respond to irregular  demand 
as effectively  as was once only  possible  for 
most favored customers .  Demand 
increasingly  determined supply. In a 
p e r i o d o f b a r e l y t h r e e d e c a d e s , 
technological innovations  have radically 
transformed 5000 years of transportation 
history. 
The resul ts have a lso inc luded 
i n c r e a s i n g  c o n c e n t r a t i o n ,  g r e a t e r 
interdependence,  and lower  profit margins 
(even  as gross profits have increased due to 
much  higher  volume).  The supply  chain  at 
large – and individual  supply  chains – 
increasingly  involves a complex  set  of 
inputs,  outputs,  and multi-layered 
relationships. And as with  other  complex 
entities,  the supply  chain  can  sometimes 
seem, (perhaps more than seem) to take on 
a life of its own. 
In  his examination of strategies for  a 
catastrophic world Ted G. Lewis explains:
Complex systems evolve discontinuously 
through  space and time… Such  systems 
appear to have no memory; that is  the 
past is  not  a prelude to the future. 
Instead the future of a complex system  is 
highly  irregular and unpredictable… 
Systems become more complex  as they 
are improved; as they  are made more 
efficient, less  expensive, and more 
capable.  They also become more self-
organized.  Therefore the more we 
improve these systems, the more likely 
they are to collapse unexpectedly.8
This is our  reality. A  pioneering 
generation  of supply  chain innovators has 
succeeded in  a  historic transition  of their 
field.  A  rising  generation takes the 
revolution  for  granted and can  barely 
imagine the pre-revolutionary  reality. The 
successors are naturally  inclined to 
perceive the progress of the last  thirty  years 
as predicting  the next  thirty  years.  This is 
not guaranteed.  Given persistent patterns 
of self-organized criticality  found in other 
complex systems,  supply chain problems  – 
even potentially catastrophic problems  – 
are very likely to emerge.
RESILIENCE: READY FOR THE 
WORST
Before the technological  revolution of the 
last thirty  years the supply  chain  featured 
much  more redundancy,  safety  inventory, 
and many  more independent  players than 
today. It was less complex, more resilient, 
more costly, and much less efficient. 
Resilience is  an innate tendency, 
usually consisting of several inter-related 
parts, that allows a system to flex under 
stress  and bounce-back to  something 
similar to its preexisting condition once 
the stress is lessened or removed.
Complex systems are not  inherently  less 
resilient  than non-complex  systems.  But 
the resilient  characteristics of complex 
systems usually  emerge from  recurring 
experience with cascading  – occasionally 
catastrophic  – failures. Failure re-opens a 
complex system  to innovation, adaptation, 
and further  optimization.  Can we cultivate 
a resilient supply chain that avoids  – or at 
least mitigates – catastrophic failure?
The contemporary  supply  chain 
continues to self-organize and optimize so 
rapidly  that it  is difficult to make any 
certain  claims regarding its innate 
resilience or  non-resilience.  But  there have 
been  examples – most  dramatically  after 
the 2011  Japan  earthquake-and-tsunami – 
that  suggest  the global supply  chain 
behaves in  a  manner  analogous to other 
complex systems.
Looking  at  other  complex  systems, three 
sources of resilience may  be especially 
promising for the supply chain:
• Diversity  (especially  in  terms of 
roles and functions);
• D e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n  ( a n d s e l f -
organization); and
• Adaptability  (even  improvisational 
and opportunistic).
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These three characteristics are closely 
related,  especially  in  terms of the resilient 
behavior they support.
Diversity  is an effective defense. The 
functional diversity  of a  system  increases 
the chance for  diversity  of response under 
stress.  If even  a  few  individuals or  sub-
groups can  effectively  adapt to the stress, 
the entire system  is more likely  to be 
preserved and have a chance for  recovery. 
The contemporary  supply  chain  has seen  a 
proliferation  of niche players,  each  with 
very  specific  functions that  contribute to 
the supply  chain’s overall health.  While 
there are fewer  competitors in  any 
p a r t i c u l a r n i c h e ( l e s s s t r u c t u r a l 
redundancy)  there has been a  significant 
increase in  niches (more functional 
diversity). This functional diversity  is a 
potentially important source of resilience.
Complex systems are innately self-
organizing. Feedback mechanisms across a 
system  facilitate the emergence of global 
p a t t e r n s f r o m  n u m e r o u s r a n d o m 
interactions among  widely  distributed 
components.  No one controls global effects. 
The global  effects are  spawned by 
spontaneous behaviors that  nonetheless 
produce patterns and rough  boundaries 
that  can  be predicted.  Especially  in  human-
related complex  systems,  dynamic 
communications among  the participants 
produce shared behaviors to which  the 
system  is attracted and around which 
system equilibrium unfolds.  
Over  the last  thirty  years,  as information 
has begun  to drive the supply  chain  as 
much  as production or  transportation, the 
supply  chain  has become more and more 
self-organizing.  Randomly  distributed 
demand information determines what 
patterns will emerge in the global supply 
chain.  While  supply  capacity  has become 
more concentrated in  fewer  players and 
places, the number  of demand signals has 
exploded and the number  of distribution 
players remains highly decentralized.  
 In  1988 Walmart  opened its first 
grocery-embedded “Supercenter.”  There 
are now  over  3,200 Walmart locations 
offering  a full line of food and related 
products.  This has transformed the grocery 
industry  and caused particular stress for 
traditional supermarkets,  such  as Kroger, 
Safeway,  and Supervalu.  But… the first 
Whole Foods Market  opened in 1980 and 
in  1988 Whole Foods began sustained 
expansion  at  the same time that Walmart 
was devouring large segments of the 
grocery  market.  Whole Foods now  has over 
300  locations and generates over  $9  billion 
in annual revenue.
In  the 1980s the McLane Company  grew 
from  a  modest regional distributor  to a 
major national provider  of food and other 
products especially  to convenience stores 
and restaurants.  In  1990 McLane was 
purchased by  Walmart. But it  was not  a 
good strategic  fit  and in 2003  McLane was 
sold to Berkshire-Hathaway  and reemerged 
as a  largely  independent enterprise. It  now 
generates over $34  billion  in  annual 
revenue distributing food mostly  to non-
grocery  stores,  the most rapidly  expanding 
segment of the grocery industry.
Walmart is certainly  the “apex  predator” 
in  the ecology  of groceries. But its 
disruptive behavior  has opened new  niches 
for  other  players. Under stress,  the 
decentralized, self-organizing character  of 
the US grocery  market has arguably 
produced greater  differentiation  and 
functional diversity.  This is a  resilient 
response.
Resilience can mitigate the negative 
c o n s e q u e n c e s  o f c h a n g e t h r o u g h 
adaptation.  Resilience expects change and 
spawns s tructura l and behaviora l 
characteristics that  accept considerable 
change as a  way  of avoiding  catastrophic 
change. Diversity  does not ensure 
successful  adaptation. A  decentralized and 
self-organizing  system  produces many  mal-
adaptive features. But  the more diverse and 
self-organizing  the system  the more likely 
the system  will generate  – nurture and 
facilitate – effective adaptation.
 In  the 1970s FedEx  emerged from  a 
deregulating transportation  sector to 
challenge many  long-time participants in 
the airfreight  business. In  just a  few  years 
the veterans experienced a catastrophe.  But 
from  the perspective of the full  eco-system 
– the US economy  and eventually  the 
global economy  – FedEx  was a  positive 
adaptation  to changing  conditions. The 
emergence of FedEx,  and other  supply 
chain  “species”  descended from  the FedEx 
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adaptation, strengthened the US supply 
chain  and national  economy  especially  by 
increasing  diversity  and self-organization 
across the supply chain.
Diversity  and self-organization  are 
inputs that  increase the likelihood of 
positive adaptation.  Effective adaptation  to 
c h a n g e – w h i l e c o n s e r v i n g  a n d 
strengthening most  attributes of the system 
– is the benefit  of resilience. But if 
adaptation  reduces diversity  and self-
organization  the adaptation is non-resilient 





Early  in  the new  century  a  senior  executive 
with  a  major  supplier  to Ford Motor 
Company  told researchers from  the 
University  of Michigan  and Arizona State 
University,  “In  my  opinion, [Ford]  seems to 
send its people to ‘hate school’ so that  they 
learn  how  to hate suppliers. The company 
is extremely  confrontational.  After  dealing 
with Ford, I decided not to buy its cars.” 9
 In  2010 the North American OEM-
Supplier Working Relations survey found:
For the first  time in the history  of the 10-
year-old study  that  looks at  the 
relationship between  automakers and 
their suppliers, a  U.S. automaker  – Ford 
– ranked in  the top three. It  was  third, 
with  Honda and Toyota in  1st  and 2nd 
place, respectively.10 
The change in  Ford’s behavior has 
several origins and reflects a broader trend.
In the 1980s,  when JIT was initially 
adopted by  many  US firms, there was much 
more attention to quantitative outcomes – 
such  as a  steep reduction  in  number of 
suppliers – than  to qualitative inputs,  such 
as the relationships between  buyer  and 
supplier.  Yet the Japanese practice of JIT 
emerged from  and depended on  very  dense 
relationships. 
A  Japanese Keiretsu  – literally  “headless 
combine”  – is a  grouping  of firms that 
collaborate in  design, sourcing,  production, 
and distribution.  They  are often  linked 
through  mutual ownership, joint  planning, 
and a  vast  web of informal connections. 
The structural  aspects of keiretsu  have 
been  long  recognized by  emulators in  the 
United States, but  the cultural  dynamics of 
these re lat ionships were not  wel l 
understood and tended to be undervalued.  
There continues to be substantive 
qualitative differences. In  2010  twenty-one 
percent  of Ford’s suppliers reported the 
automaker  used threats and retaliation  to 
get  price concessions.  Only  8  percent of 
Toyota's suppliers reported similar 
behavior. 11  The Japanese practice of JIT 
still  gives more emphasis to long-term 
relationships delivering  mutual benefit 
(voice), while the US practice continues to 
lean  toward survival-of-the-fittest  (exit). 
But  there is evidence of adaptation across 
the supply  chain  eco-system.  In  mid-2005 
John  Paul  MacDuffie and Susan  Helper 
argued:
… the “exit” vs. “voice” distinction  is no 
longer as clear as it was just twenty  years 
ago. On the “voice” side, the closed 
k e i r e t s u  s y s t e m  o f  s u p p l i e r s 
characteristic of Japanese industry has 
been  considerably opened to market 
pressures, requiring  more formalization 
and cost justification of the relationships. 
On  the other, the hard-nosed “exit” 
approach of  U.S. firms has faced 
pressure for increased collaboration to 
achieve the increased levels of quality 
demanded in the market. There has  been 
a wide range of  responses to these 
p r e s s u r e s , o f t e n m i x e d a n d 
contradictory. In  the U.S. there are 
frequent attempts to achieve the 
necessary  levels  of collaboration without 
trust; but this  approach is  marked by 
internal contradictions which, we 
believe, make it unlikely that it  can 
stabilize as a lasting model. Thus, we will 
argue, the industry is  converging from  all 
s i d e s o n a f o r m o f p r a g m a t i c 
collaboration, involving substantial  levels 
of trust, though more open and 
formalized than the traditional  Japanese 
system.12
This convergence could enhance 
diversity  and self-organization  across 
supply  chains.  The classic Japanese model 
nurtured diversity  but suppressed self-
organization.  The US approach  to 
implementing  JIT  has too often  ended up 
PALIN, SUPPLY CHAIN RESILIENCE  6
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME 9, ARTICLE  14 (AUGUST 2013) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
with  carefully  controlled – and risk-
increasing  – sole sources of supply.  While 
far  from  reflecting  mainstream  current 
practice,  there is an  increasing  realization 
that  trusted relationships – both  tactical 
and strategic – are essential  aspects of an 
effective and resilient  supply  chain. 
Trusted relationships optimize diversity 
and self-organization.
To apply  for  the Malcolm  Baldridge 
Award,  sponsored by  the National  Institute 
f o r S t a n d a r d s a n d T e c h n o l o g y , 
organizations are asked:
What are your key types  of 
s u p p l i e r s , p a r t n e r s ,  a n d 
collaborators? What role  do these 
s u p p l i e r s , p a r t n e r s ,  a n d 
collaborators  play in the production 
and delivery of your key products 
and customer support services? 
What are your key mechanisms  for 
communicating with suppliers, 
partners, and collaborators? What 
role, if any, do  these organizations 
play in implementing innovations  in 
your organization? What are your 
key supply-chain requirements?
Today  it  is difficult  for  many  supply 
chain  participants to answer these 
questions.  But  there is a  growing consensus 
that  these are important  practical 
questions.  Being  able to honestly  respond 
to these questions with  answers that  are 
strategically  predisposed to diversity  and 
self-organization  makes catastrophic 
failure less likely.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
On January  23,  2012  the president  of the 
United States released a  first-time National 
Strategy for Global Supply Chain Security. 
This initiated a  yearlong  process of private-
p u b l i c c o n s u l t a t i o n s .  F r o m  t h e s e 
discussions a  troublesome pattern  has been 
identified: For  most of the last generation 
the private sector  search  for comparative 
advantage has resulted in  a  substantial 
decrease in the supply  chain’s structural 
diversity.  Fewer  firms play  increasingly 
important roles. 
U n t i l  r e c e n t l y  t h i s s t r u c t u r a l 
concentration  in  the supply  chain  was not 
widely  recognized by  public policy-makers. 
But  as it  has become more apparent – and 
its vulnerabilities better  understood – the 
inclination  by  many  in the public sector  is 
to increase regulation.  Or  as more than one 
official said,  “We need to require more 
redundancy in the supply chain.”  
The decline of structural diversity  in  the 
supply  chain  is a  potentially  significant 
problem  that  amplifies every  threat by 
reducing  the likelihood of innovative 
responses to stress. But  an  increase in 
traditional modes of regulation  will – 
whatever  the effect  on  diversity  – reduce 
the ability  of the system  to self-organize, 
undermining  the likelihood of innovation 
under stress or  otherwise. This private-
public tug of war threatens  to wring out of 
the system two  key components of 
resilience.  This is the kind of optimizing 
that  contributes to eventual catastrophic 
failure.  This is no longer  a  supply  chain 
that  can  be yanked one way  or  another. It  is 
much  more a  spider-web,  even  more an 
ecosystem  where what  is done in  one 
corner will often  have dramatic and 
unpredictable impacts across the entire 
system.
Preserving a  system’s ability  to innovate 
is fundamental to preserving  the system’s 
overall  integrity. Failures will happen. 
Innovating  around failure is how  a complex 
adaptive system  continues to emerge.  But 
long-term  health is determined by  the sort 
of innovations and adaptations adopted. 
When diversity and self-organization are 
maximized, resilience is  nurtured. When 
diversity and self-organization are 
reduced the  next failure  is  likely to be  even 
worse.
Bureaucracies,  both  public  and private, 
tend to be suspicious of innovation. There 
is an  inclination to respond to problems 
with  predictable procedures. As procedures 
accumulate,  small  failures are suppressed 
and, in many  complex adaptive systems, 
the likelihood of catastrophic  failure is 
increased. It  doesn’t  matter  if the 
procedural  suppression  of innovation  is 
imposed by  government regulation  or 
internal management, non-resilience is the 
outcome.
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The Implementation Update for  the 
National Strategy for Global Supply Chain 
Security (February  2013) signals a 
continuing coordination role by  White 
House National Security  staff and a 
private-public supply  chain  working group 
staffed and hosted by  one of the cabinet 
departments. This could be helpful. It 
might  be a  waste of time. Over  time it could 
become dangerous. Much  depends on 
behavior  and that is a  reflection  of who and 
how and why.
The presumption when private  and 
public meet is  – whatever the stated 
purpose – the eventual agenda relates  to 
rule  making and boundary setting by the 
government.  As  such,  the process  is 
subversive to diversity,  self-organization, 
innovation,  and resilience.  “Evidence has 
accumulated that  externally  imposed rules 
t e n d t o “ c r o w d o u t ” e n d o g e n o u s 
cooperative behavior.” 13  Stakeholder 
cooperation in  setting  norms is especially 
important in  dynamic  systems such as the 
supply  chain. In complex  adaptive systems 
rules and boundaries quickly  lose influence 
without active self-monitoring  and 
sanctioning  by  those involved day-in and 
day-out,  even  minute-by-minute, within 
the system.  Some studies have found that 
externally  focused regulation can  even 
“undermine subsequent  cooperation”  in 
developing norms.14
Put another  way: When  dealing  with  a 
complex adaptive system  rule breaking  can 
be sanctioned after  the fact by  external 
rule-makers. But if prevention of rule 
breaking  is the goal  the rules must be 
developed and enforced by  system 
participants. 
The global supply  chain  has become a 
complex adaptive system. As with  most 
complex adaptive systems – and especially 
human-influenced systems – it  is self-
optimizing. If and when optimization 
reduces diversity  and self-organization  the 
possibility  of catastrophic  failure increases. 
Most  evidence suggests this is the current 
trend-line for the global supply chain.
Government action focusing on 
traditional approaches  to regulation 
would accelerate  the  movement toward 
catastrophe.  But  there is another  option. 
Social manifestations of complex  adaptive 
systems can  be influenced by  intentional 
social behavior.  Precisely  because 
government  is not engaged as a competitor 
or  vendor  in  the supply  chain (and is  an 
important  customer),  the government 
could serve as a  facilitator  or  honest  broker 
of boundary-setting,  rule-making, and 
system  sanctioning by  supply  chain 
stakeholders themselves.
The Cross-Sector  Supply  Chain Working 
Group called for  in  the White House 
Implementation  Plan could become neutral 
ground for  ongoing  communication among 
supply  chain  stakeholders. The National 
Security  staff official(s)  assigned to 
coordinate this process would certainly  not 
be any  kind of White House Czar. In  most 
ways s/he would need to be  an anti-Czar,  a 
latter-day  Metternich  composing and 
facilitating  a supply  chain  world symphony 
with  as much  skill as the old Count 
conducted the Concert of Europe.
This is unlikely.  Count Metternich  was 
unique and the complexity  of Post-
Napoleonic Europe pales in  comparison 
with  the modern  supply  chain.  Catastrophe 
is much  more likely  and from  the collapse 
of market-leaders, nation-states,  and 
legacy  systems something better may 
emerge. This is the role of catastrophe.
If supply  chain  catastrophe is to be 
avoided or  mitigated diversity  and self-
organization  must  be optimized. This 
combination  – diversity, self-organization, 
leading  to innovation  and adaptation  – is 
the strange attractor  at  the heart  of the 
s u p p l y  c h a i n ’ s r e v o l u t i o n a r y 
transformation.  The deeper  the system’s 
diversity  and the more inclusive its self-
organization  the greater  the system’s 
resilience.
Can  the anti-Czar  remember  this? Can  a 
private-public panel behave consistently 
with  this purpose and direction? Can  a 
complex adaptive system  fail and innovate 
and fail some more, skating along the cusp 
of catastrophe but  always sliding  back  into 
the deep basin  of divers i ty , se l f -
organization, and innovation?
Back  to Metternich: In his early  text,  A 
World Restored,  a  young  Henry  Kissinger 
explains how  the Austrian  Count  and 
others crafted the Concert of Europe.
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…the spirit of policy  and that of 
bureaucracy are diametrically  opposed. 
The essence of policy  is  its contingency; 
its success depends on  the correctness of 
an estimate which is  in part conjectural. 
The essence of bureaucracy is  its quest 
for  safety; its success is  calculability. 
Profound policy  thrives on  perpetual 
creation, on a  constant redefinition  of 
goals. Good administration thrives on 
routine, the definition  of relationships 
which  can survive mediocrity. Policy 
involves an adjustment of risks; 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n a n  a v o i d a n c e o f 
deviation. Policy  justifies itself by  the 
relationship of its measures  and its  sense 
of proportion; administration by the 
rationality of each action in  terms of a 
given goal.15
If supply  chain  resilience is to be 
achieved it  must  remain  a  matter  of policy 
rather  than  administration.  Supply  chain 
r e s i l i e n c e w i l l n o t  b e a c h i e v e d 
bureaucratically, but it  can be crafted 
through  the intelligent  self-conscious give-
and-take of authentic private-public 
c o l l a b o r a t i o n  i n  p o l i c y - m a k i n g . 
Bureaucratic  behavior  – whether  it 
originates in  corporate or  government 
offices – threatens the supply  chain.  Non-
b u r e a u c r a t i c  p o l i c y  m a k e r s w h o 
persistently  nourish  diversity,  self-
organization, and innovation  will  enable 
the modern supply  chain  – and all  its 
benefits – to flourish.
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